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Mr. Leigh: The Minister will therefore want to reassure us that what he is giving with one hand, his friends at the Treasury will not take back with the other.
Mr. Bayley: The hon. Gentleman will be aware of what the Chancellor said in the Budget last year. There is no proposal at the moment to tax child benefit.
There has, perhaps inevitably, been no consensus during our wide-ranging debate, but it is clear, at least to Labour, that we must proceed with the welfare reform debate. We are committed to change, but it must be change rooted in fairness, and it must provide opportunities for people who are currently denied work.
I hope that the House will welcome the orders. They provide protection and continuing security for claimants, and a record increase for recipients of child benefit, emphasising that the Government put first the needs of children. They also provide the minimum income guarantee for the most vulnerable pensioners, and that will provide a substantial boost to weekly income--almost £5 a week for single pensioners, and £7 a week for couples. They will also add to dignity and security in retirement. I commend the orders to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.--[Mr. Kevin Hughes.]
Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed):
On the afternoon of 8 June 1940, two German battle cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, sighted a wisp of smoke on the arctic horizon. Two hours later, the carrier HMS Glorious and her two escorting destroyers, Ardent and Acasta, had been sunk. More than 1,500 lives were lost, qualifying the incident as one of the worst naval disasters of the second world war.
I have no direct personal link with the tragedy, but some of my constituents do. A cousin of mine was close by, serving as a rating in the escort party to the Norwegian royal family and the diplomatic corps as they embarked for evacuation on HMS Devonshire, which features in the story that I am about to unfold. He was never able to tell me about these events, because he was lost with almost the entire complement of HMS Hood a year later, another tragedy with a similarly massive loss of life.
My constituent Mr. Sam Farrington lost his brother, who was only 17 when he went down with the Glorious. Another constituent of mine was Captain Nick Barker, who died not long after retiring to Northumberland. He famously commanded HMS Endurance at the time of the Falklands war. He lost his father, Lieutenant Commander Ben Barker, who was in command of HMS Ardent. Nick's son produced a television programme about the event, which appeared in the "Secret History" series on Channel 4.
Those family members, and others, have written to me from all over the country, and they have convinced me that the official history of the tragedy needs to be revised to take account of what has subsequently come to light.
For many years, those people have been deeply troubled by the belief that the loss of their loved ones has not been properly explained. No one is looking, after all these years, for blame or retribution, but where a supreme sacrifice has been made on such a scale, the record should surely be as accurate as possible. An unconvincing explanation produced in conditions of war should no longer be given unchallenged official approval.
The families have aroused the interest of several hon. Members. The hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), who is here, my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten) and the hon. Member for East Londonderry (Mr. Ross) have all spoken or written to me. The Admiralty, and now the Ministry of Defence, always maintained that the sinkings were merely an unfortunate accident of war. A significant number of naval historians continue to suggest what the few survivors and the relatives have long suspected--that a catalogue of errors and misjudgments culminated in the tragic events of that afternoon.
On 8 June, HMS Glorious and its two escorting destroyers were heading for Scapa Flow, having left the coast of northern Norway that morning. At about 4 o'clock, two German battle cruisers were spotted on the starboard horizon. Unable to launch its protective aircraft into the wind without turning straight towards the enemy, Glorious sent out her first radio signal at 16.15, fired up
the boilers, which had been shut down, and slowly increased to full speed in an attempt to run to the south-east.
Shortly afterwards, one of the battle cruisers opened fire with terrifying accuracy. Following several direct hits, the order to abandon ship was eventually given at about 17.20. Ardent was sunk at 17.28, and at 18.08 Acasta joined her. The bravery of the men of the doomed destroyers was later vividly praised by German crew members from the Scharnhorst. In the programme, one was quoted as saying:
Two Members of Parliament who suspected that the sinkings might not have been only another tragic accident of war first expressed disquiet about the explanation for what had happened in this House in the summer of 1940. In 1946, when morale and security were no longer paramount with the war over, Labour MP Richard Stokes asked the First Lord of the Admiralty
The official account given by the Admiralty in Hansard on 8 May 1946 has remained almost unaltered to this day. It has frequently been criticised by naval historians and some naval officers for raising opinion and conjecture to the level of fact and for failing to give an adequate explanation of the main areas of controversy.
Why was Glorious returning home independently of the main convoy? Why was she so badly prepared? Why was her air power not used even for reconnaissance? Was there not sufficient intelligence about German activity in the region to suggest that Glorious should have been in a much greater state of readiness? Could HMS Devonshire have helped the stricken vessel or did its commander have no idea of what was happening?
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow):
I welcome profoundly the fact that the right hon. Gentleman has raised this matter. If they still exist, should not the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet be made available? That would be important, because the film put the captain in a bad light. I wonder whether that is fair.
Mr. Beith:
Those are among the records that should be readily available to the naval historical branch. The point can be pursued after the debate.
The list of those who cast doubt on the explanation of the Admiralty and the MOD is distinguished. It is headed by the First Sea Lord of the day, Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound, who in 1940 questioned whether Glorious was suitably prepared for such an encounter. Aware from survivors that she had no reconnaissance aircraft aloft, no aircraft ready on deck, and no proper lookouts, and that her crew were at only the fourth level of readiness, he wrote in an Admiralty file:
The MOD's naval historical branch, apparently unaware that Roskill had changed his mind about what happened, used his official war history as recently as 1997 to support its theory that a lack of fuel was fundamental to Glorious's decision to depart from Norway. There has never been supporting evidence that fuel was the reason for Glorious's independent return from Norway. The arithmetic of Glorious's ton-mile figures would seem to torpedo the MOD's certainty. Furthermore, if a ship is low on fuel--as Glorious was, with up to a third of her boilers shut down--she cannot raise full power and speed in an emergency. She was a lightly armed and thinly armoured second world war carrier, but she should not have proceeded independently. Had she remained under the protection of other warships, she would have been steaming at convoy speed, which would have consumed less fuel.
The truth may lie in a different direction. HMS Glorious may well have become detached from the greater safety of the convoy because of a serious breakdown in relations among her senior officers. She was an unhappy ship. Her commander, D'Oyly Hughes, was a brave and distinguished veteran of submarine warfare in the1914-18 war, but he seems to have been unsuited to commanding a carrier. He was ill at ease with the role of air power at sea and seemed unable to work with officers
experienced in, and responsible for, air operations from his ship. Tensions ran high. After a major dispute he put ashore his Commander, Flying, J.B. Heath, and was preparing to court martial both Heath and Lieutenant Commander Slessor. Lieutenant Commander Slessor had written a despairing letter to his wife saying,
Lieutenant Commander Slessor perished in the sinking. Commander Heath was cleared of all charges and continued his distinguished service in other sectors, finishing as Commanding Officer of HMS Heron at Yeovilton.
In 1968, Commander Le Geyt, one-time captain of the destroyer Diana, wrote in an Admiralty file that he had seen Glorious send a long signal by lamp to her Admiral in Ark Royal asking permission
In 1978, Sir Harry Hinsley, an historian and vice-chancellor of Cambridge, wrote the official story of British intelligence in world war two. He states that, during the 10 days prior to the Glorious' sinking, Bletchley Park--where, as a young man, he analysed German naval wireless traffic--repeatedly informed the Admiralty that analysis of the traffic indicated that German "main units" were likely to emerge from the Baltic and proceed to Norwegian waters. He tells how that intelligence was ignored and consequently, in his words:
At 16.25, Devonshire's log states, "Exercised main armament"--the first time that all her 8-in turrets had been exercised in more than a month, and at almost the same time as a petty officer on Devonshire claims that he received an audible signal from Glorious. To man all one's 8-in guns is indicative of a perceived surface threat, as they are not much use against aeroplanes. The official explanation for the exercising of the main armaments has been that it was coincidental to the time of Glorious' signals. That seems too much of a coincidence.
Similarly odd is that, during her passage of 1,300 miles, Devonshire travelled at almost top speed only once. That occurred within four minutes of Glorious' last signal at 17.19, just before she was sunk, when Devonshire's log states "Increased to 30 knots", which was probably her maximum speed, and for seven minutes "Negative zig-zag". That speed was held for two hours, until she reduced to 26 knots. Why did she accelerate if she found the signal "unintelligible" and--according to the Admiralty--did not even know where Glorious was? Would she not have feared that, by doing so, she was accelerating into danger? The MOD has suggested that the unusual behaviour demonstrated by Devonshire that afternoon was coincidental to Glorious' signals, but it seems more likely that she gleaned sufficient information from a supposedly "almost unintelligible" signal to be worried about something.
Those who inquire of the MOD what actually happened that afternoon will be sent a paper called "Points of Controversy". The covering letter states that there is
Two of the key participants in the covering letter were Fleet Air Arm squadron commanding officers in Ark Royal. One of them, Commander Casson, denies that he was involved in any way in any of the decisions or actions surrounding Glorious's early departure for home or in the subsequent circumstances of her sinking. He was not even asked by the MOD if he could be cited as a key participant, and he expressed surprise when he found out
that the MOD was using him as a supporting witness. Commander Casson's colleague was no closer to the seat of decision making that day. In short, while both may have valid contributions to make on Fleet Air Arm practice and procedures of the 1940s, neither was involved, directly or indirectly, in what happened.
One of the other key participants was Stanley Rogers, a telegraphist on Devonshire, who testifies that he heard nearly all of Glorious's enemy report. The MOD, by contrast, claims that the signalman supports its contention that the signal was almost unintelligible. He wrote to the MOD in an effort to set the record straight. The recollections of another key participant, who was also a signalman, are also at variance with the MOD's account.
The covering letter sent by the MOD also states that official conclusions have been reached following
That the draft Social Security (Contributions) (Re-rating and National Insurance Fund Payments) Order 1999, which was laid before this House on 13th January, be approved.
Resolved,
That the draft Social Security Benefits Up-rating Order 1999, which was laid before this House on 13th January, be approved.--[Mr. Darling.]
Resolved,
That the draft Guaranteed Minimum Pensions Increase Order 1999, which was laid before this House on 13th January, be approved.--[Mr. Darling.]
Resolved,
That the draft Social Security Benefits Up-rating (No. 2) Order 1999, which was laid before this House on 26th January, be approved.--[Mr. Darling.]
Resolved,
That the Open-Ended Investment Companies (Investment Companies with Variable Capital) (Fees) Regulations 1998(S.I., 1998, No. 3087), dated 9th December 1998, a copy of which was laid before this House on 10th December, be approved.
28 Jan 1999 : Column 563
Resolved,
That the Companies (Fees) (Amendment) Regulations 1998(S.I., 1998, No. 3088), dated 9th December 1998, a copy of which was laid before this House on 10th December, be approved.--[Mr. Kevin Hughes.]
That the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice No. 5) Order 1998, dated 8th December 1998, a copy of which was laid before this House on 15th December, be approved.--[Mr. Kevin Hughes.]
Resolved,
That the draft Legal Aid (Prescribed Panels) Regulations 1998, which were laid before this House on 16th December, be approved.--[Mr. Kevin Hughes.]
28 Jan 1999 : Column 564
6.28 pm
"Our flags flew at half mast and the whole bridge stood to attention because of the courage of the English sailors".
Only 41 survivors were picked up after two days in the icy waters.
"when the promised report on the loss of H.M.S. "Glorious" and her attendant destroyers will be published.--[Official Report, 8 May 1946; Vol. 422, c. 1050.]
Pressure was growing in the Admiralty for a full inquiry into the sinking, but in a memorandum that came to light many years later, R. Powell, head of military branch, advised strongly against a detailed investigation. He wrote:
"A full report at this date would make very dismal reading and would invite Mr. Stokes or other MPs to ask why this or that was not done."
We are still asking those questions 60 years later.
"Glorious seems to have forgotten that she was a Man o' War"
--a comment that hardly sits comfortably with the official explanation that the disaster was due to a series of misfortunes rather than errors. A naval historian later wrote:
"An aircraft carrier not operating her aircraft is one of the most helpless things afloat."
In 1948, in his history of the second world war, Winston Churchill expressed his doubts about the reason given for HMS Glorious leaving the relative safety of a convoy of ships to head home independently. The official reason, still expressed today, is that the ship needed to return to Britain because she was running low on fuel. Churchill wrote:
"This explanation is not convincing. The Glorious presumably had enough fuel to steam at the speed of the convoy."
In 1970, Captain Roskill, who had earlier written the Navy's official and authoritative war history, expressed his view about why Glorious left the convoy. Following preliminary research, he wrote a letter to a senior member of the staff at the Royal Naval Staff College at Greenwich and said:
"the shortage of fuel theory is bunkum".
Ten years later and after much more detailed work, he took the debate further in a long article that appeared in The Times. He stated:
"The answer is distressing. The Admiralty has tried to suppress the truth for 40 years, but it looks as though 1,515 men were killed partly as a result of a whole chain of Admiralty errors".
The same man, 20 years earlier, had been charged with the responsibility of writing the official history of the Royal Navy.
"J.B. and I are in great trouble. I can't tell you the story but you'll guess the cause of it. It was bound to come sooner or later I suppose, and perhaps it's a good thing. I needn't tell where right lies, nor that my conscience is absolutely clear, but we do need your thoughts and prayers very much."
That was a message from a man serving on a very unhappy ship.
"to part company and proceed ahead to Scapa Flow for the purposes of making preparations for the impending courts martial."
Why would that signal have been sent if fuel was really the reason for Glorious to leave the convoy? D'Oyly Hughes' known state of mind and the implausibility of the fuel theory lend credibility to the alternative explanation.
"The Glorious was caught unprepared".
In attempting to counter Sir Harry, the MOD's naval historical branch drew attention to what it felt was an inconsistency between his more recent comments and those found in his official history. The NHB pointed to a sentence in that history which reads:
"It is not difficult to understand the Admiralty's scepticism. Traffic Analysis was an untested technique and one that yielded only broad and inferential clues."
What the MOD did not draw attention to was Sir Harry's very next sentence, which reads:
"But . . . although the evidence of Traffic Analysis was unsupported by other indications, the (Navy's) Operational Intelligence Office had no good reason for resisting Bletchley Park's suggestion that it should at least issue a qualified warning to the Fleet."
That differs sharply from the MOD's 1997 comment paper, called "Points of Controversy", which asserts:
"There was no indication from any source that a powerful German squadron was preparing for a sortie."
That statement is wrong. At this point, we are not arguing about alternative theories; it is a matter of fact, and the comment paper should be corrected on that point. In a letter written shortly before he died last year, Sir Harry wrote:
"The Admiralty later realised that it had made a mistake".
28 Jan 1999 : Column 568
Indeed, it was his view that lessons were learnt from the mistake and that much greater attention was given to the results of traffic analysis thereafter, with considerable benefit gained.
What of events surrounding the incident itself? Glorious sent several signals during the engagement, but the MOD has claimed that, although the nearby HMS Devonshire did pick up one of those signals, it was "garbled", "corrupt" and "almost unintelligible". The Devonshire was under instructions to maintain radio silence. On board were the King of Norway and the Norwegian Cabinet, so there are legitimate questions as to what she could have done to help the stricken vessel. However, that radio silence was broken 12 hours later, when Devonshire checked on an expected escort. More important is that five members of Devonshire's crew have testified that the signals from Glorious were far from unintelligible. Despite differing in the detail, all five were adamant that the signal was sufficiently clear to cause considerable consternation on Devonshire's bridge.
"sufficient collateral evidence received by this department from key participants to permit reasonable conclusions to be drawn and convincing explanations to be given for the sequence of events."
I suggest that there are reasonable conclusions and convincing explanations--long advanced by respected naval historians--that are different from those advanced to this day by the MOD.
"exhaustive analysis of all available records."
It has subsequently become clear that that really means analysis of all official records--those held by the Admiralty. For example, it does not include the Roskill papers in the Churchill archives in Cambridge, which are a good source of information containing all of Roskill's research into the controversy.
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