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The Prime Minister: First, I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his work; he really began this process. I know that there is a great deal of gratitude for all of the work that he did on this issue while Prime Minister. I think that I can confirm all of the points that he has raised. It is the position of both Governments that it is open to the parties to continue in an Executive without Sinn Fein. I simply repeat that I cannot force people to sit on the Executive together, but it is open to them to do so. The SDLP must make its position clear, but I understand that it is prepared to move forward without Sinn Fein

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should the circumstances be such that Sinn Fein is clearly the defaulting party. However, the SDLP must make its own statement on that.

I entirely understand the right hon. Gentleman's point about the fear in Ulster. He will know that people would not want the situation to be left in the hands of the two Governments. That is because they know that the two Governments will be subject to pressures. They would know and would fear--I think that this would be the fear of Unionists--that the two Governments would be under such pressure to keep the process going on any basis that even if Sinn Fein defaulted, some way would be found of ignoring the default. That is why I have suggested that the decommissioning process is in the hands of the independent commission. The commission will lay down the timetable for decommissioning and certify every step in the way. There will be an automatic kicking-in of the failsafe should the commission not certificate that progress is being made or should it certificate that progress is not being made. In other words, there is no possibility of the Unionists being made to sit in the Executive with Sinn Fein, if Sinn Fein is in breach of the undertakings that it gave.

The purpose of making sure that the initial statement, within days of devolution, is on behalf of the paramilitary organisation is to get rid of the notion, once and for all, that a statement by one of the political parties linked to those groups is enough. It is not. The statement must be from the paramilitary organisation, it must be, in the words that we have set out, "clear and unambiguous" in the intention to decommission, and it must be combined with the appointment of a representative to ensure that that happens. We are guarded against the very point that the right hon. Gentleman rightly says we should be guarded against.

It is worth quoting the conclusion of an editorial today in the Belfast Telegraph, which is ready to be pretty sceptical about most of the deals and agreements. It states:


That is what the Belfast Telegraph has written today, and I ask all parties to try to ensure that that is the case.

Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North): As the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), who started the peace process knows full well, during the 18 years that we were in opposition, we supported the then Government at every stage over Northern Ireland, and we did so because it was in the national interest. Will my right hon. Friend consider letting the Ulster Unionists know, when he next meets them, that the large silent majority in Britain has always supported the wish of most people in Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, but that they undoubtedly support the Good Friday agreement?

If there is slightest doubt about the wishes of the vast majority of British people with regard to the Good Friday agreement, could there be an opportunity to allow people on the mainland to vote, as people voted in Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic? If there were such a vote, it would be even larger than in those two places for an agreement that leads to the possibility of a permanent peace in Northern Ireland.

The Prime Minister: I thank my hon. Friend for his support. The Good Friday agreement was agreed in

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referendums north and south. I believe that with the certainty that we now provide about the link between the Executive and the decommissioning process, support for the agreement should be reinvigorated.

Mr. Tom King (Bridgwater): Is the Prime Minister aware that his comment that there is a total lack of trust between different sides can be readily endorsed? Does he recognise that, because of that lack of trust, it is difficult to have much confidence in decommissioning, certainly if one reads the comments of General de Chastelain? None the less, the House would accept that the Prime Minister may have sources of information and further knowledge that he cannot share with the House which give him confidence that there will be the seismic shift that he described, but which is not apparent in any of the documents currently available to us.

I still have one reservation. The Prime Minister speaks of the failsafe kicking-in, but it seems to me that there is no failsafe until 20 May, which is the moment at which it would become clear that decommissioning had not taken place. Unionists therefore face the prospect of sitting in an Executive during that period.

Against that background, the last words of the Belfast Telegraph editorial that the Prime Minister quoted, about the need for further consideration and refinement, not outright rejection--I strongly agree with that--and the reassurance for Unionists to which the leader of the Liberal party referred, are extremely significant.

Does the Prime Minister agree that it is sad that no member of the SDLP is to be seen in the House today? I saw the television broadcast which implied that there were only two political parties in Northern Ireland, in the shape of the Unionists and Sinn Fein, but I believe that the role of the SDLP as the majority non-violent nationalist party is very important.

The Prime Minister: I agree with the point that the right hon. Gentleman makes.

In relation to the detail, I should explain that the failsafe device kicks in at several stages up to May 2000. That is the benefit of the agreement that we have. Under the Good Friday agreement, there was no failsafe up until May 2000. Now we have agreed that, within a few days, the decommissioning process has to start with the statement of intent. After that, there will be the first report on actual decommissioning. Then there will be further reports all the way through to May 2000.

The Unionists will not be left in the Executive with Sinn Fein and the IRA doing nothing about weapons. The decommissioning process will get under way virtually straight away and has to be followed through all the way to May 2000. That is a far tighter timetable and agreement than we had before and they are in the hands of de Chastelain. As I said in answer to questions earlier, people would not accept it if they were in the hands of the two Governments, but most people who have talked to General de Chastelain know that he is deadly serious about decommissioning happening. If it does not happen, he will not certify it as happening.

The right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King) rightly said that General de Chastelain makes it clear in his report that he is not yet fully satisfied that

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decommissioning will happen. Correct. Never mind private assurances that are given--I do not take the private assurances that are given either. The only thing that will do for me is decommissioning actually happening. That is why we have set out this process, but if we do not test it out, we will never know whether decommissioning is to be delivered or not.

Perhaps I should make this point as well: people will say, "Why don't you get the decommissioning first and then the Executive?" Under the Good Friday agreement that is put the other way round. It is not a precondition to establishing the Executive that there should be decommissioning, but it is an obligation. We have to marry those two obligations, which is why we have attempted to do it in the way that I have described.

Let us be clear: we want republicans to succeed. If they can bring about decommissioning that will be a huge step forward for everyone. To be fair to them, they have always made it clear to me that they can achieve it if it is in line with the Good Friday agreement, but not if it is a departure from it. That is why they rejected Hillsborough, even though in many ways it offered an easier deal for them.

Mr. Tony Benn (Chesterfield): As the last remaining Member of the House who was in the Cabinet 30 years ago when the troops were sent in--one of many unsuccessful attempts to impose peace in Northern Ireland by force from London--may I add my sincere congratulations to the Prime Minister on the time, effort, patience and imagination that he and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State have shown and for which there is absolutely no precedent from any previous Prime Minister? Therefore criticism from the other side of the House should not concern him too much.

Will the Prime Minister consider the fact that, whatever the setbacks and difficulties, and there will be both, he should retain two principles at the forefront of his mind? I am sure that he will do so. First, peace and justice in Northern Ireland depend on the involvement of the two communities, and Sinn Fein has the democratic legitimacy of the ballot box. That is the basis of its entitlement to consideration. Secondly, will he cling, above all, to close relations with Dublin? For the first time since partition, London and Dublin jointly oversee the prospects of peace in Northern Ireland. That, along with a settlement of the difficulty that he has described, offers our best hope for a future in the next century quite different from the tragedy that has befallen Northern Ireland in our own lifetime.


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