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Mr. Winnick: I hope so. On one occasion when I spoke to the demonstrators I showed them a newspaper report of the murder of a brave man in Serbia, the editor of a newspaper. They showed no interest whatever, but if there are among them people such as those mentioned by the hon. Gentleman that is very good. I know that many people in Serbia, including some in the political class, want a different Government--not a nationalist or a Milosevic Government, but a democratic Government. That was the very reason for putting that editor to death--a reason that is perfectly clear from the point of view of the Belgrade regime.
I therefore hope that, once the situation in Kosovo becomes more stable, we will see what can be done most effectively to bring Serbia back into the international community. There can hardly be any stability in the Balkans if Serbia is isolated and ordinary people who are not ultra-nationalists or Milosevic supporters have to live a hand-to-mouth existence in much deprivation and despair. Everything that can be done to support people who are opposed to crimes, adventurist policies and so forth should be done. I agree that it is difficult, and that it cannot be done immediately; I merely warn the House that an isolated Serbia could pose a great danger in the future.
It was said at various times in the war that what was happening was another Vietnam. I may be wrong, but I believe that I am the only Member of Parliament still in the House who, at the time, protested here about what was happening in Vietnam. It must have seemed to some people that I was doing so almost every day, and, if I may say so with due modesty, I do not believe that I was wrong. But I saw no possible comparison between Vietnam and Kosovo, and I believe that had we and our European partners turned away--had we simply said that these crimes were terrible but that we had decided to take no action, a course advocated by my hon. Friends the Members for Halifax and for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), and promoted during the statement made on 18 January--it would have been a terrible shame, and a stain on our country and its honour.
Of course I regret the bombing, and the civilian casualties that it caused. I am a human being; why should I not feel regret? Nevertheless, I believe that what NATO did--with our contribution and, of course, that of the United States--was absolutely justified. I believe that future generations of parliamentarians will view it as a necessary step, and I am glad that it has resulted in a successful conclusion. Whatever may be the future in Kosovo, we have demonstrated in practice that we will not allow ethnic cleansing, mass murder and rapes to continue without taking some form of action--if need be, the sort of military action that has been taken over the past few weeks.
Mr. Deputy Speaker:
Order. So far, Back-Bench speeches have lasted for an average of more than 20 minutes. If all who have sat through the debate hoping to speak are to have the chance do so, the average must be reduced to about 10 minutes.
Mr. Martin Bell (Tatton):
I promise to make the shortest speech of the debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
Let me, from an independent viewpoint, congratulate the Government on a remarkable achievement, although no one would pretend that it is an unqualified achievement. The original objective of preventing a humanitarian massacre was tragically not met, and the results are being uncovered on the ground every day.
There is also a moral element. This was the most remarkable military campaign of its kind ever waged in that the attacking force, while inflicting great casualties and damage, suffered not a single casualty itself--not so much as an airman with a twisted ankle. We can be grateful for that, but we should also wonder whether, because the targeting was so general and sometimes unfocused, the casualties on the other side in the target area--often among innocent people--were much greater than they need have been.
We should also wonder whether there is validity in the new doctrine that decisive military results can be achieved by air power alone. I think not. I note that the Serb capitulation came at precisely the moment when, for the first time, ground forces were used in a realistic way. I am a former infantry man and ground force man myself, and I have insisted from the start that circumstances on the ground can be changed only by boots on the ground. We are fortunate indeed that two of the boots in Kosovo are occupied by one of the most remarkable British military men I know, General Sir Michael Jackson, who has had previous experience of this kind of operation. In 1995, he led part of the implementation force in Bosnia that imposed the Dayton settlement from Gornji Vakuf to Banja Luka. He did it brilliantly. He drove his people hard and won the affection as well as the respect of the soldiers who served him; that is not always the case with generals. Now they face a complex task in Kosovo, especially in dealing with the KLA.
I cannot help feeling that there may be an uncomfortable analogy with the situation in which British troops found themselves in 1969 and the early 1970s on the streets of Northern Ireland, where they were first greeted as saviours but soon found themselves to be targets. One of the young captains on the streets in those days was Michael Jackson. He will be aware of what the problems are.
Another problem involves the Serbs. The action is not against the Serbs; it is to protect the Serbs. They are a decent and honourable people, who have been terribly misled and have suffered. There is no monopoly of suffering. There is no monopoly of evil. Let it be noted that many of the Serbs who are streaming out in their tens of thousands are refugees for a second time, having first been driven out of Krajina. Reference was made to the destructive nationalism of the Serbs. In my time in the Balkans, which was considerable, I saw no more destructive nationalism than that of the Croats.
I note the historical perspective. Next week, we come to the end of the eighth year of the wars of the dissolution of Yugoslavia--eight years of misery and bloodshed. Sometimes I have asked myself whether the situation could have been averted. Could not the decisive action that we have seen in past months have been taken earlier? Of course it could.
The possible time for action was the autumn of 1990, when Dubrovnik was being shelled and Vukovar obliterated. I was in Vukovar on the day that it fell to the Serbs. It had been hit by 2 million shells and it looked like Stalingrad on the Danube during the second world war.
Three weeks later, I came back to London thinking that people would surely be taking account of that situation. I discovered that the commentators and the political circles were concerning themselves not with the great tragedy of the Croats and Serbs, but only with the Maastricht treaty, which was then being negotiated.
It is no secret now--it is well known--that the concessions that were given by the Germans to the British on the opt-out clauses of the treaty were matched by concessions by the British to the Germans on the unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. That was the fuse that lit two powder kegs: one was Bosnia, the other was Kosovo. We must now live with the consequences.
I agree with the remarks of the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames). Speaking as an ex-reptile, I especially agree with what he said about the reptiles. Kosovo will soon be gone from the news headlines.
We do not have an armed force of sufficient size to maintain through rotation the commitments that we have taken on. We will have to raise more infantry battalions and, more specifically, engineer regiments. We will have to pay for it somehow. The cost has not yet been calculated.
Mr. Robert N. Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby):
The Foreign Secretary said that our soldiers in Kosovo would be blind to the ethnic origin of the people whom they were there to protect. I can only hope that that will be the case. Knowing British soldiers and having served in the services, albeit in the Air Force, I am sure that our soldiers will do their utmost to protect Serbs as well as Albanians in Kosovo. I was delighted that General Sir Michael Jackson took the trouble to say to Serbs in Pristina that that was his objective; I am sure that he is sincere in that objective.
We have to look at the reality of the situation, and into the minds of many Serbs, in Serbia, have been living for the past eight years against a background of anti-Serb hysteria in the media, particularly in the west--in America, Britain and Germany--which has demonised every Serb, saying that all of them were evil. The hysteria has been deeply regrettable.
Serbia was bombed for 78 days, which has served only to harness support for Serb ultra-nationalism. In bombing Serbia, NATO has done its best to reward and to give succour to the nationalists. The Serbian people realise that they have been demonised by the west, and that the west has ignored the plight of refugees from Krajina, as it ignored the Serbs who suffered in Bosnia. People in Serbia see Krajina Serbs on their own doorsteps. As the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell) rightly said, many of the Krajina Serbs had been given homes in Kosovo, but are now refugees yet again.
The Foreign Secretary said that NATO had secured its objectives. Has it? I remember being told that NATO's objective was to protect the Albanians and to ensure that they were able to live again in Kosovo, and that bombing would ensure that they were protected. In a debate at the beginning of the war, I asked not whether bombing would bring Yugoslavia to its knees, but whether bombing would make the situation better or worse. Quite clearly, it has made the situation worse.
5.13 pm
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