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Mr. Blunt: I have listened with great enjoyment to the hon. Gentleman's endorsement of huge aircraft carriers that can float all our aircraft--in addition to C17s. He is now discussing HMS Ocean. Can I take it that he supports an increase in the defence budget from the projected 2.3 per cent. of our gross domestic product in order to pay for all that?
Mr. Hoyle: I would be foolish to be drawn in by somebody who was an adviser to the previous Government and who made all the mistakes at that time. For the hon. Gentleman to try to tempt me with a bit of bait like that is quite ridiculous. Let us move on to more sensible matters that need to be discussed.
The textile industry is in dire straits. What better way to help it than to allow it to play an important part in equipping the armed forces? When one studies MOD policy on international procurement, one sees that that has been the theme behind it, but we have always wanted to ensure that there is a UK market. That remains healthy at 76 per cent., which is an improvement on previous years. Let us ensure that we give UK companies a fair crack of the whip when contracts are being awarded. It cannot make sense that uniforms are imported from Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Canada. We should look for a supply base in the UK.
The number of contracts awarded to UK companies has increased. In 1996-97, 155 contacts were awarded; in 1997-98, 300 contracts were awarded; and in 1998-99, 358 contracts were awarded, so there has been an improvement for the British textile industry. It is an important manufacturing base and we should support it. Pincroft in Adlington in my constituency is one of the leading companies in the world for supplying camouflage for the armed forces, from New Zealand to the Falklands. Clearly, it is best placed to take up further contracts when they are being awarded.
I should also mention the Royal Marines and the fact that a fast response force is the way in which to proceed. The Royal Marines have a major role to play, but we must ensure that they have the best equipment and the best possible support from the MOD. Let us never do things on the cheap again.
It would be remiss of me not to mention the Territorial Army. Ultimately, the TA's equipment has to be stored and we must take a strategic view on that. We have made a slight mistake, especially as regards Chorley and the 101 TA battalion at Lancaster house. Even at this late stage, I urge the Minister to recognise that Chorley has a part to play. If buildings are to be knocked down--[Interruption.] I hear my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline, West (Ms Squire) grumbling. She should understand that the problem is bigger than she realises. She has not yet heard about this issue and I am sorry that she feels that she has to sigh, although she is free to do so if she wishes.
Although decisions have been taken, there is still time to reconsider what happens to Lancaster house, because it has a part to play in the future of the Territorial Army as well as the cadets. What has not been allowed for is the fact that everything that the cadets have now will be replicated. A new building where the existing building is demolished does not make much sense, and in addition, the shooting range used not only by the cadets of the Army and the Air Force, but by the sea cadets will be lost. A major cost will be incurred in trying to rebuild that. I urge the Minister to rethink the future of Chorley, because there is still hope there.
Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood):
It is always a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Chorley (Mr. Hoyle). He clearly cares about the defence of this country. He made his reputation in defence of his local Territorial Army unit, and he made a speech which showed a wide-ranging interest in a number of important equipment issues.
I regret profoundly the loss of the single-service days. Each armed force--each service of the Crown--merits at the very least a day that it can call its own in Parliament, in which we can have a structured debate about the issues that concern that particular service. Today, when we are at war with Serbia--although the Foreign Secretary does not allow us to use the phrase "at war"--I am sure that right hon. and hon. Members would have warmed to the opportunity of being able to pay tribute at length to the air crews of the Royal Air Force who are risking their lives on our behalf over the skies of Serbia and Kosovo, to the Royal Navy and to the Army personnel who have given humanitarian aid. The House should have a debate on equipment, but not at the expense of single-service days.
I shall deal with just one subject. I hope that hon. Members will not think me one-track minded if the subject is mobility. It takes a war to make us realise that our function is never to second-guess military decisions once battle is joined. Our role is to ensure that our service
personnel have the budgets necessary to conceive, define, develop and procure the equipment necessary for success in war; to man, maintain and modernise it; and to sustain it successfully in operations.
One central theme is worth repeating again and again. It is relevant in peacetime operations, incrisis management, peacekeeping, war fighting and humanitarian relief alike: it is the essential need for mobility. I shall focus on air mobility, because it was featured in the strategic defence review and because the ability to concentrate force rapidly at the decisive point has always been crucial to success in warfare. As we are daily reminded by the misery of the Kosovars, being able to project dominant force rapidly can have a deterrent effect. We seem not to have been able to do so, whether for political or military reasons. A war has eruptedand the Kosovars and many others are suffering immeasurably. Once conflict is joined, mobility is central to a war-winning potential.
The need for enhanced air transport, and specifically for strategic heavy lift, grows as our armed forces shrink steadily in size. As we have seen in the Kosovo crisis, the ability swiftly to deploy forces into theatre with their combat equipment and munitions is at a premium. Forces that now take three weeks to deploy to the Balkans from Germany and the United Kingdom would take about the same number of hours from take-off to landing into theatre.
I mentioned the strategic defence review of July last year because it identified as urgent the need for four C17s or their equivalent to improve our strategic air transport. The industrial responses to the invitation to tender for the Royal Air Force's short-term strategic airlift programme only went in at the end of January this year. A decision is not anticipated before the end of 1999. That leisurely time scale is not now tolerable. The Royal Air Force has been able to assess the C17 for years, and has had exchange personnel flying the aircraft with the United States air force. It has also assessed the other contender, the Ukrainian Antonov 124 100 series aircraft, which has been in service with Heavy Lift Cargo Airlines at Stansted for some time.
Furthermore, the delay in the Hercules C130K rolling replacement programme with the more capable C130Js, which are unfortunately not now due to enter squadron service until early next year, accentuates the Royal Air Force's lack of transport volume. The Kosovo war verifies the familiar argument that, as air transport aircraft have to operate into war zones, they must be flown and have their first line servicing performed by uniformed personnel who are subject to Air Force discipline.
For a long time, I have argued that Heavy Lift Cargo Airlines at Stansted should become, under the sponsored reserve concept, a designated Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadron. If the cost of buying or leasing the hugely desirable C17 aircraft, which has an outstanding tactical capability to operate into small airfields, is now prohibitive--I am not able to judge that, only the air staff or perhaps the Treasury can--I believe that the requirement to carry outsize loads, be they main battle tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, armoured fighting vehicles, helicopters, bowsers, bulldozers, munitions, artillery pieces, Bailey bridges, mobile radars, stores of all kinds, fuel or water, is so urgent that the Ukrainian
Antonov 124 should be procured. I say "Ukrainian" advisedly because of the risk of political interference were Antonov 124 aircraft leased from Russia.
In size, volume and weightlifting capability, the Antonov 124 is a remarkable aeroplane, but only the air staff can judge its potential against the C17 and the potential of reserve crews to operate it. Suffice it to say that many more transport aircraft are operated by the air national guard and the United States air force reserve together than are operated by the regular United States air force.
Furthermore, the evaluation, in parallel with the short-term strategic airlift programme, of the future transport aircraft to replace the second tranche of some 30 remaining C130Ks should not just consider the relative merits of the C130J, the A400M and the C17, but should also provide the Government with a crucial opportunity to rationalise and optimise the Royal Air Force's military air transport fleet to secure the maximum economy of operation.
I make two passionate pleas. First, the projected in-service date of 2007 for the replacement of the second tranche of C130Ks is too late, as they are uneconomic aircraft and some will have been in service for almost 40 years after their first procurement by the Royal Air Force. The in-service date should be brought forward as far as possible. Early availability of aircraft should be a key factor in the competition; so should spares and support simplification, and the need to avoid the construction of politically rather than militarily motivated aircraft. The Horizon fiasco is a case in point. Collaboration is not an end in itself. What is needed is affordable equipment available to the services within the required time scale and to the performance outlined in the specification. The RAF's fixed-wing transport fleet should therefore have only two fixed-wing aircraft types, one of which must be a genuine heavy-lift aircraft.
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