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Kosovo
3.31 pm
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. George Robertson): Two months into NATO's campaign, I think that it is appropriate that I should report to the House, before it rises for the recess, on the Kosovo crisis.
Before I do so, I place on record the huge debt that we all owe the men and women of all three services and their civilian support, for their bravery, commitment and sheer hard work in support of NATO's efforts to help the refugees from Kosovo and to end the horror being inflicted by the Belgrade regime in Kosovo.
The men and women of our armed forces have seen with their own eyes the results of the horrific ethnic cleansing carried out by Milosevic's troops, the special police and the paramilitaries--the torture, the systematic rape, the murder and the eviction of more than 1 million people. They know that they are engaged in the pursuit of a just cause--the return of the evicted people of Kosovo to their homes in safety and security.
At the Washington summit at the end of April, NATO's political leaders took two important decisions on the future direction of the alliance's military strategy in Kosovo. First, they agreed to step up and intensify the air campaign. The results of that decision are daily becoming more evident, as NATO planes steadily weaken and progressively destroy the capability of Milosevic's forces and increase the pressure on him to accept a peace settlement based on NATO's conditions.
NATO's air campaign is working. During last week's debate, I gave some statistics about the amount of damage that we have already done to Yugoslav forces in Kosovo. Each day, we add more to the tally. Yesterday alone, NATO aircraft destroyed at least 15 artillery pieces, five tanks, a surface-to-air missile launcher and several artillery and mortar positions. On 22 May, the tally included at least 12 tanks and 11 armoured vehicles.
The overall losses inflicted on the Yugoslav forces are now estimated to include more than 110 combat aircraft. NATO estimates that that includes about 70 per cent. of the Mig-29s and about one quarter of the Mig-21s. These are the most combat-effective of the Yugoslav aircraft, and they represent a significant loss.
We have struck about 600 individual pieces of military equipment, more than half of them tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers. That constitutes about one third of the Serb heavy forces in Kosovo. We have destroyed 75 per cent. of Serbia's fixed surface-to-air missile sites and more than 12 per cent. of the mobile systems. We have struck more than a dozen command posts.
Those are the effects of the air campaign on the forces on the ground, which present the most challenging targets. The strategic targets include most of the primary road and rail bridges over which supplies must pass. We have attacked more than a third of all the fixed telecommunications sites, and we have repeatedly attacked airfields and hangars, and numerous ammunition and fuel storage sites and barracks.
All that represents a very effective air campaign, which is achieving the military objectives that we set at the outset of the campaign. The demonstrations, desertions and dissent that we have witnessed in recent days are
evidence that ordinary Serbs are now questioning the policies of Milosevic and the damaging and unwinnable conflict with NATO into which he has led them.
The second Washington summit decision was to update NATO's plans for the deployment of ground forces. Air and ground options are sometimes described as though they are separate and different. That has never been the case. NATO has always planned for a ground force to ensure the safe return home of the refugees, once the air campaign has achieved its objective. We have already assembled a Kosovo Force of about 14,000 in Macedonia, including substantial contributions from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
However, the massive destruction wrought by Milosevic's forces in Kosovo means that the originally planned total of 28,000 will no longer be adequate. On top of the task of creating a secure environment for the returning refugees, it is now necessary to plan on a much increased scale to assist with the re-establishment of the civil infrastructure, the provision of humanitarian aid and the clearance of land mines laid by Milosevic's forces. We are working with our partners to ensure that civil structures are in place to take on those tasks, but, inevitably, much of the early burden will fall to military forces.
The North Atlantic Council yesterday took note of a revised plan drawn up by NATO's military authorities, which, subject to more detailed planning, identifies a requirement for a force of about 45,000 to deal with the full range of tasks now envisaged. That figure excludes any additional forces that may be needed to provide essential national logistic support, which may raise the overall number to nearer 55,000 to 60,000. Further work to develop this military planning is going ahead within NATO.
The Kosovo Force plans will still need to be adapted as the situation on the ground changes and to take account of wider developments in the context of a political settlement. Discussions are taking place about the contributions that allies can make to such a force.
The British Government have made it clear that, as in Bosnia, we are keen to work with other nations that are prepared to provide military forces for KFOR. Given the need for NATO to be ready to react quickly to deploy into Kosovo in support of a peace settlement, the UK is today taking a number of steps on a national basis to ensure that we can move as soon as it is possible to get the refugees back home.
We have decided that the United Kingdom will make a substantial contribution to the planned force. That is consistent with the role that we have taken so far in the campaign and with our determination to see it brought to a quick and successful conclusion. We are determined that as many refugees as possible can return home before the winter closes in.
Because of the capability and deployability of our forces, the United Kingdom is well placed to contribute to that operation. Moreover, as the Framework Nation for the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps--the ARRC--our initial contribution will inevitably be high. However, we envisage that the UK contribution to the force will reduce markedly after an initial deployment period of six months.
I am now reducing the notice to move of the three infantry battalion groups which, as previously announced, are undergoing training for possible operations in Kosovo.
The units concerned are the 1st Battalion, the Royal Irish Rangers; the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment; and the 1st Battalion, the Royal Gurkha Rifles.
In addition, we are reducing the notice of 3 Commando brigade and the amphibious ready group, of a number of combat support groups, of two brigade headquarters, of elements of a divisional headquarters and of a number of RAF support helicopters and support units. I am placing in the Library of the House a full list of the units involved.
Precisely how many of those earmarked forces will be needed by NATO will depend on a number of factors--most important, what forces other allies are able to provide in the time required. Given the importance that NATO attaches to the early identification, training, commitment and deployment of additional forces, we judge it prudent to take those steps now to keep options open and to be ready to respond once firm requests are received from NATO. The geographical distance of the United Kingdom from the theatre of operations means that deployment times are inevitably longer for us than for most other allies.
In all, we are reducing the notice to move of more than 12,000 personnel, in addition to the 5,400 already deployed in Macedonia as part of the Kosovo implementation force and the 1,600 others committed to Kosovo operations. We are also taking steps to provide the equipment and material needed to support a force of that size and are making preparations to deploy the heavy equipment of the three infantry battalion groups and some combat support to the region next month.
Those are serious steps, and they will place great demands on all three services and on individual service men and their families, but they measure up to the seriousness of the situation confronting us in Kosovo. Let us remember that 1.5 million people--more than three quarters of the population of Kosovo--have been driven from their homes in terror. Our objective is to allow them to return home and rebuild their shattered lives in secure and civilised conditions and, in doing so, to show that the cruelty and brutality that we have seen in Kosovo over the past year will simply not be tolerated.
That is a major and a momentous undertaking which, in the coming months and years, will require a major investment of diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and military effort. The measures that I have announced today are a further demonstration of the Government's determination to play a full part in that historic effort.
Mr. John Maples (Stratford-on-Avon):
I fully associate the Opposition with the support expressed by the Secretary of State for the work that our armed services are doing in the Balkans.
Last week in the Kosovo debate, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) and I drew attention to what we saw as confusion at the heart of Government policy. Despite all the Foreign Secretary's travels and all the spinning during the past week, that confusion remains. Today's statement, although it announces the commitment of considerably more British troops to possible deployment in Macedonia, does nothing to clarify that confusion.
In the light of what he has said, can the Secretary of State confirm that the three battalion groups whose notice to move he has reduced are the same 2,000 soldiers who,
he announced some weeks ago, were being assigned to KFOR in Macedonia? When does he expect them to be deployed? Is it true that the only way in which the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment has been able to make up its numbers is by borrowing more than 150 people from the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment?
Last week, the Foreign Secretary went to Washington to remove the apparent split between the United Kingdom and the United States over ground troops. We were treated to a media double act by the Foreign Secretary and Mrs. Albright. We were told that they were at one, but, no sooner had the Foreign Secretary left, suggesting a new US willingness to use ground troops, than Mrs. Albright was denying any possibility of NATO entering Kosovo in anything other than a permissive environment.
All that has been agreed is a more realistically sized peacekeeping force at 48,000, although the Secretary of State has told us that that figure might rise to 60,000. The Government have been presenting that in the media as the basis of a possible invasion force, but, at yesterday's NATO force planning meeting, Ken Bacon, the Pentagon spokesman said:
The composition of the extra 20,000 troops apparently will take another full week to decide. Whatever happened to rapid reaction? It is now nine weeks since the bombing started. Only 14,000 of the 28,000 troops are actually in place in Macedonia. When does the Secretary of State expect the full 48,000--or now perhaps 60,000--to be available in theatre? Are the NATO forces in Albania included in the 48,000 total? How many of the 48,000 troops does he expect to be equipped and configured for war fighting, as opposed to peacekeeping?
The Government clearly still believe that we can achieve our aims only by the more aggressive use of ground troops, but none of our allies appears to share that view. The Foreign Secretary continues to talk of a "semi-permissive environment", to blur that division. However, I am advised that, in reality, there is no such thing. We either drive down the road into Kosovo as a peacekeeping force, or we enter configured for war fighting and prepared to meet resistance.
Javier Solana says that the alliance plans to bring the war to a close and return the refugees before the winter. We believe that that timetable is crucial. Two weeks ago, the Prime Minister agreed that the window of opportunity was very small, and that decisions would have to be made very soon. It seems to us that those decisions have not been made. The Government's preferred option of an early use of ground troops has probably been lost already through indecision over an issue that should have been resolved before we started.
"the force will be structured to provide plenty of non-military public security function to ensure the safe return of the refugees."
Today, he said:
"this is not a shadow invasion force."
Is it the basis of a possible invasion force or not?
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