| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
6.3 pm
Mr. John Swinney (North Tayside): I begin with two primary points that set out my party's position. First, we express to the service men and women who are taking part in this action our full support and our good wishes for their security and safety.
Secondly, I am sure that, regardless of individual or party views of the bombing strategy in the Balkans, all hon. Members share the same deep concern for the displaced and terrorised Albanian population of Kosovo. Their tragedy is played out nightly in front of us, but their suffering can only be imagined as we hear of the appalling atrocities and inhumanity being wreaked by a Serbian army, which must be called to account before the bar of international opinion, as its commanders must before the international court. It is clear beyond any doubt, beyond any debate, that Milosevic and his regime are responsible for this slur on our humanity.
As we debate the gravest humanitarian catastrophe to befall our continent since the second world war, the number of expelled civilians continues to grow. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN monitors in the region this morning estimated that the total number of refugees is 365,000 in Albania and 132,500 in Macedonia. An additional 73,500 Kosovars have been displaced to Montenegro. That is indeed appalling. We must use all the resources at our disposal to help those in extremity today, and we must find a way in which to make certain that the ordinary Albanian Kosovar population will return in peace to their homes. In doing so, we should not underestimate the scale of the challenge of persuading terrified Kosovars to return to their homes. At least one Labour Member has made that point clearly.
The bombing campaign is now the central challenge to us all in seeking a just and effective solution to the Kosovo crisis. The issue is whether the stated aims of the NATO campaign have been achieved, or can be achieved. I submit that they have not. Indeed, there are no signs of an ability to do so. The debate on ground forces, which has dominated many speeches so far, shows that, as does the increasing information from inside NATO, where grave concerns are being expressed.
Mr. Jimmy Hood (Clydesdale):
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Swinney:
I have only 10 minutes and I wish to make my comments.
This is not a party political issue. The issue is being debated in houses and workplaces throughout the country. It is a matter for the views and consciences of those in all parts of the political spectrum. Concerns about the current NATO strategy that have been expressed by members of my party have not been voiced in isolation. Some of the strongest remarks have been made by serving and former members of the military, who know that this campaign is not working and cannot work.
That view is informed by the gradual publication of the real views of military planners, politicians and decision makers around the world. Last week, the chairman of the United States joint chiefs of staff gave evidence to the Senate armed services committee. General Henry Shelton told Committee members that the air war might fail to achieve the prime objective of compelling Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo. He was expressing a view that was given to Madeleine Albright before the campaign started, yet she and her advisers persisted in the belief that 24 or 48 hours of bombing would conclude the matter. The evidence of four weeks shows that judgment to have been unsubstantiated.
General Shelton's view is amplified by the former commander of United Nations forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Sir Michael Rose. Writing in one of the Sunday newspapers this weekend, he said:
It strikes me that, when an individual of the military experience and calibre of Sir Michael Rose makes such an assessment, it should be listened to. The Government may of course choose to express repugnance at such comments, as they did at earlier interventions along similar lines. It would be wise, even now, for better sense to prevail.
The concerns of military experts such as Sir Michael are also shared by many in the House. Today, I read with interest--I also listened with care to his speech--the comments of the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell), who wrote:
Mr. Hood:
Is the hon. Gentleman reaffirming the Scottish National party's official policy that it is against the action that has been taken in Kosovo? Is he reaffirming his leader's view?
Mr. Swinney:
If the hon. Gentleman had listened to my comments, he would know that that is abundantly clear. There is a basic right in a democracy to be free to express views sincerely held and well argued, and to show mutual respect for divergent views. That mutual respect is not always shown in this House, as we have seen today.
The key issue now is what comes next in this conflict. I draw hon. Members' attention to today's edition of The New York Times. Under the headline,
Apparently, the oil blockade has not been implemented owing to doubts about its legality. It would, say some, require a UN resolution. Is it conceivable that there can be a bombing campaign for almost four weeks without UN sanction, yet an oil blockade cannot be implemented for lack of one? It is beyond belief.
I believe, my party believes and many people in this country and overseas believe that the bombing campaign has failed in its objectives. Now is the time for new thinking--for moving forward to find solutions that do not further escalate the situation.
Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East):
The House is overwhelmingly behind the Government, but that has not been evident from the series of speeches that we have just heard. That is because this is a democratic House, because there are many uncertainties, and because it is very proper for colleagues in our democratic assembly to make the sober and sobering speeches that they have made. Four weeks into the campaign, the picture remains very gloomy. Progress is not as great as we had hoped, and there is frustration about that, in the absence of clear evidence that the war aims with which we set out are being achieved.
There is a new wave of atrocities, and new evidence that many hundreds of thousands of people in Kosovo are now in the hills, close to starvation. Will my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence say what air drops are being contemplated to alleviate the plight of those people in the hills? The war is escalating. We hear that United States reservists are being called to the front.
There is a risk of political collapse throughout the Balkans, so the stakes are very high. This conflict is very different from the Falklands conflict, in which the aim was clear--to get the Argentines out of those islands. It is very different from the Iraq conflict in 1990-91, in which the aim was clear--to force Iraq to leave Kuwait. In the Balkans, the aims must necessarily be far muddier.
It was very proper for the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard), in a very good speech, to ask for clarity on several aspects--for example, concerning the future constitutional status of Kosovo. We have moved on from Rambouillet, which is dead in many respects. We now talk about some international status, but there is no clear precedent for that. We know about the position in Namibia, in Cambodia and in eastern Slavonia, but each differs from that in the Balkans. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary airily talks about a mixture of international bodies. Surely there should be a United Nations trusteeship, with others helping as appropriate.
There is uncertainty as to how we regard President Milosevic. Is he--as President Clinton now apparently says--to be regarded as a war criminal, who must be hounded out of office, or is he a possible negotiating partner in the endgame in Kosovo? As colleagues have properly said, there are other potential war criminals who are leaders in Balkan states.
What about the role of ground troops? Is it plausible that, at some time, President Milosevic will run up a white flag and say, "I surrender," without any ground forces entering his territory? There would need to be a case for troops to enter in an aggressive posture, rather than by consent. If we insist that ground troops will not enter unless by consent, we must scale down our war aims and realign those aims to the resources that we are prepared to deploy.
It is important for us to point out all the complexities from our armchairs--from the comfort of the Chamber--but the Government had to take decisions, and act decisively. This is a conflict which NATO--whose 50th anniversary is this week--dare not lose, and ultimately cannot lose, because it has vast resources at its disposal, whereas the Serbs have limited resources, rapidly depleted, at their disposal. It is a conflict that Milosevic must not win, because of the precedent that that would set for others who might also be intent on ethnic cleansing in that highly fragile region.
In the immediate future, therefore, we must maintain the military pressure and build our available forces in theatre. We must give President Milosevic a clear signal that we will go as far as is necessary--that we are in earnest, not bluffing. NATO unity is precious, and it is vital that that message be passed to President Milosevic, so that he is in absolutely no doubt.
We must build up our military capacity incrementally. It is true that United Kingdom forces are now in Macedonia, but there are only 14 Chieftain tanks there. That is absurd if we wish to show credibly that we have the will, if we need to, to enter with ground forces. We must give a signal to President Milosevic of greater co-operation with the KLA--at least in terms of intelligence and non-lethal co-operation--and we must show a commitment to the International War Crimes Tribunal, by offering to give it greater help in the form of personnel and resources. By acting in all those ways, we shall give a clear signal.
However, we must adopt a two-track approach--both military and political. We should pursue the military strategy energetically, but we must be ready, in the fairly near future, to rebalance the political and military strategy. That means increasingly consulting Russia as a partner and seeking to work with the United Nations, ever to be ready to accept an outcome that may be less than total victory, if the broad objectives that we seek can be achieved--such as that of avoiding a wider Balkans war.
We should leave the door open for compromise, and avoid that absolutist language which, alas, is used by some retired US generals and even President Clinton. To make an eventual negotiated settlement possible, we should avoid using words such as holocaust and genocide.
If possible, we should avoid making Serbia a wasteland, ruined and humiliated. We should think of the example of Germany in 1918, and the ghost that haunted Europe later. We should remember the complexities of the history of the Balkans--the fault line of Europe. A multi-ethnic empire is unravelling, with all the consequences that might flow from that. We should remember that, before Racak, the KLA had killed more civilians than the Serbs--and there is the memory of Krajina.
However, compromise must come from strength, not from weakness. It may include keeping an open mind about the nature of the military--yes, military--force that will have to enter Kosovo to ensure that the refugees may return in safety and stability. The OSCE and NATO may play a part, but they will have to work very closely indeed with Russia--and, as far as possible, do so under the umbrella of the United Nations. Compromise would not
rule out partition if greater goals could thereby be achieved. Remember that the boundaries in that area are often very ill-defined, as we saw in Bosnia.
"air-power is a blunt weapon, wholly inappropriate for use by itself in this form of conflict".
He went on to suggest that air power cannot win and that, as a full military campaign seems impossible to organise on any reasonable time scale and would in any case simply escalate international tension, some diplomatic solution needs to be found.
"We are continuing to bomb as if bombing alone would produce the result we wish. But it has not and it will not."
That view is also taken by many outside the House--distinguished churchmen, innumerable journalists and military experts--and was taken from the beginning by my hon. Friend the Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) in his broadcast three weeks ago.
"U.S. is asking NATO for Sea Blockade of Yugoslavia's Oil",
one of America's most respected newspapers reports on the need to apply full sanctions to Yugoslavia. Incredibly, oil is still being delivered to the former Yugoslavia. There is incredulity in some parts of NATO that, while oil refineries and storage tanks are being bombed, oil is still being bought by a war machine that could be slowed and stopped by the shortage of that one commodity.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |