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Dr. Phyllis Starkey (Milton Keynes, South-West) rose--
Mr. King: May I make a little progress? I do not want to take too much time.
The example of northern Iraq leads me to my next point. I hear the facile statement that air power can never work and we are bound to need ground troops. We did not need ground troops in northern Iraq. I visited Operation Provide Comfort, which was a spectacular success, and we had one Royal Marine commando helping to provide humanitarian relief. Medecins sans Frontieres was operating there as well. There was no Iraqi Government presence because the area was occupied by ground troops--Kurdish Peshmerga, who had a level playing field because they were not facing Iraqi air power and helicopter gunships or the sort of oppression that they had not been able to resist previously.
What interests me about Kosovo is the future situation on the ground. Degrading the military assets, capability and resources of the Yugoslav army--and, therefore, its ability to oppress the people in Kosovo--raises the question of how the Kosovo Liberation Army will react and what its activities will be if it has rather greater freedom of manoeuvre. I repeat the call made by the hon. Member for Swansea, East for restraint by the KLA, which is very important. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary will support that.
If the KLA seeks to exploit what the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife yesterday referred to as the semi-protectorate situation that will exist, the arguments for the action that the Government have taken will become extremely difficult to sustain. That action may be considered merely to have presented an opportunity for another side to oppress and to score some points in return. In such circumstances, subject to the position on the ground, air power can make a contribution.
I should make one further point, in parenthesis, before returning to my key plea to the Government. When the Prime Minister made his statement, I raised the question of support for our armed forces. I am seriously worried, because it is not sufficient to say in the House how splendid our armed forces are and how proud we are of them, unless we accompany those tributes with support. Our armed forces must have confidence that they will be supported. One of the features of the conflicts in the Falklands and in the Gulf was that the forces we put on the ground had the fullest possible support for the task that they had to undertake. I am worried about the overstretch that our forces will now face. The Prime Minister said that he was confident that our contribution could be sustained. I should be grateful if the Secretary of State for Defence would explain to the House how that will be achieved. To all other observers, it seems that we are facing an unsustainable situation.
The Government's action was the least worst of the alternatives. Having committed our forces to this action, they are entitled to support, provided that our forces know that there is an end objective. The objective must be to keep the political track open. We must continue to repeat the message that that opportunity for negotiation is
available and that the bombing need not continue. The offensive need not be sustained, provided President Milosevic responds to the approaches that have been made to him.
If those approaches are to be successful, they must be accompanied by a communications offensive in Yugoslavia. I was struck by something that I heard on the radio this morning. Someone who was interviewed in the street said that he did not know who to be more angry with, Mr. Milosevic or NATO. The challenge for the Government and for NATO is to ensure that people are more angry with Mr. Milosevic over the present events in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. If we win that battle, that--perhaps more than the bombs and the offensive--may persuade Mr. Milosevic to change his mind about the disastrous course on which he is embarked.
Mr. Harry Barnes (North-East Derbyshire):
Nothing I am about to say excuses Milosevic, Tudjman and many other people involved in hideous acts of ethnic cleansing and attacks on populations who cannot defend themselves. However, I want to begin by pointing out that the former Yugoslavia was destroyed from outside, not from inside.
First, the former Yugoslavia was destroyed economically and politically. It was destroyed economically because of the requirement of international financial institutions that debts should be repaid to international banks at all costs, despite massive deprivation, problems with communication, agriculture and employment, and divisions between different areas of Yugoslavia because of those massive economic pressures. Its Government were obliged by the terms of the International Monetary Fund and others to cut social expenditure to meet their requirements.
The Yugoslavian tragedy is that the country has been placed in a position similar to many African nations. Almost all the tragedies in Africa are associated with similar economic conditions and backgrounds. Only a few nations, such as Tanzania, that have had considerable international debt have been able to avoid break-up and conflict such as occurred in Yugoslavia.
Secondly, the former Yugoslavia was destroyed from outside by the German-inspired recognition of the secession of two of the richest republics in Yugoslavia: Slovenia and Croatia. The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and the conflicts that followed led to the crisis in Bosnia. We must recognise the background to the present situation for which the world community has a serious responsibility.
Mr. Gill:
Is not the significance of the German recognition of those two states the fact that it happened at a time when the European Union was talking seriously
Mr. Barnes:
I realise that the Conservative Government had some responsibility for agreeing to those arrangements and to that recognition. They responded to those pressures, and did not take action to try to sustain the position of Yugoslavia, to rebuild it and to encourage multi-ethnic links.
Mr. Andrew Tyrie (Chichester):
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Barnes:
I want to make some progress.
The economic and political circumstances that I have described enabled Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic to play the ethnic card. The horrors that we have witnessed are their responsibility and that of others involved in this terrible conflict. That card is now being played in the Serbian-KLA conflict in Kosovo.
Mr. Tyrie:
The hon. Gentleman seems to have completely missed the most important cause of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, which was the rise of Serbian nationalism driven by Milosevic. Milosevic initiated Serbian nationalism in a dispute in Kosovo, and that subsequently led him into ill judged military adventures in Croatia. The idea that the IMF or Germany alone were largely responsible for the collapse of the former Yugoslavia misses the key ingredient, which was Serbian nationalism led by Milosevic.
Mr. Barnes:
My argument is that Serbian nationalism led by Milosevic was a key element in the conflict, but the circumstance that allowed him to play the ethnic card was the collapse of Yugoslavia through the economic and political pressures from outside its borders. That in no way excuses Milosevic. For a long period, the political leaders of Yugoslavia had not played the ethnic card: there was considerable pressure during the time of Tito and others not to do so. When the circumstances changed, Milosevic used it--initially in Kosovo. He met Serbs in Kosovo and gave in to the pressure. He later went to rallies where he played the ethnic card and has used it since in the most terrible way. He is utterly to be condemned.
However, we should not ignore the background to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia or deny our responsibility for it. If we do so, we shall be ignoring the fact that international action must be taken to ensure that such conflicts are removed from the world and other opportunities are advanced.
Dr. Starkey:
If my hon. Friend is implying that western nations have responsibility for this situation, does that not make the argument even stronger that we should now intervene to stop the current undoubted humanitarian crisis?
Mr. Barnes:
I suggest that my hon. Friend should wait to hear my conclusions. She may be somewhat surprised by them.
Once the conflict had broken out between Croatia and the Serb paramilitary forces, it was difficult to find a means of preventing or containing ethnic cleansing from outside--although I noted the earlier observation by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Mr. Wareing), on Krajina, that we might have been able to act against Croatia to that end. Two considerable powers were in conflict, both receiving logistic and political support locally that squeezed out those who were trying to establish peace and reconciliation. It was necessary to resort to different areas for defence.
In such circumstances, international intervention was awkward, although many brave people in the wider Yugoslavia stood up to press for peace and reconciliation. In the early days of the conflict, a "peace caravan" travelled through Croatia and Serbia. It was similar to the "peace train" that travels between Northern Ireland and the Republic in a bid to end paramilitary activities in that island.
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