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Dr. Cable: I thank my hon. Friend for that constructive suggestion. However, if the cuts crisis is to be avoided through precepting, the increase would have to be fairly substantial, in the order of 12 per cent., and it would require forbearance on the part of the Government. Perhaps the Minister will offer clarification on that point.

Drawing the threads together, I ask: where are the cuts leading? At what point do fire services become dangerously overstretched? This year, the fire service management have clearly gone to some trouble to prioritise firefighting equipment, through risk assessment carried out in a professional manner. They will argue that the five fire tenders identified are those whose loss will put the public least at risk, and that all sorts of improvised arrangements of that nature have to be adopted. However, there is a point at which such arrangements become positively dangerous.

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I am no expert, but simple common sense dictates that, in the event of a major emergency or combination of emergencies, the fewer fire tenders and firefighters there are, the greater are the response times and the risk of death. The professional management of the fire service now believe that, if cuts in excess of the five now contemplated are made, we will not be in merely difficult territory; real danger will threaten the public. The Fire Brigades Union, which is more outspoken than the management, already believes that the increase in fire deaths--in 1997-98, the number increased from 67 to somewhere in the 80s--is probably attributable to the fact that fire cover was reduced. I am not sure whether that can be proved, but the figures are not encouraging.

Mr. John Randall (Uxbridge): Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is not only the public who would be put at risk by the reduction in services, but fire crews themselves?

Dr. Cable: That is absolutely right and an important point. Unfortunately, disasters such as the King's Cross fire appear to be needed to remind us all of threats, not only to the public but to fire officers. In addition, although the fire service is right to have refocused its priorities from property to people, risk to property remains an element of concern.

Let me now outline some of the longer-term problems that the Government will have to address if the overall difficulty is to be alleviated. The first is the pensions problem. I have already sketched the difficulties, and most hon. Members already know the underlying problem. The difficulties started in the post-war period, a relatively easy period in which far more money went into the fire service pension scheme through contributions than was taken out. It is not altogether clear what happened to the surplus, but I suspect that, instead of being spent on the fire service, it leaked out to the Greater London council and was used to permit lower rates around London. We all had an apparently free lunch at the expense of the London fire service's pension provision, but we have now reached the point of having to pay the bill.

The pensions problem is wholly unsustainable, because contributions are likely to fall further. The Government have begun to address the issue of pension arrangements for new recruits to the London fire service; that is a creditable effort, but it does not deal with the problem of the pensions overhang and it may make the existing problem worse. New recruits may opt out of the pension arrangements and cease to pay their 11 per cent. contribution, which would result in lower overall contributions at a time when pensions outgoings increased because of longevity and redundancies. The problem will get wholly out of control if something is not done.

What are the options? The hon. Member for Croydon, Central (Mr. Davies) suggests that, within the SSA arrangements, pensions should be isolated from the rest of the budget and, in effect, be reimbursed by central Government. That would take pensions out of the internal financing arrangements of the LFCDA, which is my preferred option. A second option, which builds on the suggestion made by my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Mr. Hughes), is to rely more heavily on precepting and to allow pension costs to be passed on to local authorities without restriction.

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Various methods are available, but it is clear that the Government have not yet proposed a method of dealing with the pension problem. It is one thing to deal with new recruits and prospective pensioners, but the real financial difficulty arising from pensions has not yet been faced. I hope that the Minister will take the opportunity of this debate to address those problems.

My final point relates to the fire service's overall operational flexibility. The fire service management believe that their financial position would be easier if they were able to operate more flexibly. They are governed by a set of legislative regulations that has accumulated over the years. That severely inhibits their freedom of action, for example, in charging big business for fire prevention services, which appears in principle to be a reasonable thing to do. It also inhibits flexibility in other ways: it is a proper part of the Government's approach to social exclusion that the fire service should refocus its efforts on deprived areas, which are where most fires occur, but that sort of operational flexibility is currently inhibited by restrictive legislation. In last year's debate, the Minister said that he was willing to look at that legislation and to introduce a new fire Bill. I should be grateful for some information about when that will happen, how it will happen and what mechanism will be used, for that is an important part of the story.

I suspect that the House is of one mind on the fact that there is a serious short-term problem. I should like to know how the Government propose to deal with it, especially in matters, such as capping limits, where the Government have a responsibility. I should also be grateful if the Minister revealed how the Government intend to address the longer-term problems of pensions and fire service flexibility.

11.18 am

Dr. Rudi Vis (Finchley and Golders Green): I accept much of what the hon. Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable) says and I shall try not to repeat his remarks, because that would be boring. Instead, I shall ask why the London fire and civil defence authority is affected by impending crisis.

Mr. Robinson, the chief fire officer and chief executive of the LFCDA, has informed us of the many financial difficulties he faces. Unfortunately, neither the LFCDA's financial figures nor the measures taken to stabilise them add up. The hon. Gentleman is correct to say that we may be here again next year if we allow the LFCDA management to continue to act as they have until now.

When Mr. Robinson was appointed, he must have accepted the job on the basis and the understanding that he had to run an efficient and safe fire service. I doubt whether he said that, although he would do that, he would not take account of pension arrangements; my guess is that he accepted those responsibilities.

In a letter sent to hon. Members in December, Mr. Robinson sets out the main problems. The pension scheme is unfunded; when it was started, in 1947, income was high and expenditure low, whereas last year expenditure was £77 million and income was only £16 million--a £61 million shortfall.

When did that start? As the hon. Member for Twickenham said, it started in the 1970s. My dog could understand the problem, if I told him about it. What has

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Mr. Robinson done to change the system from an unfunded scheme to a funded one? Absolutely nothing: neither he nor his predecessors took the necessary management action. So what does he say now? He says that a funded scheme for new firefighters could be a solution only in the long run--but if the process had been started in the 1970s, we would now be well into that long run and the problem would have been avoided.

The cuts in the fire service began just when expenditure started to exceed income. Since 1979, a lot of equipment has been lost, but the problem has not been solved, merely avoided. That is a management failure. What does Mr. Robinson propose to do? He proposes to make another 50 or 60 people redundant, or more, depending on the circumstances. What will those people do? They will draw pensions from the scheme, thus making the problem worse. That is not a solution--just the opposite.

Mr. Robinson also intends to make savings in the support areas. In a letter, he stated that 86 per cent. of income was spent on front-line services. However, the same letter stated that the service spent 21.4 per cent. of income on pensions. Subtracting 21.4 per cent. from the 100 per cent. income total leaves a remainder that is too small: it is not possible to spend 86 per cent. of income on fire services. The figures do not add up.

Mr. Robinson has said that the management structure has been changed. It is hard to imagine, but there used to be five layers of management. Now there are three layers, but that is still far too many. London's fire service has a military structure. Even in television programmes such as "London's Burning", one can see firefighters, grown men and women, touching their forelock to management. My goodness: everyone is afraid. Top managers have bigger cars, bigger offices and more assistants. The fire service has less to do with fires than with management. Priorities are upside down.

I am a Dutchman by birth, and I maintain that we could learn from the way things are done in the Netherlands. There, some pertinent questions would be asked, and the answers would provide the basis for action. What is the service for? It is a fire service. What does it do? It fights fires; it helps people in flats; it helps to get people out of lifts that do not go up or down; it helps in dealing with road accidents; and all sorts of other things.

Depending on the relevant regulations, the management should have ensured that there was income to cover the service's activities. In the Netherlands, a structure was built to allow the service there to fight for the necessary income. The LFCDA does things differently. The management structure comes first: only when that is in place does attention turn to fighting fires. That is the wrong way around. The LFCDA is not doing what it should be doing.

I have read the budget proposals, but they contain not a word about expenditure on civil defence, which is part of the LFCDA's responsibility and would have to be covered in any honest overview. Why have we not been told about civil defence?

It is a scandal, but it is common now to see a gleaming little car arriving at the scene of a fire. Who gets out? A management person. What does he know about fires? Nothing. He says, "Oh, my goodness, that's a fire." The management person stands there for about 10 minutes and then asks the firefighter in charge when it will all be over. On being told that it might take about two hours,

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the management representative assumes that everything is under control and that he can go home. Why does that happen? The answer is that the management person is paid out of money for front-line services. That element is hidden in the budget, but we must not forget that. To my mind, it is unacceptable.

Why must firefighters retire at the ridiculously young age required? I know of many who are totally fit, as medical supervision proves. They want to go on working, either on active service or at desk jobs, but there is almost no way for existing firefighters to get into management. The structure is one of "us and them", and the management do not want them.

The LFCDA has protested that it has consulted all relevant people and groups. Has any firefighter been consulted, or been involved in any way? The answer is no. If I want to meet firefighters, rather than just go to head office, I have to ask it for permission. The situation with the LFCDA management is unbelievable. If my house should catch fire, I would want firefighters to come, not management.

The financial problems are severe, but the solutions are idiotic. In the literature that he has sent, Mr. Robinson states that overheads will be shared with other emergency services. There has just been a massive change in the police structure in Barnet, but the LFCDA did not get in touch to offer to share the overheads involved in reorganisation, which it could have implemented at the same time. No contact was made.

Changes to the north circular road mean that Finchley fire station is poorly placed. However, other emergency services have a very much better site near Finchley high road. Has the LFCDA taken up that option? It is considering the matter, and doing so in such a way that one might think that it may be working to that end; yet the budget report has details of cuts that have been made in ancillary services. More than 50 per cent. of personnel in the LFCDA property division--the authority's asset management arm--have been kicked out. Those are the very people who should talk to other emergency services about saving money--proper money, not improper money--but there has been no negotiation at all.

I believe that the LFCDA management are not capable, and that Mr. Robinson should go. In addition, I contend that its political control must be examined. Every year, three or four of the 32 councillors who represent London's boroughs are caught out. The other 28 councillors are very sympathetic, but what they are thinking is, "Thank God, it's not me this time." The result is that votes are held and cuts are approved in all the areas for which they are proposed. There should be an independent inquiry into the inefficient and irresponsible management of the LFCDA.


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