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Ms Jean Corston (Bristol, East): I congratulate my right hon. Friend on establishing the inquiry in the first place. Does he agree that the report lays on all of us both a duty and an opportunity to ensure that employment in, contact with or use of our public services should not depend on conformity to a white, male culture? Does he accept that policing in multicultural areas such as my constituency requires the police to take an open attitude, and to be in contact with, and have the confidence of, local groups? May I commend to him the work done at Trinity Road police station, which works with the Bristol race equality council against racist incidents? May I suggest that, as part of their training, every police officer should be required to read "Faces of Britain: A Cultural Guide", a booklet produced by that police station?
Mr. Straw: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her remarks. My hon. Friend the Minister of State, Home Office has just given me a quick briefing on the value of the work done at Trinity Road police station, and he will visit it shortly. A great error was committed 15 to 20 years ago when people thought that they had to bother about anti-racist policies only in areas in which black and Asian people lived in any numbers. In fact, we need to bother more about anti-racist policies in areas that are all white. I do not want the police service to get the idea that, just because an area is predominantly white, they do not need to recruit black and Asian officers. Regardless of whether areas are mainly white or not, officers will, in the course of their careers, come in contact with black and Asian people. In any event, we must ensure that officers of the law treat people equally, regardless of the colour of their skin, race or creed.
Kosovo
4.30 pm
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Robin Cook): Madam Speaker, with permission, I would like to make a statement on the Kosovo talks.
In my statement three weeks ago, I reported that the Contact Group had agreed to summon both sides to negotiations for a political settlement on the basis of the documents tabled by that group. Both sides responded to that summons and took part in peace talks held until yesterday at Rambouillet. As co-chair of the talks, the United Kingdom was fully engaged in brokering agreement between the two parties, and the House will wish to recognise the immense effort put in by officials, some of whom have worked without break and occasionally without sleep. I record the appreciation of all the British team for the close co-operation of France, both as co-chair and as host of the talks.
At the outset, both parties to the talks had a large number of reservations about the Contact Group's proposals for the constitution of a self-governing Kosovo. The great majority of them were resolved. However, the Yugoslav delegation still has some difficulties, such as the limited role of the Serbian courts; and the Albanian side is still particularly concerned about the absence of a commitment to a referendum on independence at the end of the three-year period. Those problems remain. Nevertheless, we obtained consensus from both sides for a democratic, self-governing Kosovo, and agreement to the main elements in the detailed texts on its constitution.
Those texts provide Kosovo with its own assembly, constitution, president, Government, taxes, laws, and police and security. They provide a sweeping measure of autonomy for Kosovo, including the right to conduct foreign relations in respect of the areas within the competence of the Kosovar assembly. The constitution also provides full protection for the national communities within Kosovo, including the right of both Serb and Albanian communities to have representative bodies to protect and promote their respective languages, cultures, religions and educational curriculums.
There was broad agreement on both sides regarding a major international presence in support of the political settlement. Elections to the assembly, local communes and community bodies are to be supervised by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Both parties agreed to the appointment of an international ombudsman to monitor human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the texts provide for the European Commission to take the lead role in co-ordinating the economic reconstruction of Kosovo.
The most difficult issue was the proposal for an international military presence in Kosovo. The Yugoslav delegation refused to accept that the presence of foreign troops was consistent with Yugoslav national sovereignty. There were also serious difficulties on the Albanian side--particularly among representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army, who found it hard to accept that a condition of an international military force must be that they demilitarise and surrender their weapons.
Throughout the talks, I made it clear that Britain was willing to provide ground troops to underpin the interim settlement, but that there could be no question of us or
our allies doing so without a clear commitment to such a ceasefire and to the withdrawal or disarmament on both sides that is necessary to make it a reality.
Both parties agreed to meet again on 15 March to discuss all aspects of the implementation of the new constitution of Kosovo, including the civilian and military international presence. My colleague Hubert Vedrine and I are considering how we can use the interval between now and then to convince the wider public in Kosovo and Serbia that the outcome is a good bargain for both, and the best deal that they will have to end the conflict.
I regret to inform the House that violent conflict continues in Kosovo. On Monday, there was fighting near Vucitrn. Yesterday, there was further fighting at Bukos, in which we know that at least one Serb was killed and five were injured. We do not yet have figures for casualties on the Albanian side. Today, there has been further fighting near Suva Reka.
Last night, Javier Solana confirmed that NATO expects both sides to respect the ceasefire and remains ready to use whatever means are necessary in support of it. Yesterday, all the NATO members of the Contact Group repeated their support for decisive NATO action if Belgrade makes a disproportionate response or takes violent reprisals against the civilian population. We also hold the Kosovo Liberation Army responsible for its part in maintaining a ceasefire. Both sides should use the next three weeks to build on the new agreement for peace, not to break down the existing agreement for a ceasefire.
When I last spoke to the House on this issue, I ended by saying that I could not confirm that the talks that we were seeking would take place, nor guarantee that they would succeed. We were successful in getting both sides to take part in the talks. As a result, we have created a peace process, and the end of the Rambouillet talks is not the end of that process but only the conclusion of its first phase. Both sides have committed themselves to taking part in its next phase.
I cannot report to the House that we have yet reached complete agreement to the Contact Group texts, but we have secured agreement to the overwhelming majority of them. That result proves that we were right to try for peace by summoning the talks, but also demonstrates the extra mile we still have to travel. I can assure the House that we will maintain our pressure on both sides to end the conflict through negotiations.
Neither side is going to end this conflict through military action. Neither side can gain from prolonging it. The longer Belgrade continues to try to resolve the conflict by military repression, the more difficult any final outcome that stops short of independence for Kosovo is made. The longer the Kosovo Liberation Army continues to provoke conflict, the more difficult it makes it for the international community to stop the bloodshed among its people.
Both sides have recognised the value of the Contact Group proposals. I urge them now to work with us in implementing them, and to turn their commitments on paper into reality on the ground: the reality of a Kosovo free from fear and governed by free elections.
Mr. John Maples (Stratford-on-Avon):
Will the Foreign Secretary confirm that no agreement has been reached or signed at Rambouillet, and that the sticking points were Kosovo's insistence on a referendum on
As I understand it, the strategy was to get the Kosovo Albanians on side quickly and then threaten the Serbs, but it fell apart early and proved to be misconceived. Why was there such a miscalculation? Why was the Kosovo Albanian position not better understood in advance? That was the fundamental fault. The Foreign Secretary had a carrot for the Kosovo Albanians and no stick, and a stick for Milosevic but no carrot. This obvious flaw in his strategy led to Milosevic being allowed off the hook.
Now we are to have a three-week delay. All hon. Members hope that things will work on 15 March, but each delegation is probably going to spend the three-week hiatus talking to its hardliners, seeking unity not behind an agreement but behind sticking points to strengthen its negotiating position. There is a danger that the situation on the ground will deteriorate by 15 March. It is happening already and will inflame both sides.
Why was the Rambouillet format chosen for the talks when the Dayton model--shut all the parties away in a remote, unattractive location without access to press or home capitals, with all the principals present, and refuse to let them go until an agreement has been reached--was known and successful? [Interruption.] Well, it worked and this has not. Why choose a French chateau just outside Paris with free access to the media and perpetual contact with delegations' capitals? All the principals were at Dayton, including Milosevic and Holbrooke. The key character, Milosevic, was missing at Rambouillet. Of course, Holbrooke was at Dayton, where having one's arm twisted by him was pretty effective. Apparently, it is not quite as effective when done by the Foreign Secretary.
There were the additional mistakes of for ever setting deadlines, and extending them, and having a Contact Group of five nations that did not agree among themselves. The Contact Group had no real coercive threat, and Russia disagreed with the imposition of what threat there was. The only real coercion was from the United States, which had to try to rescue the process. Surely the lesson is that only the United States is a credible threat--at least that is what Milosevic seems to think.
I have some questions, and I would be grateful if the Foreign Secretary addressed them. The Rambouillet process was supposed to last two weeks. Despite extensions, it has failed in its objective. In the Foreign Secretary's words, the talks have become "a process". I hope that that process will succeed on 15 March, although we have serious doubts. What will the Foreign Secretary do if the Kosovo Albanians refuse to sign without a commitment to a referendum? What will he do if the Kosovo Albanians agree, but Milosevic refuses to have a NATO force? Would we bomb Serbia, or would the Foreign Secretary agree to any other force? If bombing were to start, how could he guarantee the safety of OSCE monitors? Does Russia still wholly oppose a NATO force?
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