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Mr. Andrew Tyrie (Chichester): Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Hood: No, I am sorry. I will not give way, because I have only 10 minutes.
Mention has been made of Russia. I was in Moscow some weeks ago, and I met Russian politicians in the Duma. We understand that Russian presidential and parliamentary elections are pending. Hon. Members are right--I am sure that the Foreign Secretary, who is in his seat, and all Governments understand this--in thinking that the Russians are central to reaching a solution. My view is that the Russians told Milosevic to settle at the Rambouillet peace discussions, but that Milosevic did not believe that NATO would take action. To use an unparliamentary term, Milosevic told the Russians to get stuffed. The Russians are now in a difficult position.
Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden):
I recognise that the Government and NATO were faced with a sensitive situation following the breakdown of the Rambouillet talks. The choice was clear to many at the time; either we did nothing, or we intervened on humanitarian grounds to end the brutality of ethnic cleansing. I was not surprised, therefore, that the Government--together with their NATO partners--took the unanimous decision to support intervention by the use of force. Nor was I surprised that, faced with the prospect of a well-armed enemy in a hostile environment, the nations concerned were reluctant to risk the prospect of heavy casualties, and opted for an aerial bombardment.
The Foreign Secretary will accept that there was a desire to contain the conflict and to prevent it from spreading through the Balkans, leading to the involvement of Russia. There has been every attempt to try to keep Russia on-side. I recognise the political considerations, having been in the Army in the second world war and, subsequently, a Minister under Lord Carrington when we had to deal with the opening difficulties in Northern
Ireland. That reminds me that we must balance military force with military feasibility and political consideration if we are to bring public opinion along with us.
What worries me is that public opinion expects quick results and--invariably in today's atmosphere, and as a result of our history since the war--a bloodless war. It would be inexcusable if, in the course of listening to public opinion and looking at the difficulties, we allowed the reputation of NATO to suffer. That is the point on which I wish to concentrate.
As a member of the NATO parliamentary assembly, I--along with colleagues from the House--will be attending the NATO summit this weekend. I am concerned about the effect of what we say there and what we do now in Kosovo on people's present perception of NATO, and of the alliance itself. For 50 years, the alliance has kept the peace. I conclude that if the public are likely to grow more and more impatient about what is happening, they will look to NATO and say that NATO has failed. It would be inexcusable to allow that to happen.
Throughout the cold war, NATO was regarded as the most successful political and military alliance in modern history. It faced, on a fixed border, a tough enemy with a single front line. NATO bluffed it out; not just with words, but with a willingness and conviction that, if necessary, force would be used. There was no question that nuclear forces would have been used if there had been an attack by the then Soviet Union.
Since then, NATO has turned its attention to adapting the alliance to enlarge its membership. It has embarked on a new relationship with Russia, as a result of the NATO Russian Founding Act. It has made other arrangements through "Partnership for Peace" with former enemy countries. NATO is looking at the new threats to European security which could emanate from outside its previously established frontiers. NATO started on a formidable task of reshaping its strategy which was not complete when this situation blew up in our faces.
How do we give effect to the NATO strategy in a way that entails implementing changes in its modus operandi? The thinking is there, but it is not reflected on the ground. There is a recognition of the need for more flexible forces, which are capable of quicker responses and able to cope with sudden outbreaks of violence, terrorism, drugs, refugees, chemical and biological missiles, as well as with peace enforcement, peacekeeping and regional disputes that could affect the security of the NATO Euro-Atlantic alliance. It would be a tragedy if NATO's capabilities, and our confidence in it, were besmirched during the transition.
Talk of sending thousands of ground troops to deal with the Serbian crisis invariably leads to questions about whether NATO is up to the job. Indeed, such questions have already been asked. I think that we are all aware of the risks, which have been mentioned today. The ports of entry are inadequate, the airfields are limited and the terrain is hostile, favouring guerrilla warfare. In any event, the build-up of additional forces would take some months.
The following question than arises. If ground forces are to be used--and I think that they are needed--which country will bear the biggest burden? Obviously it will be the United States which hitherto has shown a marked reluctance to send troops to NATO to help us to discharge our duty. That is hardly a recipe for a more balanced and efficient alliance.
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow):
Terrible things are happening now, and the only chance of preventing more from happening during the next few weeks will be through entering into talks with President Milosevic, unpalatable and unpopular though that option may be. What other way is there?
Let me ask the Foreign Secretary about war crimes. If he were to learn that, day after day, he and his colleagues were to be arraigned for such crimes, what would be his reaction? It would be to fight to the death. It must also be taken into account--although we may not find it easy to understand--that many Serbs now want to be heroes, as their grandfathers were when they fought the Wehrmacht and were Tito's partisans. That is the psychology. Any ground war would therefore be a formidable undertaking, rendered all the more formidable by the fact that the only point of entry is over Albania, which features an unsatisfactory infrastructure and mountains rising to 6,000 ft. Where else is there any entry?
Let me ask another question. Is it wise for western leaders to repeat time and again that the Kosovar Albanians have asked them to continue the bombardment? Let us suppose that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was a Serbian soldier in Kosovo, and knew that the bombings described by my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon) were taking place in his area, damaging factories and, inevitably, causing collateral damage. What would be his attitude to those who, we are repeatedly told, have asked for the bombing to continue, and to continue more intensely?
My right hon. Friend says that he has spoken to the Foreign Ministers of seven countries. What is the position of the Greeks? We read, for example, that the Mayor of Athens has asked for the bombing to end forthwith. I hope that my right hon. Friend, the Defence Secretary, will tell us something about that when he winds up the debate.
I also want to ask about the Kosovo Liberation Army. In an intervention that was not well received, I directly quoted from the report of the German federal police. Have Ministers seen that report? Have they seen the Europol report? I have seen extracts, but they may have seen the full report. If I am wrong, no doubt they will say so.
I am among those who were here in the late 1960s, during the arguments about Vietnam. If I go into the Lobby tonight with my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), it will be partly because I feel that Parliament has been insufficiently considered in all
this. Thirty years ago, Harold Wilson--who took a rather different view on Vietnam from his party at the beginning--used to sit here hour after hour listening to what was said, as did many senior members of the Government. Harold Wilson--and it was not his party's large majority that made him do this--stood up to pressures from Lyndon Johnson that, because of the financial situation and the state of the pound, were far greater than those being exerted now by an American president. I think that it is a loss to the country that Parliament was not heeded much earlier, when the dissenters could at least have had their say.
During the last debate on Kosovo, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said that there were no problems with the Russians. He had been having valuable discussions about Murmansk, the future of the Soviet Arctic fleet and the millennium, which could potentially lead to a very dangerous situation. Are those discussions continuing, or have they been broken off? The Russians are extremely angry about what they, and those in much of the rest of the world, see as cost-free militarism.
Let me return to the subject of Vietnam for a moment. Troop numbers are increased constantly in the search for the elusive light at the end of the tunnel: that is the situation that we seem to be in. Have we learned from Vietnam?
Let me ask specifically about pollution. What, in the view of Foreign Office Ministers, is the truth about what happened last night, and has happened before, in regard to chemical plants? What happens if a nuclear plant is hit?
There is also a Serbian point of view, which I want to put in the words of a Serbian citizen whom I would prefer not to name. She writes:
The solution that has been given by Sir Michael Howard should be considered. He is Chichele professor of the history of war. He says:
"I restate: the ignorance on which NATO based its attack constitutes criminality.
I am not saying whether that should be endorsed. All I am saying is that it is a view that we had better take account of and that the Serbs are extremely determined people. NATO's bombs have blasted the germinating seeds of democracy out of the soil of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro and ensured that they will not sprout again for a very long time.
To explain by means of the simplest metaphor. You are kindly invited into someone's house. You are plied with cakes and tea. You take up residence. You produce a large, very large, number of children at great speed. You like the house and ask for it to be given you. When this is refused you take out a gun, having previously armed yourself illegally, and try to shoot me. The shot fails so you call in NATO, with its 19 nations, including the most powerful nation in the world, to shoot me for you."
"The alternative is a negotiated settlement that Serbia can live with, even if it does not satisfy the maximal demands of either side. The danger is that public opinion in the West is now becoming so heated that any compromise settlement will be condemned as surrender or, worse, 'appeasement' and no Allied leader will dare to recommend it. But the longer the war goes on, the less likely it is that this option will remain open.
19 Apr 1999 : Column 626
Sometimes making peace requires as much courage as waging war."
Making peace requires as much courage as making war: that is the point that I should like to leave the House with. We should have the courage to start negotiations as the only hope of saving the plight of those people in Kosovo and, indeed, saving much more.
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