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DEFENCE
CR Gas
Mr. Livingstone: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what reasons CR gas was selected from the available riot control gases to be stockpiled for the counter-terrorist response capability. [63844]
Mr. Spellar:
CR gas was selected some decades ago as a potential counter-terrorist response capability and there are no surviving records of this decision. However,
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stocks of CR gas continue to be held as tests have confirmed it to be effective as a potential counter-terrorist response capability.
Mr. Livingstone:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much CR tear gas has been manufactured by his Department since 1968; and at which establishment it was manufactured. [63843]
Mr. Spellar:
The riot control agent CR was only ever manufactured by the MOD at the Chemical Defence Establishment at Nancekuke, Cornwall, between 1962 and 1977. On the closure of Nancekuke and the subsequent return of the site to the RAF, the remaining stocks of CR were transferred to the Chemical and Biological Defence Sector of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency at Porton Down.
It is not possible to determine from the remaining records exactly how much CR was manufactured after 1968.
Mr. Sanders:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will list the recruitment totals from 1990 to the present for each TA centre in Devon, Cornwall, Dorset and Somerset. [64464]
Mr. Spellar:
This information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Mr. Cousins:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) if he will list the countries with which there are Government to Government Defence contracts paid for in oil in the last five years; and when the memoranda of understanding with those countries were signed; [64636]
Mr. Spellar:
There have been no Government to Government Defence contracts paid for in the last five years, which involve Her Majesty's Government taking oil as payment.
Ms Dari Taylor:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what key targets have been set for the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre for 1998-99. [65079]
Mr. Doug Henderson:
The role of the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre is to produce imagery intelligence and imagery products and services to meet MOD and operational command requirements. The Key Targets for the Agency for the 12 months from April 1998 are as set out.
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(2) if there are guide prices for oil established within the memoranda of understanding with states purchasing defence equipment from the United Kingdom with oil risings; and what measures are in place to protect defence contractors and public funds from variations in oil prices. [64640]
Key Target 1:
To provide operational intelligence support as follows:
98 per cent. of Priority 1 tasks to be completed within 24 hours of the receipt of appropriate imagery.
92 per cent. of Priority 2 tasks to be completed within 48 hours of the receipt of appropriate imagery.
88 per cent. of Priority 3 tasks to be completed within 7 days of the receipt of appropriate imagery.
Key Target 2:
To provide detached Service personnel as required up to a total of 22 at any one time.
Key Target 3:
To complete Strategic, non-operational, intelligence requirements and other tasks as follows:
92 per cent. of Priority 1 tasks to be completed within 24 hours of the receipt of appropriate imagery.
88 per cent. of Priority 2 tasks to be completed within 48 hours of the receipt of appropriate imagery.
80 per cent. of Priority 3 tasks to be completed within 7 days of the receipt of appropriate imagery.
75 per cent. of Priority 4 tasks to be completed within 6 weeks of the receipt of appropriate imagery.
Key Target 4:
To revise the methodology of measuring the degree of customer satisfaction with the service provided.
Key Target 5:
To achieve a 2.5 per cent. improvement in efficiency.
Key Target 6:
To conduct evaluation of reconnaissance systems for MOD and other Governments within agreed times and allocated resources.
Defence Animal Centre
Ann Keen: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what key targets have been set for the Chief Executive of the Defence Animal Centre for 1998-99. [64742]
Mr. Doug Henderson: The Chief Executive of the Defence Animal Centre has been set the following Key Targets for 1998-1999.
- 1. Meet 100 per cent. of the requirements for trained military personnel and trained military working animals for operations.
- 2. To achieve a customer satisfaction rating of at least 95 per cent. for the quality of its trained output.
- 3. To achieve a customer satisfaction rating of at least 95 per cent. of the quantity of its trained output.
- 4. To achieve a customer satisfaction rating of at least 95 per cent. for the timeliness of delivery.
- 5. Meet course specific training success rates for Military Working Animals of at least 95 per cent.
- 6. Meet training success rates for personnel of at least 90 per cent.
Trident
Mrs. Ewing: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on changes to the Strategic Defence Review decision to cancel the final tranche of Trident nuclear missiles; and what value of Trident missile components have been purchased from the USA since the Strategic Defence Review. [65042]
Mr. George Robertson:
There has been no change to the Strategic Defence Review decision to cancel the planned final batch of Trident D5 missiles. Since the SDR, we have authorised $100.6m for US fiscal year 99 procurement of Trident missile components as announced in my written answer of 30 July 1998, Official Report, column 453. Some of these relate to the completion of earlier missile orders; of the remainder, some will be required as in service spares and the balance will be sold back to the US in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding that I announced on 30 July 1998, Official
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Report
Mrs. Ewing: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make it his policy to store the warhead component separately from the missile delivery vehicles of the Trident nuclear system. [65044]
Mr. George Robertson: We concluded in the SDR that storing Trident warheads separately from the missiles would be incompatible in current circumstances with maintaining a credible minimum deterrent with a submarine-based nuclear system.
Mrs. Ewing: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the arrangements for the provision of spare and replacement parts for the Trident nuclear missile system, indicating in how many cases there is a single supplier of spare or replacement parts. [65041]
Mr. George Robertson: The Trident missile system was procured off the shelf from the United States under the provisions of the Polaris Sales Agreement of 1963, as amended for Trident. Missile system components, including spares and replacement parts, are procured on our behalf by the US Department of Defence (DoD). For most elements of the system, the DoD uses Prime Contractors (for example, for the missile itself the prime contractor is Lockheed Martin Missile Systems) who in turn employ numerous sub-contractors. Because of the nature of the procurement, we do not have detailed visibility of the sub-contractor network, but I can say that for most major components single suppliers are employed because of the high costs of supplier qualification and the low levels of production now remaining.
Mrs. Ewing: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make it his policy to rule out a first-strike use of the UK's Trident missiles. [65045]
Mr. George Robertson: In conducting the Strategic Defence Review, we concluded that such a policy of No First Use of Nuclear weapons would be incompatible with our and NATO's doctrine of deterrence, and that it would not further nuclear disarmament.
Correspondence
Mr. Maples: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon will receive a substantive reply to his question to which a holding answer was given on 2 December. [64733]
Mr. Spellar: I replied to the hon. Member on 16 December 1998, Official Report, column 520.
UN Volunteer Force
Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what forces Her Majesty's Government have on stand-by for United Nations duty; how rapidly they can be deployed in an emergency; and what consideration he has given to improving their (a) training and (b) readiness; [64956]
- (2) if he will make it his policy to support the creation of a permanent UN Volunteer Force. [64957]
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Mr. Doug Henderson: The Government do not support the concept of a permanent United Nations Volunteer Force because it would involve duplicating expensive capabilities that already exist among member states, and because it would be impractical to create a single force that could cater for every eventuality. We believe the most effective way to provide the UN with military support is through the Secretary-General's Standby Arrangements initiative. Since 1994, the United Kingdom has declared a range of forces to be potentially available under the United Nations' Standby Forces Planning Arrangement to facilitate the rapid deployment of forces once political decisions on their use have been made. Following last year's Strategic Defence Review, we have decided to strengthen our commitment by declaring the whole range of our rapidly deployable forces as potentially available to the United Nations. This will be formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding which we plan to have ready for signature by March this year.
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