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The Prime Minister: I agree entirely that the political track must be kept going the whole time. One reason why people say that we have over-delayed in this is that, from last October onwards, we had a political track that we were trying to make work, precisely because we understood the consequences of taking military action. I agree with what the hon. Gentleman says about the UN and legal authority, and I also agree that we should be fortified by NATO's unity. The fact that 13 countries now have combat aircraft in the region, able to be used in the operation, is an example of NATO's strength and purpose.
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): Thursday's debate is scheduled to be answered by the Minister of State and the Under-Secretary. In the circumstances, would the Prime Minister consider that either the Foreign Secretary or the Secretary of State for Defence, and perhaps he himself, should take part in what is a crucial debate?
In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, the Prime Minister said that there would be "swift retaliation" if Yugoslav troops attacked troops in Macedonia. What, exactly, is meant by
"swift retaliation" in those circumstances? Finally, a factual question: what have Mr. Primakov and the Russians had to say about the proposed military strike?
The Prime Minister:
The position of the Russian Government and Prime Minister Primakov is well known and I doubt that it has changed, although they, too, feel a huge degree of frustration about the way their attempts to try to get a peace process on track have been thwarted by Milosevic. As for swift retaliation, we will judge that according to the needs that may arise at the time. It would not be wise speculate on that further, but people should know that, if our forces are attacked, there will be retaliation and it will be severe. Finally, my understanding is that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence is indeed opening the debate on Thursday.
Mr. Michael Colvin (Romsey):
The Prime Minister has said that action is now required to avert a humanitarian disaster, but the situation that he has graphically described shows that a humanitarian disaster already exists in Kosovo. I accept the exchanges that have taken place about the use of ground forces, but the Prime Minister said in reply to one question that as many as 100,000 troops might be required if ground forces had to be committed to follow up air strikes. The Serb army numbers more than 200,000, so many more than 100,000 troops would be required.
Following on from the Prime Minister's answer that troops would be deployed to Macedonia if there was a direct threat to the extraction force of 10,000 troops there, I remind him that the Macedonian army numbers only 20,000; it is a tenth the size of the Serbian army. What contingency plans have the Government, with our NATO allies, to deploy troops to Macedonia quickly--we lack heavy lift--so that they are ready to take action against Serbia, if that is required?
The Prime Minister:
There are already many troops and heavy weapons in Macedonia--and, indeed, elsewhere--so NATO certainly has the means to visit severe retaliation on Milosevic should he attack any NATO forces. In respect of the ground troops, I agree that more than 100,000 would be needed; that is the very reason why I am suggesting the difficulties of taking such a course.
The hon. Gentleman says that a humanitarian disaster already exists in Kosovo. That is why we need to act, but if we were to fail to act--if we were simply to allow Serb forces to carry on their repression, without even the inhibition that the threat of action might have--there is absolutely no doubt at all what would happen. They would repeat what happened at Racak many times over.
Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North):
Is not the choice for the international community simple? Either we allow the atrocities--crimes against humanity--to continue or we decide to act, and act decisively. We listen to the voices of non-intervention in this House, but almost without exception, those who argue for non-intervention and issue constant warnings of what disasters will follow if we intervene were wrong about the Falklands in 1982, wrong about Kuwait in 1991, and certainly wrong in
The Prime Minister:
My hon. Friend is quite right to point out that there are those who can always find a reason never to act. I emphasise that the consequences of this action will be serious--we know that--but as we have said before, the consequences of not acting are more serious still.
Mr. Paul Keetch (Hereford):
While I agree with the Prime Minister about the professionalism of our armed forces in the region--I have constituents out there, as have other hon. Members--what British civilians are there on the ground? Is he aware that British subjects havebeen targeted for kidnapping and killing by terrorist organisations in recent months? How will he ensure that British civilians are kept out of events as much as possible?
The Prime Minister:
We have given clear advice to any civilian organisations operating in the area and we give what protection we possibly can. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we are well aware of the danger and threat to our civilians.
Mrs. Alice Mahon (Halifax):
Does the Prime Minister accept that many of us genuinely believe that bombing a sovereign state could cause more, not fewer, civilian casualties, and could destabilise the whole of south-eastern Europe because the Serbs will almost certainly fight to defend their homeland? Is he aware that I visited Macedonia a few weeks ago? Not a single Macedonian Member of Parliament or citizen to whom I spoke believed that Macedonia should be used by NATO to take aggressive action against the Serbs--although the Macedonians rightly expect protection, given that they have allowed NATO extraction forces to be based there. They believed that dialogue was the best way forward. Perhaps a different way--perhaps putting sanctions against the Serbs on the table--might have helped, although sanctions harm the economies of emerging democracies in the area.
What will the strategy be if the bombing fails? What will we do if what is rightly described as the disgraceful action against the Kosovars continues?
The Prime Minister:
We have set our objective; we intend to succeed in it. I agree with my hon. Friend that dialogue is the best way forward. That is why we went the extra mile to put together the talks process at Rambouillet. We put together the agreements last October between Milosevic and Richard Holbrooke. We have done everything that we possibly could to make dialogue work, but we are left with the realisation that dialogue has not worked. Then what do we do? Do we simply allow the repression to continue, or do we act?
In the past couple of years, there have been several occasions when the Government have faced that dilemma. No one wants to commit our forces unless we really have to do so, and everyone understands that the consequences of doing so will always include an element of uncertainty, but if we do not do that and we allow this to continue, then what? That is also a fair question to ask.
My hon. Friend talks about the Serbs and their homeland. The concept of Kosovo as an autonomous area within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia strikes the right balance, recognising that the vast majority of people in Kosovo are ethnic Albanians and that it is their homeland too. All they desire to do is to be allowed to live in peace there, free from repression. We surely have to be the people who give them that chance.
Mr. David Curry (Skipton and Ripon):
What happens if bombing does not bring President Milosevic to the negotiating table?
The Prime Minister:
I set our objective clearly. It is to curb Milosevic's ability to repress the Kosovo population. We want him to come back to the negotiating table, but the precise minimum objective of any military action has to be to curb his ability--to reduce his ability--to suppress the Kosovar Albanian people. That has to be the task that we set ourselves. We can fulfil that objective. It is the right objective and it ties in, rightly, with our justification, which is primarily--as I set out in my statement--humanitarian.
Mr. Kevin McNamara (Hull, North):
Although I support my right hon. Friend's statement, we have still not had the answer to the question, "What if?" If it is our aim to curb the Yugoslav ability to persecute the Albanian people, the logic of that must be that we put in land troops. If we do not put in troops on the ground and merely use air strikes, we are left in a worse position than when we began.
Is not the logic of the position that, eventually, we will end up with at least a United Nations protectorate or a NATO protectorate, if not an independent Kosovo, with the problems that that will have? How will we be certain that the Dayton accords will be upheld by all the signatories to them?
The Prime Minister:
I do not accept that land troops are necessary to curb repression in Kosovo. Air strikes properly targeted--directed against the military capability of the oppressor--can achieve the objective that we set ourselves.
Secondly, my hon. Friend mentioned the concept of a United Nations protectorate. There is no notion of establishing a UN protectorate in the strict legal sense, but obviously the purpose of putting in ground troops was to back up an agreement--a constitutional settlement--in Kosovo, and that, of course, is what we still want to do if it is possible. A precondition, however, is that an agreement is in place to which not merely the Kosovar Albanians but the Serbs themselves will agree.
I believe that the action that we have proposed will be successful.
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