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Mr. Spellar: The need to maintain stability is another consideration. I asked exactly the questions that the right hon. Gentleman raised. Those are relevant technical matters, and I am satisfied with the answers.
The assumption has been challenged in recent years but there is no documentary evidence to support the attack on it. What is known is that Glorious had been at sea at considerable distance from base for six full days, and that her normal routine would have allowed her to remain at sea for only five days.
The right hon. Gentleman said that Glorious had to leave the convoy. At the time of her departure, the convoy had not formed, and if she had remained off the coast of
Norway waiting for the convoy to form, fuel would certainly have been consumed and could have become an issue. In that event Glorious might not have had enough fuel to reach the United Kingdom and also to retain a prudent margin for emergencies.
Mr. Beith:
Does the Minister know anyone outside the current MOD who believes that part of the theory, bearing in mind that the amount of fuel used on convoy passage at convoy speed would have been less than that required for the vessel to proceed with any hope of safety at a faster speed to make for home with only the destroyer escort?
Mr. Spellar:
As I said, that would also have meant waiting for the convoy, and the possibilities had to be balanced. The question is whether the decisions were honestly made. We have to work on that assumption. There seem to be reasonable grounds for doing so. It is difficult at this distance and with the lack of records, but the assumption seems reasonable, given standard working practice in the Navy at that time, so we should not lightly discard it.
For reasons that I have explained, it is still considered likely that lack of fuel was a consideration in the decision that Glorious should return to the UK, but it is not possible to state that as a definitive fact. We have agreed that. What I can say is that even if Glorious was low on fuel, she would have been capable of raising full power and speed in an emergency.
I shall deal with the question whether the Admiralty ignored intelligence warnings about naval activity in the area. Although the right hon. Gentleman draws from the late Professor Sir Harry Hinsley, he does not make it clear that the last warning to be circulated within the Admiralty related to German ships in Norwegian waters being associated with operations in the North sea. A day later, the Glorious and the destroyers were sunk nearly 1,000 miles to the north of the North sea.
In the letter that Sir Harry wrote shortly before he died last year, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, Sir Harry speculated:
My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) advised me that he had urgent travel arrangements and apologised to the House for the fact that he could not stay until the end of the debate. The quote from Sir Harry Hinsley's "Official History of British Intelligence" compressed quotations that were expanded by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed--a page of text is compressed into a few lines. Among those phrases, into which comes a warning of a move from the Baltic into the Skagerrack, is a warning that ships in Norwegian waters may be associated with operations in the North sea.
I draw the attention of the House to the section which, as we heard, gives a balanced view. Sir Harry Hinsley stated that it was not difficult to understand the
operational intelligence centre's scepticism that traffic analysis was an untested technique. However, as the right hon. Gentleman commented, Sir Harry stated later in the paragraph that the OIC had no good reason for resisting Bletchley's suggestion that it would issue a qualified warning. I would say to my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow that there is therefore a balance of judgment to be struck. We have to look at both sides, as did the official history.
Another main issue of speculation, which has been raised in the debate, has been the signals dispatched by Glorious and the role played by HMS Devonshire. It is known that Glorious sent two signals before it sank: the first, "enemy report", at 16.15 hours; the second, an "amplifying report" at 16.40 hours. There are no British records which record the receipt of the first signal. Receipt of the second signal is recorded. It is difficult to conceive that Devonshire would record receipt of the second signal and not the first. It is known that the first signal sent by Glorious was not received by any British vessel, although subsequent records have shown that the full text was recorded by the Gneisenau.
The text of the second "amplifying signal" was recorded by Devonshire in the admiral's record as "My 16.15. 2P/B". The time of the signal was also given. Unlike the first signal, this signal did not give the position of Glorious, nor was it stated whether the sighting was made from the ship, or if it resulted from an air sortie.
That signal did not state that the ship was under attack. Records show that the quality of the signal was poor. I suggest that the content, which was discussed on the bridge, may have puzzled the hierarchy on Devonshire, but did not provide information which would give cause for Devonshire to break radio silence.
The right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed also raised the question of Captain D'Oyly Hughes and the early departure. The official documentation on that subject consists of one note--by the Commander- in-Chief, Home Fleet--instructing the Glorious to proceed to Scapa Flow to conduct the court martial.
That does not automatically lead to the conclusion that Captain D'Oyly Hughes was responsible for that decision, which had to be approved by Vice-Admiral Wells. I was slightly concerned when the right hon. Gentleman questioned whether all the records were available. As far as I am aware--he should write to me if he has any information to the contrary--all the official records are available, including records from the Commander- in-Chief, Home Fleet.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether it was coincidence that the Devonshire exercised its main armament as Glorious was transmitting the "enemy report". I have looked into that as well, and I am advised that that would appear to be so. I understand that, traditionally, the Navy uses the period between 16.00 and 18.00 for what is known as evening quarters, to exercise the gun crews. It might also be worth noting that the cruiser was already at defence watches, with three out of four turrets manned.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether Devonshire would have manned its main armament, because of the prospect of an attack from the air rather than an attack from the sea. I am advised that the 8-in guns of the County class cruisers were designed as dual-purpose weapons, for long-range use against aircraft
as well as surface ships. The turrets enabled a 70-deg angle of elevation, and rapid rates of slew and elevation, for anti-aircraft use. In the absence of surface ships, German long-range reconnaissance aircraft were the expected threat to the west of Norway.
There are a number of alternative theories, and we could discuss them and their merits, but I am not sure that that would serve any great purpose. Many of these issues are inevitably matters of interpretation. We believe that there is a sound basis for the interpretation that the Ministry of Defence has put forward, drawn quite properly from departmental records, and supplemented, where appropriate, from personal recollections. The severe loss of life and lack of documentation means that there is no definitive record, and no one is qualified to arrive at a true version. I am satisfied, however, that all Admiralty records relating to the incident are in the public domain.
Mr. Beith:
I think the Minister took to be from me a comment made by the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) about the availability of records. I have not questioned the availability of records.
May I discourage the Minister from going wholly into defensive mode? He has suggested that there is a considerable area for speculation and disagreement.
The nub of my case is this. The paper "Points of Controversy" suggests that is so, but the text of the official report--which has, however, been slightly revised since it first appeared in Hansard in 1946--does not.
It would greatly help the families concerned if the area of disagreement, or the potential alternative explanation, were aired more clearly in the document.
Mr. Spellar:
We are satisfied that there has been no cover-up of these tragic events, and that the MOD's interpretation is soundly based. We are satisfied that it is the most likely explanation. As I have said, however, it is a question of interpretation--as we accept, honest interpretation--of different views. The problem is that there is no new evidence on which we can draw to resolve the differences.
I feel that those who criticise the MOD's interpretation of events should themselves accept that our conclusions have been honestly drawn and rigorously researched. We argued it all through, and also looked at new information, which, in some instances, led to a slight modification of our conclusions.
We provided the right hon. Gentleman with a detailed and, perhaps, complicated account of the incident in July 1997, which we believe will interest other Members. I shall arrange for it to be placed in the Library. Members who read the record of the debate will gain an impression of its nature, and of the reasons for the position taken by the MOD and the naval historical branch: an honest position that has, I think, stood the test of time.
Question put and agreed to.
"I think that the best evidence that the Admiralty later realised it had made a mistake in ignoring my warning lies in the fact that its relations with the naval Section at Bletchley Park changed significantly after the disaster".
That is an example of conjecture, but it may also have been selectively quoted fact.
28 Jan 1999 : Column 575Adjourned accordingly at twelve minutes past Seven o'clock.
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