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Remaining Private Members' Bills
HARE COURSING BILL
Order for Second Reading read.
Second Reading deferred till Friday 21 May.
Order for Second Reading read.
Second Reading deferred till Friday 14 May.
Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [16 April], That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Debate to be resumed on Friday 21 May.
Order for Second Reading read.
Second Reading deferred till Friday 14 May.
Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [23 April], That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Debate to be resumed on Friday 14 May.
Order for Second Reading read.
Second Reading deferred till Friday 14 May.
Order for Second Reading read
Second Reading deferred till Friday 23 July.
Order for Second Reading read.
Second Reading deferred till Friday 11 June.
Order for Second Reading read.
Second Reading deferred till Friday 14 May.
Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [12 March], That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Debate to be resumed on Friday 14 May.
Order for Second Reading read.
Second Reading deferred till Friday 14 May.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.--[Mr. Betts.]
Dr. Rudi Vis (Finchley and Golders Green):
Unfortunately, I cannot be brief, so I shall try to be quick. I will also read out quite a bit of information, as I want the record to be entirely straight in its details of dates, times and names, of which there are a few. I was going to say also that I would not take interventions because I wanted to make sure that the record was full. However, that will not now be necessary.
The debate concerns the regulation of insolvency practitioners, with special reference to Heritage plc. The Government have promised repeatedly to help small businesses to survive and prosper, and I welcome that. However, there are contrasting interpretations of existing legislation. That is particularly the case when it comes to the excesses of the insolvency industry, as practised by the banks and their servants the insolvency practitioners.
Through the greed and questionable practices of those practitioners, operated with impunity, many small and medium-sized companies are needlessly closed; their directors--who frequently have put all their personal assets on the line--thrown out of work; and their families thrown on to the streets to become an extra burden on the taxpayer.
According to figures provided by the Independent Banking Advisory Service, if all banks followed the example set by the Royal Bank of Scotland and separated the roles of reporting accountants and receivers, 44,700 jobs a year would be saved. Meanwhile, the insolvency vultures continue to earn fat fees.
Lord Sudeley referred to the case of Heritage plc, Lloyds TSB and Grant Thornton in the Lords debate of 26 January 1999. Heritage plc was quoted on the London stock exchange. It operated in east London and Manchester, supplying major retailers in the United Kingdom with household articles. It employed more than 100 people, many of whom were disabled. The former chairman, Mr. Jeffrey Lampert, was my constituent until Lloyds TSB succeeded in evicting him and his family from their home.
The case perfectly reflects the unchecked excesses of the sharks to whom I have referred. Before coming to me, Mr. Lampert took the Heritage plc story to the Bank of England, which said, "This should be dealt with by the banking ombudsman." The ombudsman, hearing that the company's turnover was more than £1 million a year, said, "It's not for me, go back to the Bank of England," which then said, "Go to the FSA," which said, "It's not us; we don't consider individual cases. Go back to the Bank of England." The Bank of England had no further comment at that stage.
Mr. Lampert went to the London stock exchange, which referred him to the Department of Trade and Industry D2 prosecutions section, which concluded:
In December 1996, Mr. Lampert approached Peter Ellwood, currently Lloyds TSB group chief executive, and his approach proved similarly fruitless. Mr. Lampert has personally banked with Lloyds for more than 40 years--truly a case of "Your Life Your Bank", as the soft advertising campaign says. The facts about Lloyds TSB are different from the image that it seeks to create. I have statistics showing that the Independent Banking Advisory Service receives 36 times more complaints about Lloyds TSB's integrity, which is well defined, than about the Midland bank's.
Apart from the fact that Heritage plc was quoted on the London stock exchange, its case is reasonably typical. Heritage banked with Lloyds from its inception and the bank sponsored it onto the London stock exchange in July 1988. As a result of that flotation, as one would expect, Heritage embarked on a series of acquisitions, advised by the bank. Despite what the directors believed was a long, close and mutually trusting relationship, Lloyds TSB suddenly closed down Heritage plc. The only logical reason for that action, which did not emerge until two years later, was to conceal a sting operated with the aid of Lloyds TSB's co-conspirator, the insolvency section of the well-known firm of accountants, Grant Thornton.
As I said earlier, dates are important. Early in 1995, it emerged that Heritage's then financial director, George Raynor, had been acting in a dishonest way with his PAYE. It also emerged that Grant Thornton, where Raynor had personal friends, and which he had appointed as tax adviser to Heritage plc, was aware of the irregularities but had chosen not to tell Heritage. For that reason, and because of his failure to keep a proper sales ledger, Raynor was fired in June 1995. Grant Thornton was fired as tax adviser a little later, in August 1995. At that exact time, the bank began to insist on my constituent giving personal security.
In July 1995, the bank demanded an accountant's report and insisted on using Grant Thornton, despite Heritage's objections. Heritage directors were shown only a draft of that report, and were told that it was to be finalised after figures audited by KPMG were made available weeks later. In fact, the report was finalised by Grant Thornton only four days later. It misquoted the directors and contained damaging conclusions that were not shared with Heritage plc.
Even more sinister is the fact that three weeks later, on 10 August 1995, another concealed report was prepared, to which I shall return later. It contained the conclusion:
One year later, in June 1996, when Lloyds TSB's exposure had been reduced by about £500,000 and it had earned about £250,000 in interest and fees, Mr. Lampert received another immediate call for an additional £125,000 loan. He was unable to meet the bank's timetable--
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst):
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but I hope that he can assure me that the matters with which he is dealing are now historic in a legal sense, and that no sub judice question arises from continuing proceedings.
2.32 pm
"taking account of the code for crown prosecution it is not in the public interest to instruct an officer to conduct an enquiry."
I am satisfied that the statutes are in place, but they are not being interpreted in a way that protects businesses and jobs from the excesses of the insolvency industry.
"the decision to support Heritage is now finely balanced".
The same day that the report was prepared, Mr. Lampert was told by Lloyds TSB how well the bank and Grant Thornton now believed Heritage was doing in overcoming the problems left by Raynor, and Mr. and Mrs. Lampert were encouraged to make an equity investment in the company--that is different from a loan--of £250,000, using money lent to them by Lloyds TSB and secured on their family home. If Mr. Lampert--or any of the other directors--had had sight of the August 1995 report, obviously he would not have agreed to the investment. Even as late as 1998, Lloyds TSB, through its solicitors Hammond Suddard, still denied the existence of the two concealed reports.
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