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Mr. Cook: First, I strongly endorse my hon. Friend's point about the interim character of the Contact Group
proposals. The Kosovo Liberation Army does not give up any issue of principle in coming to negotiate on the three-year interim period; nor, for that matter, does Belgrade, by taking part in those negotiations, compromise on any issue of principle about the long-term future of Kosovo. My hon. Friend is right to say that those who want there to be an independent Kosovo--and that does not embrace the Contact Group--would be well advised to take this opportunity to create the democratic structures that would establish a political community within Kosovo which, if independence were to be the outcome at some future date, could be ready to take that extra step. However, for the time being, we propose a democratic, self-governing Kosovo within the Federal Republic but with extensive control over its own affairs.
My hon. Friend asked also about the legal base for any action. We are clear that we have legal authority for action to prevent humanitarian catastrophe and we are all deeply worried that we shall be looking at just such a catastrophe unless we are able to get a political settlement under way. I stress to my hon. Friend and to the House that the proposal that I have outlined this afternoon was welcomed unanimously by the Security Council and that no permanent member disagreed with it.
Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East):
As a relative newcomer to the sponsorship of the concept of military deterrence, does the Foreign Secretary appreciate that the best chance of deterring an aggressor is to be as specific as possible in stating what military action will follow if that aggressor fails to comply with requirements? Therefore, when the right hon. Gentleman talks about the possibility of military action against Serbia, will he spell out clearly whether he means that it will be simply air action, unsupported by anything else? Does he mean that such action will take place only in the disputed area of Kosovo, or will it extend to Serbia itself?
Mr. Cook:
As for late converts, the hon. Gentleman may like to remember that many people on the Labour Benches condemned Saddam Hussein while the hon. Gentlemen of the Conservative party were arming him.
On the hon. Gentleman's question about military intervention, I frankly believe that there is a lot of merit in keeping President Milosevic guessing about exactly what we would do. The hon. Gentleman is, however, quite correct to say that, if there were military action, it is unlikely that it could be confined to the province of Kosovo.
Mr. John Austin (Erith and Thamesmead):
May I join my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) and others in congratulating the Foreign Secretary on his determination and perseverance in bringing about a viable political settlement that all sides to the dispute should adopt? However, will my right hon. Friend tell the parties involved that the agreement is for the interim, that there will be final status negotiations in three years' time, and that there is no possibility of the international community's countenancing any change in the internationally recognised borders of Macedonia or Albania? Will he also tell them categorically that nothing is ruled out of the final options, including the possibility of an independent Kosovo?
Mr. Cook:
I took an opportunity during my visit to Skopje to see the Foreign Minister of Macedonia and to
My hon. Friend is right to say that we are discussing an interim period, and that a review clause will provide for a review under international auspices and with international mediation. At present, no particular outcome is ruled out, but I hope that all sides will come to the talks ready to make a serious effort to achieve stability during the three-year period. If Belgrade wishes Kosovo to remain in the Federal Republic at the end of the three-year period, the best way to achieve that is to demonstrate that the Kosovo Albanians can have a future of peace, stability and freedom from repression within the Federal Republic.
Dr. Jenny Tonge (Richmond Park):
In the unwelcome event of military action by NATO, can the Foreign Secretary make any plans to protect the civilian population, and to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of Kosovo?
Mr. Cook:
We are already extensively involved in humanitarian aid in Kosovo, and Britain is one of the major donors to the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations. Plainly, if military action were to be taken, I would certainly seek to avoid an impact on the civilian population. I cannot guarantee that there will be no such impact, but that will be a heavy factor in our consideration of whether to proceed with military action.
Mr. Michael Clapham (Barnsley, West and Penistone):
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the part that he played in putting together the peace package. Does he agree that, if troops are to be used to build confidence between the two sides, they must be introduced speedily to become part of the negotiations? Does he further agree that military action by NATO would make almost impossible both the use of ground troops and peace in the foreseeable future?
Mr. Cook:
My hon. Friend is right to say that the reason for deployment of ground troops would be to provide the confidence and reassurance on the ground in which we can start the process of reconstructing a democratic, self-governing Kosovo. His argument also has force when he says that progress in the political settlement would be more difficult to achieve in the wake of military action. However, if no progress can be made, we would not be losing progress by taking military action.
Belgrade must reckon carefully on the options available. One option is to take part in the talks, and to secure a future not only for itself but for the Serb community in Kosovo. If Belgrade fails to take that option, it should not doubt our resolve and willingness to press home with what we have committed ourselves to do
in the North Atlantic Council. I hope that it will not come to that, but it is very much in the hands of Belgrade to respond positively to an offer that is in its own interests.
Mr. John Randall (Uxbridge):
I thank the Foreign Secretary for his balanced statement. Does he agree that, if in these grave circumstances NATO were to use force against the belligerents, although Yugoslav targets might be readily identifiable, the nature of the KLA guerrilla force means that it might shelter among the civilian population and it would be almost impossible to take action against it? If that were tried, there would be grave consequences for the civilian population.
Mr. Cook:
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comment on my balanced statement, which I take as a compliment. His assessment of the KLA is right. I cannot add or detract from what he said because it was fair comment. The KLA should not ignore the fact that its behaviour will be a factor in whether military action is taken against Belgrade. There could be no question of the North Atlantic Council authorising action against Belgrade for failing to take part in talks if the KLA fails to take part in them. We are keen to ensure that we use all the levers to try to achieve progress towards peace and stability, but we are not going to be conscripted as the KLA's air force.
Mr. Tony Benn (Chesterfield):
In considering the composition of the ground troops who may be sent in, has the Foreign Secretary taken account of the fact that, within living memory, tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Serbs were killed by German troops? The survivors of those massacres are still there. Might that factor influence the composition of ground forces?
Mr. Cook:
German troops are already present in Macedonia, where they are welcome and ready to take
Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham):
The Foreign Secretary has said several times, in this statement and elsewhere, that British ground troops might be deployed to police a settlement. Has he absolutely ruled out the possibility that they will be deployed not in Kosovo but in Serbia in the event of the failure of such a settlement?
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