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Mr. Simon Hughes (Southwark, North and Bermondsey): Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that for those of us who come to the view that the action can be supported only reluctantly, not least because it is the first time in our lifetime that we have acted against another European country, the other justification to add to the legal ones is that it is the common view of all the democratic partners in the regional organisation to which he refers that, in the interests of our continent and
its peace, it is necessary to support the people of Yugoslavia against a Government who are interested in repressing them and their liberties, not defending them?
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Michael J. Martin): Order. That is a speech, not an intervention.
Mr. Campbell: My hon. Friend has made his point and it is well worth making.
The Government's military aim has been adequately set out both by the Foreign Secretary and by the Secretary of State for Defence elsewhere, but there is as yet no clear political aim. I suggest to the Government that that clear political aim should be to damage the military infrastructure on which the Milosevic regime is based, to an extent that that regime is no longer willing to tolerate that damage and is persuaded--even compelled--to return to negotiation. If we are to achieve a stable and durable solution, that can best be achieved by the creation of a protectorate--
Mr. Alan Clark (Kensington and Chelsea):
Ah, ground troops--half a million should do it.
Mr. Campbell:
The right hon. Gentleman need not become over-exercised--I shall come to his point in a moment. The optimum outcome would be one that was achieved by negotiation, but if negotiation were to prove unsuccessful, we would be bound to consider other means at that stage.
It is wrong to say that we would never consider further military action, because we cannot predict the conditions or the circumstances of the time. One would want to take into account the extent of possible opposition, the likely effectiveness of opposition forces, the possible or probable levels of casualties on both sides, the availability of forces to carry out the task, and the political cohesion of the allies. If those factors sound familiar, they should: they are precisely the considerations that arose during the Gulf war when, despite all predictions to the contrary, the issue of going beyond the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait and going on to Baghdad arose as a serious one for consideration by the allies. The decision on that occasion is known, but it was for consideration at the time, not by reference to a prescriptive position adopted in advance.
Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East):
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was right to return from Berlin for this debate. He will have been told about the response of the House to yesterday's statement and he will have judged from the comments today that there is at least this consensus in the House: we all recognise the gravity of the situation; we are all concerned about the safety of our troops and those of our allies; and we all recognise the enormous uncertainties.
There was--on this point perhaps, I part company with some hon. Members in our democracy--a certain inevitability in the move towards war once President Milosevic had rejected the deal that was on offer at Rambouillet and Paris. The reluctance to move towards war was demonstrated by this week's final attempt to find a solution and to issue a final warning to President Milosevic, who showed Mr. Holbrooke that he was still obdurate.
Why is there uncertainty? It is partly because of the recognition on both sides of the House that there is a lot of history in the Balkans; some may say that there is too much history in the Balkans. During the second world war, the Serbs were our allies. They had a magnificent role in fighting against the Nazis, while some who are now our allies were ready to collude with the Nazis at that time. The Serbs know the terrain; they have high morale; and they are united.
The uncertainty is due also to the recognition that bombs do not bring peace; but there is no consensus among our allies for ground troops to be committed to the quagmire and minefield of the Balkans. That was dramatically demonstrated in the United States, when the Senate only just voted--by 58 votes to 41--in favour of air strikes. There is no serious prospect of the US committing ground troops to the area, save after an agreement and only to underpin any such agreement. All our allies would display the same reluctance to commit ground troops.
There is recognition also of the great collateral political damage that will have been caused, not only to Montenegro, which was separating itself in part from President Milosevic and Serbia, but, more important, to relations with Russia. The Contact Group's consensus and political unity with Russia, which was acting alongside NATO, has been a great prize, and it is sad that we have forfeited that prize as a result of the bombing. We naturally understand the sensitivities in the Duma and why Premier Primakov has to freeze relations with NATO.
If some in Russia now threaten to break the embargo, however, we must ask whether they have already done so in part, and I cite the example of the Russian aircraft that was stopped in Azerbaijan two or three days ago. By breaking the embargo, they would wholly undermine the principled position that they purported to take at the Security Council of the United Nations, because they would be breaching a UN embargo. The collateral political damage must be put in the balance.
There is recognition also of the danger of mission creep and, because the area is so combustible, the danger of other states, including some of our NATO allies, being engulfed.
The problem that we must all also recognise is that, when the conflict ends, it may not be possible to re-establish the status quo ante. I heard the Deputy Prime Minister say yesterday that the Rambouillet package is still on the table, but that assumes a willingness on the part of the Serbs and Albanian Kosovars to live together in a new Kosovo. After the ethnic cleansing and Serbian
heavy armour bombardments, which has destroyed villages, does anyone seriously expect people to live together in an autonomous Kosovo? That is very unlikely.
Mr. Cynog Dafis (Ceredigion):
May I raise with the hon. Gentleman an issue that, surprisingly, has not so far been mentioned in the debate? Many fear that the bombing will enrage the Serbs and encourage them to retaliate on a large scale against the Kosovars. The issue has been raised by a Kosovar journalist in The Guardian today. He says that, unless ground troops are committed, there will be no way of averting a humanitarian catastrophe.
Mr. Anderson:
That is part of the high-risk operation, but in spite of it, the Foreign Secretary and his NATO allies were right to go in.
Why do I say that? We must all recognise that President Milosevic was offered an excellent deal at Rambouillet. He would have retained the integrity of Yugoslavia; sanctions against his country would have been progressively reduced; and he would have secured protection of the Serb minority in Kosovo. All that, and the possibility of a new chapter in the relationship between Yugoslavia and Europe--our Europe--has been undermined as a result of his intransigence.
How do we justify the bombing, with all its high risks? As the Foreign Secretary has underlined, the very credibility of NATO was at stake. Having huffed and puffed and given so many final warnings, we would have been incredible, as we would on any future occasion on which NATO sought to threaten other countries, if we had crept away in the face of the very clear evidence of further bombing and further ethnic cleansing. I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the remarkable unity not only in NATO, including the three new members since 12 March, but among other countries that have suffered from the Balkan tragedy, such as Romania, which has shown total support for the action.
I will not go over the criteria of the just war theme in detail, but the cause is just on humanitarian grounds. It is absolutely clear that the Government and our NATO allies had exhausted all other means. The action has limited aims and methods. International law has moved on from when we said that the integrity of sovereign states was sacrosanct. That disappeared, or was at least diminished, with the formulation of the universal declaration of human rights. The matter was taken further following the Helsinki process in 1975, and recently with the development of the doctrine--not obligation--of intervention due to an imminent or actual humanitarian catastrophe.
Mr. Christopher Gill (Ludlow)
rose--
Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate)
rose--
Mr. Anderson:
I shall give way only to thehon. Member for Ludlow (Mr. Gill), as many other hon. Members want to speak.
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