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Sir Nicholas Lyell: The Opposition do not support the continuation of the hereditary principle in its present form. Speaking entirely personally, I think that one of the matters that the royal commission will want to consider--as the Government wisely want to consider, and I shall throw them a bouquet in a moment--is the possibility of some hereditary peers being allowed to continue at the election of their fellows.

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However, that is not Conservative policy--I speak from the Back Benches--and it is not Conservative policy to support the hereditary principle. What we demand is a one-stage reform, which is perfectly possible, whereby a sensible and carefully thought out proposal for the future is introduced at the same time as the aims of the Bill are implemented.

Mr. Gordon Prentice (Pendle): Is not the essential point that an unreformed second Chamber could block proposals from this place?

Sir Nicholas Lyell: Possibly. I shall deal with that in a moment.

We Conservatives have never been against the genuine reform of the House of Lords. Conservatives have always been in favour of evolutionary reform. Indeed, as the Leader of the House will recognise, one of the ironies is that it was the radical but evolutionary Conservative reforms of Harold Macmillan's Peerage Act in 1963 that created the modern system of life peers, who look like forming the mainstay of the second Chamber, at least until a fully thought out reform is implemented.

Although I am deeply critical of the emptiness of the Bill--the right hon. Lady puffed herself up, I say with respect, by describing it as "exquisite simplicity"--I give the Government one cheer for seeming at last to listen, with regard to the setting up of the royal commission, even if that should have happened 18 or 20 months ago. It is a step forward which I welcome.

A further step forward, as far as it goes, is the Government's indication that they are minded to accept an amendment that will permit 90 or 91 existing hereditary peers to continue to play a role in the transitional upper House, pending proper reform. Why should that reprieve be so limited? Is it not a fact that the Government deeply need the constructive contribution made by so many hereditary peers of all parties, and that if the Government did not accept this reform, they would have to create a large number of the existing hereditary peers as life peers in order to continue the effective work of the upper House? In seeking genuine, evolutionary reform of the second Chamber, we should bear those points in mind.

Dr. Starkey: I am puzzled by the right hon. and learned Gentleman's use of the word "evolutionary". My understanding of evolution is that it involves change by a number of steps. Is not that exactly what the Government are proposing? Can he explain his understanding of evolution? Is it rather a "big bang" approach which the Conservatives seem to be suggesting?

Sir Nicholas Lyell: To give the hon. Lady a simple answer, she is proposing to wipe out fish. She might leave mammals and birds, but she is wiping out fish. She is not allowing fish to evolve. She is simply wiping out one portion of the practical workings of our Parliament, and that is not evolution. One can never carry analogies too far, but let her reflect on that.

Meanwhile, I shall give the Government a little more credit. I understand their desire to ensure some change. They are entitled to remind us, as the right hon. Lady did,

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that since 1911 many attempts at radical reform have foundered, just as they foundered a generation ago--not because of the opposition of the upper House, she should remember, but because they were caught between the hammer of Michael Foot and the anvil of Enoch Powell, in what seemed to be an unholy alliance to defeat any reform in the late 1960s.

Given the real role of so many hereditary peers of all parties and none, I suggest that it would be sufficient and wise in the interim to allow them to continue to play their part until proper reform is introduced.

I shall throw out a few thoughts about the role and composition of a properly reformed upper House. We are not dealing with a blank canvas. The Government may not have thought through their proposals, but a great deal of constructive thought has been given to the matter over the past 20 years, not least by some of us who entered the House in 1979, when 18 years of continuous Conservative rule were certainly not envisaged by me, and when the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) represented a real threat, with his proposals to alter the House of Lords. Likewise, some constructive proposals were offered by the committee chaired by Sir Alec Douglas-Home in the late 1970s.

The upper House is, first, a revising Chamber. For that, we need peers who are not there just for the kudos, but who are prepared to do the work and who in future, I suggest, may have to be paid something for doing so. Secondly, the upper House provides a check on the Government of the day, giving them the opportunity to think again, as the present Government recognise.

However, that understates the true function of the upper House. Our reforms must ensure that it continues to fulfil its primary function as a constitutional anchor, made up of a group of citizens of stature, independence and discretion, who carry the confidence of the country as a whole. If they say to the Government of the day, of whatever complexion, "Stop and think again", they must carry weight not just by their votes, but by their reputation.

How should Members of the upper House be selected in future? The Government's interim proposal is for an appointments commission, whose recommendations the Prime Minister will undertake not to veto. I sincerely warn against so-called independent appointments commissions. They are inevitably more quasi-autonomous than autonomous, and they are not answerable to Parliament.

If the Prime Minister's objective is to appear not to be appointing his cronies, such a commission may indeed seem to be helpful to him, but the danger is that by hiding behind such a commission, he will be divesting himself not of his power, which as Prime Minister will always remain very great, but of his responsibility and his answerability to this House.

In another, parallel respect, the Lord Chancellor, to his credit, has moved away from the idea--much floated before the general election--of such an independent commission for the appointment of judges. The Government should think very carefully indeed before allowing the Prime Minister to escape answerability on the vital matter of appointees to the House of Lords.

The greatest strength of our constitution is that almost every aspect of public life must in the end be answered for by a Minister or the Prime Minister, and thus effectively by the Government of the day. That is a real

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sanction--for Governments, unlike so-called independent commissions, can be kicked out by the electorate. That is the democratic foundation of our constitution.

Mrs. Beckett: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is, perhaps, a little at cross-purposes with the White Paper. The independent commission, which will be appointed on Nolan principles in order to preserve its proper independence, will appoint the Cross-Bench peers. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will retain responsibility for appointing any Labour peers, and has undertaken not to exercise any veto over the names put forward by the leaders of other parties.

Sir Nicholas Lyell: I am grateful for that clarification; I think that I understood it. My criticisms still carry weight.

Ultimately, the Prime Minister is responsible for the system as a whole. If it goes awry, he must be seen to be answerable for it. If it goes awry in a way that distorts our constitution, the Government of the day must not be seen to be hiding behind a so-called "independent" commission.

Mr. Peter Bradley (The Wrekin): I am at a loss to understand the right hon. and learned Gentleman. Is he saying that the independent commission should be independent of the Prime Minister or answerable to him?

Sir Nicholas Lyell: I do not believe in independent commissions. As my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) said, the Prime Minister will appoint the commission and members of the commission will enjoy being on it. They are inevitably under considerable indirect pressure to do roughly as they are told by the Prime Minister of the day. We should not put too much faith in independent commissions.

Part of the upper House may well be directly elected by the electorate. I have always favoured reforms that allow part of the upper House to be elected. It will be particularly important if hereditary peers are to be done away with altogether, because it will be a way of introducing new and younger blood to the upper House. As the Government's White Paper points out, one of the difficulties and ironies is that the average age of life peers is seven years greater than that of hereditary peers, notwithstanding the large number of hereditary peers and the fact that they presumably live to old age on exactly the same statistical basis as all the rest. If we are to get new and younger blood into the upper House, we must find a method of doing it. The idea of having a proportion of elected peers has merit.

Once elected, for whatever party, the elected peer should have a substantial period of office--at least six and perhaps nine years per election. He will have the authority of having been elected, but he must also be given a substantial measure of independence because an important feature of the upper House is that its Members, whatever their political persuasion, should be independent.


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