| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours (Workington): The assumption that many people are making is that NATO action would be against Serbian military assets. However, if this is an argument--as has been said at the Dispatch Box before--between Greater Serbia and, to some extent, Greater Albania, are there not circumstances in which NATO military action might have to be taken against forces other than those of Serbia?
Mr. Cook: If that assumption exists, it has no validity in terms of the text approved by the North Atlantic Council on Saturday, which is even-handed and has authorised Javier Solana to take action, depending on the response of both parties--not just one party. At the same time, we must be realistic. Military action in Kosovo against the KLA is not a readily feasible military option because there is no concentration of targets, and they are mostly among civilian areas that we would not wish to target. However, I hope that those questions will not arise. Quite apart from any prospect of military action, it is plainly in the interests of both sides to come together and make a success of the talks. I hope that they will draw that conclusion themselves.
Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood): In the somewhat dire eventuality of Britain having to inject a military force on the ground, will the Foreign Secretary explain on whose side that force would be and its precise objectives? Would the force be interposed between two belligerents in what could prove to be an extremely long and costly engagement in an area ideally suited for guerrilla warfare? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that self-determination for Kosovo, sooner rather than later, may prove to be the most realistic political option?
Mr. Cook: The hon. Gentleman has raised the prospect of self-determination for an independent Kosovo several times; therefore, I find it surprising that he should warn that those who argue for that in Kosovo would choose to shoot at troops who were there to police a political settlement. There can be no question of any external force being interposed, because there is no such thing as a front line in Kosovo in which it could be interposed. The objective of any such deployment would not be in support of either side, but would be in support of a political settlement. Such a deployment would be realistically likely only if both sides were committed to that political settlement.
Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North): In view of the remarks of the shadow Foreign Secretary, is my right hon. Friend aware that those of us who were in previous Parliaments remember only too well how the then Conservative Foreign Secretary, now Lord Hurd, treated with derision those of us who called for action to protect the lives of Muslims in Bosnia, and we are not likely to forget it? Does my right hon. Friend accept that all the evidence that has come to light in the past few days demonstrates that the mass murders have been orchestrated by Belgrade, and it would be naive to think otherwise? I hope that the plan that my right hon. Friend has announced today will succeed, but we should remember that, like Baghdad, unfortunately Belgrade understands only force.
Mr. Cook: If my hon. Friend is right on that last point, there is a clear possibility of that force being applied if
Belgrade does not respond to the diplomatic invitation that we have made. I share my hon. Friend's concern about the atrocities and I also understand the point that he makes about the tight discipline and communications in the Serb security forces. I stress to the House that the important issue, and the strategic objective, must be to find a political settlement. As long as there is no political process regarding Kosovo, the ceasefire will continue to crumble. We will persuade both sides to look for a solution other than through conflict only if we can show that there is another way to achieve a much better solution.
Mr. William Cash (Stone): Does the Foreign Secretary accept that many in this country welcome the move that he has made and wish to encourage the settlement along the lines that he has suggested? However, in the light of his rather cautious remarks about the other members of the European Union, will he indicate the extent of differences between the member states? He was careful not to mention the extent of unanimity between the member states.
Mr. Cook: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his support for what we are doing. We discussed the issue at the European Union meeting of Foreign Ministers only a week ago today, and there was total unanimity in condemning the atrocities and stressing the importance of the political process. Four of the largest members of the European Union were present at the Contact Group on Friday--Britain, France, Germany and Italy--and all fully supported the conclusions that I have presented to the House. At present, I am not aware of any substantial disagreement in the European Union and I am sure that, should NATO decide that ground troops are an appropriate way to ensure that the political settlement can take root, many other members of the European Union will participate as members of NATO.
Mr. Robert N. Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby): As one who, as long as 14 years ago, argued while in Yugoslavia that Kosovo should get full republic status, I congratulate my right hon. Friend and his colleagues in the Contact Group on coming up with a framework document that is a basis for negotiation. I agree with him that military activity will never solve the problem. Has he taken cognisance of the words of Colonel Edward Cowan, our former military attache in Belgrade, on BBC Radio 5 on 22 January that military action would be a disaster? I ask my right hon. Friend to consider the possible consequences of re-igniting the conflict in Bosnia if Serbia is bombed.
Mr. Cook: There is no one in the Contact Group or in NATO who actively wants to initiate military action. Any such decision would be taken with great reluctance and only if Belgrade refused to respond to the fair offer that we have made. I hope that Belgrade will recognise that it is in its interests to give a positive response and to share the view expressed by my hon. Friend that the way forward is to negotiate on the remaining difficult areas. Equally, Belgrade should have no doubt about our resolve if it refuses to end the conflict and fails to take this opportunity to engage in a political process. We are clear
in our determination that that cannot happen without a response from NATO and we have set out clearly what that response might be.
Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate): I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on the level of diplomatic unity that he has achieved on the objectives that he has laid out to the House this afternoon. However, he should bear it in mind, when he upbraids my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard), that it was the Prime Minister's press secretary who described the results of the Foreign Secretary's previous efforts as dithering and disunited. Will he explain to the House what authority has been delegated to the Secretary-General of NATO to do what and with what military forces in the light of the response of both parties? How much authority over the control of its armed forces has the United Kingdom given away in response to the military events of the next few days?
Will the Foreign Secretary explain from where the troops who will be used in the long-term control and protection of the settlement will come? It is rumoured in the newspapers today that 8,000 British soldiers may be involved in the initial stages but, as the strategic defence review made clear, we have the capacity to deploy a formation only for one six-month spell.
Mr. Cook:
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his congratulations, and I assure him that I come to the House with the full backing of the Contact Group of the North Atlantic Council, of the Security Council--and also of the press spokesman for the Prime Minister.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether we had given away control of British forces. Of course we have done no such thing: what we have done is participate as full members of an alliance that has a procedure for joint decision making. Part of our procedure has always been that, towards the end of the political decision making, we hand over authority for action to the military membership.
In this case, we have handed over the authority for action to Javier Solana, the NATO Secretary-General, but we would, of course, expect consultation before any further step is taken. Indeed, the conclusions of the North Atlantic Council explicitly state that he will take into account the Contact Group's assessment of the responses. I can therefore tell the hon. Gentleman that I am totally confident that there will be further consultation with Britain before any action that involves our forces takes place.
Dr. Norman A. Godman (Greenock and Inverclyde):
May I offer my compliments to my right hon. Friend? In terms of political developments, should the Kosovo Albanians not be urged to play the long game? From their point of view, it makes good sense that there should be an autonomous administration long before there can be any talk of self-determination. However, does not military force or action have to be legitimised by international law and by the support of the United Nations Security Council? If there are not to be American troops on the ground there, what role will the American Administration play in what is, essentially, a European problem?
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |