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Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East): Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that one of the most warmly greeted statements made by the Deputy Prime Minister last night was the warning to any Serb forces or individual troops who committed atrocities that they would have to account for their actions in a war crime tribunal, no matter how long it took? Would he like to take this opportunity to reinforce that warning and to apply it to President Milosevic himself?
Mr. Cook: I welcome the hon. Gentleman's question. Judge Arbour has again confirmed that the remit of the International War Crimes Tribunal extends to Kosovo.
We shall hold personally responsible not just any field commander who is present when his forces carry out atrocities in Kosovo, but their political leaders in Belgrade.
Mr. Simon Hughes (Southwark, North and Bermondsey): In addition to that clear and important message, will the Foreign Secretary reinforce the message that was implicit in what he said a moment ago: that the people of Britain and our European sister countries want the people of Yugoslavia to have the same freedom as the Albanians to enjoy what they regard as important in Kosovo? We do not want to deprive them of that. The offer of such a settlement remains on the table today, as it has for the past six months.
Mr. Cook: We have repeatedly told President Milosevic and his Government that we want to find another relationship with Belgrade. If Belgrade changes its politics of repression and ethnic confrontation, we shall be willing to look at ways to build bridges between Serbia and the modern Europe. The tragedy for the people of Serbia is that they can see all the countries on their borders building bridges with Europe. Two of those countries are in the process of accession to full membership of the European Union. Others have developed trade agreements with the European Union. They are all building bridges that are closed to the people of Serbia solely because of the politics of their Government in Belgrade. If that changes, the relationship between Serbia and the rest of Europe can change as well.
The first reason why we took action was that we were aware of the atrocities that had been carried out and we had the capacity to intervene, but that is not the only reason. Our confidence in our peace and security depends on the credibility of NATO. Last October, NATO guaranteed the ceasefire that President Milosevic signed. He has comprehensively shattered that ceasefire. What possible credibility would NATO have next time that our security was challenged if we did not honour that guarantee? The consequences of NATO inaction would be far worse than the result of NATO action.
As a result of NATO's expansion to include Hungary, it has a common border with Serbia. How can we be committed to securing peace and maintaining the stability of NATO's borders while one of our immediate neighbours is conducting a violent military operation?
If we had turned a blind eye to the bloodshed and conflict over the border, the outcome would not have been peaceful. During the past year, President Milosevic has suffered from the delusion that he can defeat the Kosovo Liberation Army by confronting the whole Albanian population. The predictable result has been that the strength of the KLA has grown from a few hundred to more than 20,000. President Milosevic has been its best recruiting sergeant. As a result, the conflict is greater and it would have continued to get worse if we had not intervened to curb President Milosevic.
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow):
Will my right hon. Friend refer to relations with the Russians? I was talking to The Economist's correspondent in Moscow, Edward Lucas, who asked what would happen to Russian cargo ships or aircraft that might be carrying arms to the Serbs. Are they likely to be intercepted by NATO forces?What is the position of the valuable contacts that my right
Mr. Cook:
I assure my hon. Friend that that contact and co-operation will not come to an end through any wish on our part. I do not believe that there will be any wish for that from the Russian Government. My offer of help with radioactive waste in Murmansk was very warmly received by the authorities there. I am confident that they will want to proceed with what they know is a solution to a pressing problem.
We also maintain regular dialogue with the Russian Government. I was present in Berlin last night when we interrupted our European Council in order that Chancellor Schroder, as President of that Council, could speak on the telephone to Mr. Primakov. Russia has been supportive throughout of our attempts to broker an agreement through negotiation. I regret the fact that we cannot find common cause on the need for military action, but I am absolutely confident that Russia shares our impatience with President Milosevic and that he must bear the main responsibility for the situation in which his country is placed.
Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot):
I heard on the radio this morning that the Prime Minister had said that he would talk to Prime Minister Primakov today. Given that it is extremely important that we should understand the Russians' sensitivities and do nothing that is too provocative towards them, has the Prime Minister yet had the opportunity to speak to Mr. Primakov, and can the Foreign Secretary report back to us on that conversation?
Mr. Cook:
I understand that it has not yet been possible to make the arrangements for that call, but I agreed with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister last night that we should seek to maintain the dialogue with Mr. Primakov as a matter of urgency. I will also seek to speak to my opposite number, the Russian Foreign Minister. We are very anxious to maintain dialogue.
I want to take this opportunity to respond to a point that I neglected when I replied to my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). I am confident that the Russian Government will not seek to break the United Nations arms embargo on Serbia. I know that voices have been raised in Russia urging that; but as yet we have had no suggestion from the Russian Government that they intend to supply arms to Serbia, and I do not expect that they will do so. We will certainly want to confirm that when we speak to the Russians.
If we had not acted now, we would have been obliged to act in the future when the situation had become worse. If the situation had deteriorated and the conflict had continued, it would have spilled over into the neighbouring countries, at which point NATO would have been forced to act, but in more difficult and more dangerous circumstances.
We have withdrawn all our diplomatic and other Government personnel from Yugoslavia, and for some time we have warned all other British nationals to leave. There are several thousand British service personnel deployed elsewhere in the region, in Bosnia and in Macedonia. I repeat to the House the clear warning given by the Prime Minister, that any action that targets those personnel will be met with a response that will be swift and severe.
Responsibility for the present position lies squarely with President Milosevic.
Mr. Tony Benn (Chesterfield):
Article 51 of the United Nations charter says that any nation that is attacked has the right of self-defence. Was the statement that my right hon. Friend has just made intended to contradict the legal right of Yugoslavia, under bombardment, to defend itself?
Mr. Cook:
Certainly not. The statement that I have made is fully in line with article 51: if our troops are attacked, we will employ self-defence to protect them. We are acting clearly on the legal principle that the action is justified to halt a humanitarian catastrophe.
Mr. Cynog Dafis (Ceredigion)
rose--
Mr. Cook:
I will not give way again, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.
There is a pressing need to stop the crisis. The best way in which President Milosevic can halt further attacks on Serbia and on his forces is by halting the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo for which he is responsible.
This is not the first humanitarian crisis for which President Milosevic is responsible. In the early 1990s, he was at war first with Slovenia and then with Croatia. The massacres at Vukovar and the merciless bombardment of Dubrovnik were representative of a war driven by ethnic hatred. In the mid-1990s, Milosevic was the prime player in the war in Bosnia which gave our language the hideous term, "ethnic cleansing". Only after three years of fighting, in which a quarter of a million people were killed, did NATO find the resolve to use force.
It is President Milosevic's brand of ethnic confrontation that has brought a decade of violence and suffering to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia.
Mr. Cook:
I said that I would not give way again. Others want to speak in this debate.
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