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Mr. John Randall (Uxbridge): We are all aware of the sanctions and threats that have been used against Belgrade. As the Foreign Secretary said that responsibility for the breakdown of the ceasefire could be placed equally with the Yugoslav forces and the KLA, what sanctions and threats could be used against the KLA?
Mr. Cook: We have vigorously denounced the KLA in just about every international forum. We have also, through Security Council resolutions, called on states neighbouring Kosovo and on others in Europe to act to try to cut off the flow of both funds and weapons to the KLA. We are actively reviewing what more we can do to apply pressure to the choke points in the supply of weapons to the KLA. We are not dealing with a state or, indeed, an organisation with any clear political leadership or representation, so it is much more difficult to apply effective pressure, especially when the KLA refuses to take part in negotiations.
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): I thank my right hon. Friend for the tone and caution of his statement. If there is to be a 96-hour warning period before military action--if that happens, heaven help us--will there be an opportunity for a serious discussion in the House of Commons on a matter that has great long-term consequences? What is the attitude of the west towards the further break-up of the Yugoslav state? What is our policy on that?
Mr. Cook: First, I want to clarify one point because I would not want the House to be under any misapprehension: the 96 hours to which I referred is the period of notice in which planes are on standby; it is not necessarily the same as a 96-hour warning period. I have reported to the House repeatedly on the situation in Kosovo and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, and I can give my hon. Friend an undertaking that we will certainly continue to do that before events achieve any worse momentum than at present.
My hon. Friend asked about a break-up. The position taken by the international community in all its different manifestations--including the European Union, the Contact Group and the Security Council--is that we do not support independence for Kosovo. That is partly because the countries in the neighbourhood would
strongly resent and resist any attempt to establish an independent Kosovo because of the destabilising effect on themselves--and we should always remember that the agenda of the KLA is not independence for Kosovo, but a Greater Albania. It would also have an effect in Bosnia about which all hon. Members should be concerned: it would be very difficult to resist the demand of Republika Srpska for independence if Kosovo were to succeed in achieving it.
For all those reasons, we have resisted the callsfor independence for Kosovo, but the persistent non-compliance by President Milosevic, and atrocities such as those that happened this weekend at Racak, make it extremely difficult for us to convince the people of Kosovo that they have a future short of independence.
Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood):
Notwithstanding the Foreign Secretary's last remark--and I recognise the importance of the statement that he has made in the vexatious circumstances following the gruesome massacre in Racak--I hope that he will not preclude any ultimate political outcome. Although the interim period is for three years, the right hon. Gentleman has not defined or clarified in any meaningful sense the objective that the Government are working to achieve at the end of that period. Could it not be that, eventually, self-determination will prove to be the only durable settlement?
Mr. Cook:
The Christopher Hill paper contains provision for a review at the end of that three-year period. However, the contention over how strong that review should be is at the heart of the disagreement between Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians about the Hill paper. It will be difficult to find an outcome in which both sides can agree to common words in the review at the end of the three-year interim period, yet I believe that the immediate way forward for the Kosovar Albanians is to engage in the process of creating autonomous, self-governing and democratic institutions during that period. It is very frustrating that, so far, we have been unable to construct an Albanian negotiating team that is willing even to discuss that.
Mr. Vernon Coaker (Gedling):
Will my right hon. Friend continue to take the strongest possible action to ensure that President Milosevic is aware of our horror at what has happened and our determination to act when necessary?
I was in Kosovo a few weeks before Christmas with UNICEF. Although we are talking today about the horror that occurred at Racak, the horror in Kosovo has been going on for months. Many people there feel that the Serbian Government's aim is to cleanse Kosovo of the ethnic Albanians.
Mr. Cook:
My hon. Friend is absolutely right to stress the widespread suffering and hardship experienced in Kosovo as a result of the repression organised by Belgrade. Among the most distressing features of the security force's actions last autumn were the destruction of the harvest in the fields and the shooting of farm animals in their barns. There is no doubt that the intention was to make it more difficult for the Kosovar Albanians to get through the winter.
We remain strongly committed to humanitarian relief and, as a nation, we are doing as much as any other to support such work in Kosovo. Events such as those of last weekend make it much more difficult to get on top of the problem. We believe that at least 5,500 additional refugees were created in the region by those events.
Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury):
Will the Foreign Secretary bear in mind the words of the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), who reminded the House that horrible atrocities are being perpetrated in a number of countries and that Britain cannot become the world's policeman? Are we not faced with just another example of Britain committing our overstretched armed forces to a mission that lacks a clear and long-term military objective? What would the Foreign Secretary tell the wife, mother or family of a member of the British verification team if that member were seized by a kidnapping group, given that he would not have had any kind of weapon with which to defend himself?
Mr. Cook:
I must tell the hon. Gentleman that there is no question of Britain being the world's policeman, but we are proud of the way in which we play our part and make a major contribution to the world community. We participate in events in the former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and in Kosovo as a member of the North Atlantic alliance and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. We cannot expect to retain our position as a permanent member of that council--and the respect that goes with it--and as a major member of the North Atlantic alliance if we are not willing to take part in actions when mounting such actions is deemed necessary.
In respect of the hon. Gentleman's question about the Kosovo verification mission, it is not for me to answer on my own--it is also for the mission's members. In a spirit of humility, I refer the hon. Gentleman to the various statements that they have made over the weekend, in which they have made it clear that they are determined to get on with the job, that they are sorry to have pulled out of Racak and that they are proud of what they are doing. I think that we should be proud of them.
Mr. Malcolm Wicks (Croydon, North):
Is it not extraordinary and tragic that a 20th century that was scarred by Nazi genocide is ending not only with the recent genocide in Bosnia, but with the current atrocities in Kosovo? Despite the complexities, which we understand, is there not one common factor--Milosevic himself, who, time and again, has shown himself to be the puppet master of evil in the former Yugoslavia? Why do we treat him as a statesman and not name him as a war criminal? Would the Government support efforts by the International War Crimes Tribunal to try Milosevic for his crimes, for which he is responsible?
Mr. Cook:
It is for the prosecutor of the International War Crimes Tribunal to decide whether to indict any citizen or politician in the former Yugoslavia, and that is a matter that that body must address. If any member of the regime in Belgrade or elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia were to be indicted, we would, as we do on all other occasions, support the tribunal's right to make that indictment and support the case for a trial.
However, the important aspect of my hon. Friend's question is not simply the issue of the personal responsibility of President Milosevic, but the
backward-looking and poisonous ethnic hatred that makes up the politics of so much of the regime in Belgrade. That is why, as part of our response to the problems of Kosovo and Bosnia, we have persistently said that there must be freedom of expression, a free media and genuine and meaningful democracy in Serbia as a condition of Serbia taking its place in the modern world and the modern Europe.
Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East):
In endorsing every word of the question asked by the hon. Member for Croydon, North (Mr. Wicks), may I ask the Foreign Secretary whether he and his advisers believe that President Milosevic either authorised, or at least approved after the event, the massacre that has just taken place? If the right hon. Gentleman thinks that President Milosevic backs those terrible murders, what does he think the motivation is? Could it be to terrorise the local population, to drive them out of Kosovo, or even to test NATO so that Milosevic can see how many murders NATO is prepared to put up with before taking action, as it eventually and belatedly did in Bosnia?
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