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Mr. John Burnett (Torridge and West Devon): Is there any evidence, other than the hearsay evidence provided by the MOD connected with receipts of signals by Devonshire, that the signalling equipment in HMS Glorious was defective?
Mr. Beith: I know of no such evidence, although there is testimony as to the difficulty of reading some of the signals. However, there is strong evidence that they were far from unintelligible, both in the recollections that I have quoted and the fact that there appears to have been a response by Devonshire to what must have been worrying indications in those signals.
As I was saying, several well-known naval historians have cast doubt on the official version. They ask other questions that are too numerous to raise in a short debate. I cannot believe that the Ministry of Defence would suggest that it has, in its in-house naval historical branch, a monopoly of competent or credible naval historians, or that they are uniquely qualified to arrive at the true version of what happened.
I have great respect for the knowledge and diligence of those in the naval historical branch and the care that they have taken in responding to letters from me and in assisting Ministers to do so in the two years that I have been involved in the matter. However, they can be wrong or, as in this case, too zealous in defending conclusions reached in more difficult times with less information than we have now.
The sinking of HMS Glorious and her escort ships took place almost 60 years ago. Definitive conclusions may never be reached. All the surviving evidence is freely available, yet respected naval historians have consistently
come to conclusions different from those of the MOD. The few remaining survivors and the relatives of those who were lost, many of whom have written to me, are entitled to an open and public recognition in the official account that there are other viable explanations for what happened.
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow):
The House owes a debt to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) for raising this subject.
I shall explain my own locus in this matter, such as it is. As a child, I repeatedly saw Glorious in the Firth of Forth, because she was often based at Rosyth. My parents had friends on the ship. I recollect their extreme distress when it was sunk, since many of the crew who had been with the ship since 1938 or 1939 were on board.
I ought to declare two other loci. I was taught by the late and wonderful Sir Harry Hinsley, who talked about this matter. I used to go to see him, especially during the Falklands war and afterwards, in the master's lodge of St. John's college, Cambridge. That relationship lasted until he died. I was also a student friend of Tim Slessor who, along with Mr. Harrison, has done so much work on the film. I was very sorry for Captain D'Oyly Hughes's daughter, who was obviously put in a very difficult position over the film, and naturally came to her father's defence.
I should like to put gently--it is very difficult to be wise after the event--a point made by Tim Slessor, which I have given in writing to the Minister and his advisers:
Slessor says:
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Spellar):
I apologise to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and to hon. Members who have spoken and the rest of the House--although one term almost encapsulates the other--for the state of my voice. I hope that it lasts until the end of my speech.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) that we are grateful to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) for raising the issue of the loss of HMS Glorious, HMS Ardent and HMS Acasta off the coast of Norway on 8 June 1940. Several issues were raised on which I shall need to write to the right hon. Gentleman, but I hope to reply to him on other issues during the debate.
As we all agree, the tragic loss of the Glorious was one of the greatest disasters suffered by the Royal Navy during the second world war. I am sure that hon. Members would wish to join me in expressing sympathy to the families and loved ones of those lost.
Over the years since the loss of the Glorious and her escorts, Members of the House have understandably expressed concern over the circumstances surrounding their loss. It is a sensitive issue. It is of genuine interest to the House, and interest has been revived by the recent showing and repeat of the Channel 4 documentary "Secret History"--mentioned by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed--about this episode. It may help if I expand further on the background that the right hon. Gentleman has provided.
The evacuation from Norway, in May 1940, took place at one of the blackest and most confused periods of the war. At that time, the German army had invaded France. British forces, including the Royal Navy, were heavily involved in these operations, which culminated in the fall of France and the evacuation of the British expeditionary force from mainland Europe. Moreover, Italy had just entered the war on the side of the Axis powers and, understandably, the risk of a German invasion was regarded as a serious threat.
The aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Glorious had sailed from Scapa Flow for Narvik, in Norway, on 31 May. Ark Royal was tasked with providing fighter cover during the withdrawal from Norway. Glorious was tasked with the evacuation of RAF aircraft from Bardufoss in the north of Norway; those aircraft would be urgently required for the defence of the United Kingdom.
At 03.00 on 8 June, having embarked the RAF Hurricanes and Gladiators, the Glorious, together with the destroyers Ardent and Acasta as anti-submarine escorts, set sail for Scapa Flow.
At about 16.00, Glorious sighted the mastheads of what we now know were the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which were on course to close on the Glorious. Ardent was ordered to investigate, and the Glorious altered course to the south. At the same time, orders were given to prepare a Swordfish reconnaissance aircraft, but it was too late, and none were airborne before the Scharnhorst opened fire at 16.31, followed shortly after by the Gneisenau. As the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed said, the order to abandon Glorious was given at 17.20. At 17.40 Glorious sank. The Ardent sank at about 17.30. The Acasta, with great gallantry, continued to close with the enemy and succeeded in damaging the Scharnhorst, which was forced to return to Trondheim.
Understandably, and regrettably, no report of proceedings, or deck logs for May and June 1940 survived the loss of the Glorious--nor, tragically, did any officer or senior rating who was in a position to comment on navigation, operations or command decision making. Any reconstruction or analysis--I believe this would be common ground--is therefore wholly dependent on evidence given to the board of inquiry by relatively junior personnel, and external sources such as signals received during the period under review, the reports of other ships and naval authorities, and recollections of participants. In addition, we now have the unambiguous German records. Nevertheless, the picture is not complete. Inevitably, there are gaps, which cannot be filled, and that has understandably allowed room for speculation to grow about the circumstances of the loss of the vessels.
Over the years, several points of contention have been raised. I should like to make it clear that we believe that many of those arise entirely from genuine differences of interpretation. What is clear is that, when Glorious detached to return to Scapa Flow, she had already carried out the mission for which she had been despatched--the retrieval of the RAF fighters. She could make no further contribution to the safety of the evacuation convoys, which were the fleet's next main concern. It is also assumed that, after five days at sea off Norway, she had only sufficient fuel to return to base, allowing for the obligatory requirement to maintain a reserve of 33 per cent. The House may be interested to know that that figure has been increased to 60 per cent. for today's royal naval vessels. That is not just because of problems with sludge at the bottom of fuel tanks, although that is a serious consideration.
It being Seven o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.--[Mr. Betts.]
"The MOD tries to have it both ways. In the Under Secretary's letters, it claims to have nothing stronger than 'reasonable conclusions' and 'convincing explanations'. In the MOD's 7-page paper 'HMS Glorious--Points of Controversy' it goes much further; it is firm and quite unequivocal in its assertions. For example, on the matter of intelligence available about likely German warship movements into Norwegian waters, the MOD paper claims: 'there was no indication from any source that a powerful German squadron was preparing to sortie, let alone that one had been at sea since 4 June'. This is in direct contradiction to the Official History of British Intelligence (HMSO 1978--page 141) by Sir Harry Hinsley: 'A fortnight before the German battle cruisers made their sortie, Bletchley Park began to report to the Admiralty that German main units were preparing to move from the Baltic northwards up the Norwegian coast . . . The Admiralty had no good reason for resisting the suggestion that it should at least issue a qualified warning to the fleet . . . Glorious was caught unprepared'. This is many miles from the MOD claim that 'There was no indication from any source'.
I ought to add that I was also taught by the late Sir Frank Adcock, who was also a decryptor at Bletchley, and who had perfect knowledge of German, which he had studied in Berlin under Williamwitz Nollendorf. Sir Frank later edited the "Cambridge Ancient History". In his discussions about Bletchley, Adcock again referred to hindsight. I never put Hinsley's and Adcock's accounts together, although Hinsley was sometimes given to exaggeration. I suspect that we cannot regard him as an absolute, definitive source in his recollection of what he did in his youth. If we are to talk of the distant past, we ought to be a little careful.
"Given that John Spellar's letter to Alan Beith (t August 1997) specifically says 'I agree that if any one of these contentions [of which the above is just one] to which the Admiralty and the MOD have consistently adhered could be disproved, then [it] would justify public concern over the handling of the matter [the whole of the official account] from 1946 to the present day".
In a sense, there is a balance between Sir Harry Hinsley's work and that of the naval historical branch. I do not come to the conclusion that the naval historical branch is necessarily wrong, although the Minister's reply will be of very great interest.
6.54 pm
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