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Sir John Stanley: I have entirely supported NATO's military action since the conflict began, but I take the Secretary of State's point. Movement by unanimity means movement according to the lowest common denominator. However, our position was similar to that which we faced in Iraq. It was open to a limited number of NATO countries to state their positions on ground forces and it was open to individual countries to make forward deployments of ground forces into Macedonia or, conceivably, Albania.
Mr. Bradshaw: I had intended to make the same point as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development, but as the right hon. Gentleman has mentioned a build-up of troops, does he agree that if we had substantially built up our forces while negotiating in good faith at Rambouillet, we would have given a great deal of propaganda ammunition to Milosevic, who could have accused us of negotiating in bad faith?
Sir John Stanley: It seems clear that Milosevic had wholly given up on Rambouillet by January or February and was making his barbarous plans for the comprehensive ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. On the suggestion that he may or may not have believed that we were acting in good faith, I shall again quote the Foreign Secretary's remarks to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 14 April, which I found profoundly disturbing. He said that
- "we had a very clear impression that President Milosevic did not believe that we would take military action and, because of that, was not willing to participate fully in the peace process."
On the air side, there was a similar error to that committed over ground troops. We made it clear at the outset that the target would be Serbian military capability. I do not believe that Milosevic was likely ever to be impressed by a NATO air threat couched in those terms alone. President Tito had an obsession with the survivability of his armed forces against the likelihood--as he saw it--of a Warsaw pact attack, and he had nearly 40 years in which to indulge that obsession.
The television-watching British public may have been somewhat surprised at the end of the campaign. Having been treated, night after night, to statements from NATO spokesmen to the effect that we were successfully degrading Serbian military capability in Kosovo,
they may have been shocked to see mile after mile of unscathed armoured vehicles pulling out of Kosovo. That does not come as any surprise to those of us who have watched over the years how the Yugoslav armed forces are deployed and how they protect themselves. Milosevic was never going to be hugely impressed by threats to his military capability.
The air war was turned by substantially widening the target list so that we ended up attacking the main sinews of Milosevic's grip on power. That certainly significantly undermined the confidence of the civilian population in his leadership. We turned our air attacks--rightly, as we had to bring about the end of the war as quickly as possible, if only to save the remaining Albanian Kosovans still alive in Kosovo--to economic and infrastructure targets, party headquarters, state-controlled media and so on. It is a sad reflection on how badly the deterrent card was played that we ended up bombing during the war a wider range of targets than we had ever given any intimation we would do during the peace, when we were trying to prevent the conflict from arising.
Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East):
The right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir J. Stanley) asked a number of wholly legitimate questions. I agree with him that one feature of the conflict was the pinpoint accuracy of the bombing. Yes, there were a dozen or so tragic accidents, but in the context of the 37,000 sorties it gives an indication of the sophistication of modern weaponry.
I am less happy about what the right hon. Gentleman said about the Rambouillet accords and his assertion that President Milosevic would have been readier to sign the June agreement than the Rambouillet accords. Surely the right hon. Gentleman recalls that the Rambouillet accords would have provided for a substantial number of Serb troops to remain in Kosovo. That was a major difference from the June agreement. The right hon. Gentleman spoke about the possible independence of Kosovo. The Rambouillet accords included a carefully crafted form of words, put together by our British negotiators, which may have pointed towards, but certainly did not mention, a referendum. It was certainly not part of the negotiating aim of NATO to provide the basis for an independent Kosovo.
The right hon. Gentleman made a powerful point about war criminals. The United Nations Security Council resolution calls for the full co-operation of all parties, and that includes the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, he ignored the practical point of reaching into Yugoslavia and getting hold of the indicted war criminals. Short of invading Belgrade, it would be wholly impossible to implement. That said, the right hon. Gentleman, with whom I serve on the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, made an excellent contribution to the debate.
I was careful to note that there was no triumphalist tone in the presentation of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. Equally, the Prime Minister did not rejoice on the steps of No. 10. That is because we all recognise that we have reached only the first stage in the whole operation. Yes, there has been a remarkable military victory, but many challenges remain. Indeed,
The Secretary of State for International Development made the important point that sometimes Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen in their criticisms ignored the key factor of alliance diplomacy. The right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling asked, as have others, why we did not say from the start that we were prepared to commit ground troops. He will know that in the October meetings only one country was prepared to commit ground troops and that was the United Kingdom. That is a fact of life of alliance diplomacy. The debate about ground troops in October last year was diverted by the Holbrooke deal with Milosevic. The deal was almost immediately repudiated by Milosevic as reflected in increased troop deployments in Kosovo.
At Rambouillet, Milosevic was again offered a good deal which would have retained the territorial integrity of his country. He was not serious about it, and then there was Operation Horseshoe. At the end of Rambouillet there was the promise from the Serb negotiator, Milutinovic, that he would go back and sell that deal to Serbia. Clearly, there was total deceit on the part of the Serb negotiators. We then turned to war and now we are back to diplomacy, which should have been the position from the start. But the House must understand the imperatives of alliance diplomacy.
I am delighted that the right hon. Gentleman was objective enough to mention the key role played by the British Government and to say that the Prime Minister emerges with credit. The Prime Minister was principled and took a moral position from the outset. He stiffened the alliance at key times.
Russia blocked the possibility of military action in the United Nations Security Council. We have to try to understand that in terms of the problems of Russian history and the feeling in Russia that it has been sidelined and bypassed by the international community, for example in relation to what happened in Iraq and Cyprus. One lesson from the conflict must surely be that we must mend our relationship with Russia as speedily as possible.
The other area of great concern is the legal basis for the action. My hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon) pointed out the international legal ambiguities. There were great problems in acting, but think of the problems in the area and beyond had there not been action. Think what encouragement it would have been to others inclined to consider ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless the action gives rise to a proper problem in respect of its international legal basis. We were citing the imminence of humanitarian catastrophe and, of course, that can be interpreted subjectively and can provide an unhappy precedent for intervention elsewhere in the world.
In the early 1990s Lord Hurd, when he was Foreign Secretary, made an interesting speech to the United Nations General Assembly stating that the UN should seek to forestall conflict, but should work through regional groups. His specific proposal in relation to Africa, for example, was that the west should provide military training and infrastructure for an African intervention force. That might be relevant now in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Alas, nothing appears to have been done regarding that initiative of the
early-1990s. I hope that one lesson from that would be to consider ways not only of refining the international legal basis, but of using regional intervention by regional groupings when such conflicts arise.
In relation to the immediate task ahead, the first priority is the safe return of the refugees. Almost 1.4 million Kosovan Albanians are currently refugees--internally displaced, in camps or abroad. It is vital that they are allowed to return home in safety and that shelter should be found for them. I look forward to hearing what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development says about prefabricated housing, for example. One of the more distressing features is that, even as they departed, Serb forces were gratuitously destroying the houses of those people who had fled their country. I hope that something will be said about what we can do to ensure the provision of houses.
The international force must contain the desire for revenge. KFOR faces an enormous challenge in controlling the understandable desire for revenge on both sides. KFOR must be seen to be wholly even-handed. Yes, KLA men as well as Serbs must be arrested--as must whoever tries to step outside the peace agreement. Serbs are indeed now leaving Kosovo; we must try not to replace one form of ethnic cleansing by another. Surely, it is of the utmost importance to try to preserve a multi-ethnic entity in Kosovo itself. It would be a poor model for the region if we were to allow, or condone, atrocities that fuelled a further exodus of the Serb population of Kosovo--which was roughly 200,000.
Uncertainties remain, including those in respect of Russia. Many points have been made about Russia's cheeky and deceitful intervention at the airport. However, relations with Russia are part of the collateral, political damage that has resulted from the conflict. There are also problems within Russia. The NATO intervention has reinforced the stereotype of an aggressive NATO and encouraged nationalist forces in Russia. Much must be done to build bridges, as I have pointed out. The alliance surely underestimated Russia's determination to seek a role in the Balkans. Moscow is determined to be heard this time and really wants to be part of the solution. In the end game, it is vital that Russia plays a part. However, Russian demands for its own sector, which may lead to partition, must be resisted.
There are problems regarding the future legal status of Kosovo, and there are ambiguities in the UN Security Council resolution. We talk about the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remaining, but what will be Serbia's authority--if any--within Kosovo? Travel documents have been mentioned. What form of travel documents will the Kosovan Albanians have when they leave? Clearly, they will be most reluctant to travel on Yugoslav documents. Will they have temporary UN travel documents? What consideration has been given to that matter? It is difficult to see how any real authority can be exercised over Kosovo by Serbia.
The right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling made some points about independence, self-government and the ambiguities relating to those matters in the June agreement. The interim Administration that has been agreed will be under the authority of the UN; that means that China and Russia will have an effective power of veto over the future of the province. However, the status
under international law is uncertain. One talks about territorial integrity, but, in effect, it will be UN trusteeship in all but the formal, legal position.
What about President Milosevic himself? He is an indicted war criminal, but we continue to deal with him as if nothing has changed. In so doing, there is a serious danger of undermining the war crimes tribunal and, ultimately, the international criminal tribunal and humanitarian international law generally. Obviously, we must remain alert and must be extremely cautious; we must not give Milosevic too many opportunities to exercise what the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling called the wriggle factor, or the ambiguities remaining after the agreements or in other places, such as Macedonia, Montenegro and Vojvodina where he may try to use his ability to make difficulties. The west will have only a partial victory as long as Milosevic remains in power.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development may pick up the point that I made earlier about the way in which the BBC World Service may be used constructively. Its output to the region has already been increased, but it could play an important role in the training of democratic journalists and media people, and in increasing its output to reach beyond the current Milosevic regime to the people of Yugoslavia.
In relation to the KLA, a point was made about the interesting difference between "disarmament" and "demilitarisation", presumably because, with some form of light arms, the KLA is still assumed to have a policing force in the new Kosovo. It is not clear how the KLA organisation will respond, although so far the indications are reasonably favourable. However, there is obviously a division within the KLA between those who want an independent Kosovo and others who support a Greater Albania, which would be a highly destabilising feature in the area as a whole. There is antipathy between Rugova loyalists and the KLA leadership, and clear evidence--although it has not been mentioned in this debate--of a degree of criminality among some of the KLA groupings.
In relation to the longer-term need to build a lasting peace, we want to bring the perpetrators of crimes to justice--a point made forcefully by the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling. The evidence of the mass graves already revealed is absolutely appalling. The perpetrators must not be allowed to get away with those atrocities. Although the leaders must be indicted, there should perhaps be a lesser form of punishment for the smaller fry. Various precedents could be considered--perhaps from South Africa, in the use of a truth and reconciliation commission. We need to find some way of allowing people to expiate the acts that they have committed.
In relation to the longer-term building of relevant structures in the area, economic frameworks are needed. I welcome the British Government's initiative in respect of free trade agreements between the western European countries and the countries of the region. In those economic structures, we need to be aware that several of the countries in the region are themselves innocent victims of the conflict. One thinks of the damage to the economy of not only the obvious countries, such as Macedonia and Albania, but of Bulgaria and Romania. That suggests that we need to have a stability pact--a stabilisation agreement for the Balkans as a whole. There must not be the paralysis of policy that existed after
1989, when Milosevic ended autonomy in Vojvodina and in Kosovo, but the international community allowed that to continue and did nothing.
"Peace hath her victories no less renowned than war",
and perhaps there will be far greater challenges in establishing peace and stabilising the Balkans in future.
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