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Mr. Mallon: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. MacKay: I shall specify which failsafes are missing, and then I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman. I want to make it very clear why we believe that the failsafes promised by the Prime Minister are not in the proposed legislation, and why we shall be seeking to
amend the Bill to ensure that they are. When the Bill is amended, we will vote enthusiastically for its Third Reading.
Three failsafes are missing. First, there is no tight, transparent timetable in the Bill. We are being asked to rely on various remarks of the respected independent General de Chastelain, and hope that he will produce a timetable. That could lead to a fudge, and the Prime Minister knows that. We want a timetable in the legislation. Then we can judge whether any paramilitaries are failing to decommission in time. We must have a tight, verifiable timetable.
Secondly, if the IRA fails to decommission on time--I sincerely hope that it decommissions so that Sinn Fein can play its full role in the Executive--it should be automatically excluded from the Executive. As the Bill is drafted, the whole Executive and the whole Assembly would be closed down and suspended. I have never known of a situation in which everybody is punished equally. Those who have done no wrong and who have fulfilled their obligations would be punished in exactly the same way as those who failed to fulfil their obligations by not decommissioning. That cannot be fair and equitable.
We require a third and final failsafe. I hope that the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister will agree that only some of the paramilitary parties are the slightest bit interested in the Assembly or the Executive. Only the Provisional IRA, through Sinn Fein, is interested in the Assembly and the Executive, and only the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Progressive Unionist party are interested in the Assembly. None of the others has any political representation in the Assembly, so there is no punishment for them. As the Bill is drafted, the Loyalist Volunteer Force could fail to decommission on time and bring the whole pack of cards tumbling down. That cannot be right.
It is not reasonable to ask the Provisional IRA to decommission, if we cannot be certain that the loyalist paramilitaries will also decommission. We would be asking republicans to disarm when their own people, as they would put it, would be fearful of attack from loyalist thugs, terrorists and paramilitaries but have no means of defending themselves.
So, it is absolutely essential that, if any paramilitary group fails to decommission on time, its terrorist prisoner release is immediately halted by the Government. That is the only sanction that we have against them, and we need it not just to protect the democrats and the democratic process, but to assure the republicans that there will be loyalist decommissioning as well and that their own people will not be unduly exposed.
The hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) has been very patient, and I shall now give way to him.
Mr. Mallon:
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way; I indeed have grown patient. Will he explain his espousal of the Hillsborough declaration, which was also espoused by the Unionist parties, with only a little token decommissioning, no de Chastelain report and a commitment to run the d'Hondt system on that Maundy Thursday and for an Executive to be up and running by the end of Easter, but his refusal to accept this proposal, which contains not only the de Chastelain report but the
Mr. MacKay:
I can straightforwardly explain that. In a perfect world all of us, including the hon. Gentleman, would prefer decommissioning to be going ahead at the same time as ministerial appointments, and that is why we supported the Hillsborough declaration.
We are now being offered that Ministers be appointed to the Executive with no certainty that there will be decommissioning in future, and the possibility of a fudge. That fudge will be removed if our amendments are passed. It will then be legally binding that there will be a timetable, the exclusion of Sinn Fein if the IRA does not decommission, and the halting of terrorist prisoner releases for any paramilitary group, loyalist or republican, that does not decommission on time. These are true failsafes that would avoid a fudge and ensure that the proposed legislation moves forward.
The Secretary of State and the Prime Minister are absolutely right when they say that there is a lack of trust. We know after nearly 30 years of troubles in the Province that trust is in desperately short supply. To paraphrase, Unionists do not trust the IRA to decommission at all, and republicans, and quite probably some constitutional nationalists, do not believe in their heart of hearts that the Unionists will ever agree to share power or to be Ministers in an Executive with nationalists or republicans, and certainly with Sinn Fein.
The Secretary of State and I will never be able to persuade those people, because the trust is not there. The only way forward is to have legislation of the sort that is being introduced today, where there are copper-bottomed guarantees and failsafes in law so that those concerned are not taking my word for it, nor the right hon. Lady's, nor even the Prime Minister's or General de Chastelain's. They will have it in law, in statute and in an Act of Parliament that has been passed by the House of Commons that, if anyone reneges on his obligations, he will be fully penalised.
Mr. David Trimble (Upper Bann):
As the Secretary of State said in her introductory remarks, the Bill is to give effect to the declaration made on 2 July by the Prime Minister in association with the Irish Prime Minister. In that declaration, the Prime Minister is asking us to take part in an Executive with Sinn Fein in advance of decommissioning. The right hon. Gentleman knows that we are reluctant to do so. Our reluctance will be portrayed by some as an unwillingness to share in an Administration with Catholics or nationalists. That is untrue.
The d'Hondt formula, which will produce an inclusive Executive, was the proposal of the Ulster Unionist party. The concept of proportionality goes back to the proposals made by Jim Molyneaux, as he then was, and the
hon. Member for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley) to the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 1987. The administration of the shadow Assembly, over the course of the past year, has been conducted jointly by myself and the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon). Last Friday, our Ulster Unionist executive explicitly endorsed the concept of an inclusive Administration. I mention this so that no one should be taken in by the Sinn Fein lie on this point.
Nor do we have an absolute objection to those with a terrorist past. We know that people can change and that having a past does not disentitle one from a future, but it places an onus on those concerned to show that the past has been left behind. I recall that, a few days after becoming leader of my party, I was happy to welcome into our headquarters a politician who was once a republican activist. I had good reason to know that he had left that past behind him. He is not the only former republican activist with whom I have been willing to work. Our problem is not with former terrorists; it is about taking an existing and active terrorist organisation into government, for that is what Her Majesty's Government now propose.
To meet that concern, the Government offer what they call a failsafe mechanism. As I said on 2 July, that mechanism is flawed and unfair--unfair because, if Sinn Fein breaks its obligations, everyone in the Executive is ejected from office. As the right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) said, the innocent are punished along with the guilty, and the democrats are treated as though they were indistinguishable from the terrorists.
The fair response is obvious and has been mentioned. The offending party should be removed. If that were in the Bill, it would go a long way to making it acceptable, but it is not. Why not? The answer given by the Prime Minister in his newspaper article, to which we have heard reference, is that he cannot compel any party to remain in the Executive. In the circumstances, the implication is obvious. The implication is that the SDLP does not want to sit with us, if it means being apart from Sinn Fein.
Why arrange matters in the legislation so that that position is concealed, while we are forced to a public choice? The answer to the second question comes from a study of clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill. They provide for a review, which is arranged and carefully structured to be equally open to two different outcomes. One is that Sinn Fein is excluded, and the other is that the default is waived and the original Executive is reconstituted.
We are left with the suspicion that this arrangement has been made to hold out the prospect that we can be pressured into waiving the failure to decommission--that decommissioning can, as it has been throughout this process, simply be moved into the next phase. We are left with the suspicion that that is the Government's intention. I have tabled amendments that would cure that flaw, and I invite the Government to accept them.
The mechanism itself is flawed. There is no certainty about it. Yes, the Secretary of State is made subject to a duty, and rightly so, because the Government know that after the way in which she has disregarded those matters which, under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, she should have taken into account, no Unionist would have any faith in her judgment.
However, decommissioning itself is not subject to any precise duty. Clause 1(1) refers to commitments. Those are defined as commitments under the agreement or the
joint statement, but does that involve any clear commitment, short of completing decommissioning by May 2000?
The Secretary of State has attached weight to statements given by General de Chastelain who said that, in his view, the procedures should begin within a few days, and actual decommissioning should begin within a few weeks; but can it be said that there are commitments to that, and that those constitute commitments under the statement, for the purposes of the Bill? In any event, we know only too well how republicans can spin out procedures.
It would be beneficial if people looked carefully at the decommissioning scheme. It does not refer to timetables. Timetables have been mentioned, but there is no explicit reference in the decommissioning scheme to a timetable. The nearest that we come to it is in paragraph 12 of the decommissioning scheme, which states:
It may be possible to stretch that language to include a timetable, but can it then be said that there is a commitment to that timetable for the purposes of the Bill? The arrangements will have to be proof against legal challenge. A further flaw is that they depend on the judgment of the commission. Although I have every faith in John de Chastelain as a person, I am well aware of how procedures can be exploited and how timetables can be stretched. Again, I have tabled amendments on that which will cure that flaw. Again, we invite the Government to consider them.
That is not the only flaw in the arrangement. Asthe right hon. Member for Bracknell has said, decommissioning must be mutual. We expect republicans to decommission. Equally, loyalists must decommission. It would be difficult to expect republicans to go through with decommissioning if loyalists refused to reciprocate. Although one has to say that republicans have a bigger arsenal and they could start, there must still be that mutuality. The Bill has a sanction for republican default--specifically Sinn Fein-IRA default--but there is no sanction for loyalist default or, indeed, default by the Irish National Liberation Army. It and the loyalists are not likely to be in the Executive and one loyalist party--and, indeed, the INLA's party, if it still exists--is not even in the Assembly. The only sanction there can be for other paramilitary groups is in respect of prisoners' release.
The Secretary of State has hinted that that sanction would be applied in the exercise of her discretion under the existing legislation, but, as I pointed out to her, the sanction in the Bill against republicans is automatic. In my view, the sanction against other paramilitaries ought to be equally automatic and it is of course open to the Government to amend the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 to do that. Again, amendments have been tabled which would have that effect.
There are other flaws--many others--but I do not want to go through them all in detail; I shall pick out just a few. The statement made by the Prime Minister referred to suspending
Much worse than those omissions is what appeared on reading the Bill to be the deliberate continuation of the north-south implementation arrangements in direct defiance of the agreement. The Secretary of State has referred to a draft treaty lodged in the Library. That is the first bit of information that we have had about that. I shall endeavour, when I can, to look at that document to see whether it is effective. I am sorry that she did not see fit to inform us about that important matter on which we had already made representations to the Northern Ireland Office and the Government.
Despite the flaws in this option, there are those who would say to us that we should put the matters to the test anyway. It has been said that we have nothing to lose and would gain by exposing republicans. I can see two ways in which it is possible that we could gain. First, if it were clear that actual decommissioning would occur--and did in fact occur within a few weeks, as I would define "few"--then not only us but society as a whole in Northern Ireland would gain, because we could then say that the situation had clearly turned the corner and we would be able to proceed in Northern Ireland in a wholly peaceful and wholly inclusive manner. That is a prize worth obtaining and there would be advantage--not only to us, but to republicans and nationalists as well. Indeed, I have not been able to understand why republicans have not been prepared to move on that matter with us, as we have repeatedly offered to do.
I suspect that the explanation for republicans' failure to move with us on that matter is that they still have hopes of being able to bring the entire republican movement--their so-called army as well as their party, inextricably linked as they are--together into the heart of government. That would carry with it the danger of creating a Mafia state and it would also retain, if only for a future generation, the option of using violence to finish the job. That explanation, to our way of thinking, is reinforced by the complete absence of any evidence of what the Prime Minister called a seismic shift in republicanism. We have looked, and we will continue to look with an open mind, for signs of such a move. We would like it to happen, but we will guard against the wish being father to the thought.
The second way in which it is possible that we would gain would be if, in the event of a failure to decommission, the SDLP decided to form an Administration without Sinn Fein, but in view of the structure of clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill, and the constant equivocation about that by nationalism generally, the prospect is not inviting. I do not want to go into too much detail on this issue, but I have to say that it is sad that a party that asks us to gamble cannot tell us what its position will be in certain clearly defined circumstances that are perhaps only a few weeks away. It is not a matter
of prejudging something in unknown circumstances or writing a blank cheque, although we were offered one a few months ago. It would be easier for us all if the SDLP could muster a fraction of the courage that it attributes to us.
Those two ways in which it is possible that we could gain from this measure now seem unlikely. In all other ways we would lose. Undertaking such a gamble would mean putting an enormous strain on society as a whole, and on Unionism in particular. In undertaking such a gamble, one would sacrifice an important principle involving the integrity of the democratic process. It is stated several times in the Belfast agreement that only those who are committed to peaceful, democratic means should hold office. It would clearly be wrong to place in government those with a private army.
I can illustrate the problem that would arise quite simply. Under the Government's proposals, we could easily have in Belfast a Sinn Fein Minister of Health in charge of, among other things, an anti-drugs policy, while his colleagues in the IRA continued to use the threat of armed force--and, who knows, perhaps even the Minister's advice--to enable them to control and exploit the supply of illegal drugs.
We summed up this whole issue in the phrase: "no guns handed in, no hand in government." We know that matters are not always as clear cut as we would like. That is why, on 10 April last year, we accepted an agreement that has unsatisfactory aspects, as the right hon. Member for Bracknell said. Moreover, the agreement's provisions on decommissioning contained ambiguities. I considered that there was enough time for republicans to establish their intentions, and I was fortified by the fact that the Prime Minister publicly shared my construction of those provisions as requiring a beginning of decommissioning in June 1998.
The agreement divided Unionism. I thought that, as the benefits of the agreement came through, support for it would grow. Instead, over the past 15 months, the perception of Unionism has been that matters have not improved. None the less, I consider that what I did then was right. I still want the agreement to succeed, but I remain to be convinced that the right way to do it is through this hastily concocted scheme, which clearly has not been thought through.
We must take account of the possibility that individuals or a movement are in the process of evolution, and that, given time and space, could change. We know that our objectives can be achieved in a variety of ways. If there was a clear, watertight scheme, in which there was at the outset an unequivocal commitment to change and a process that genuinely guaranteed to deliver that change, we would have to consider whether a scruple over a period of days could be justified. We do not have that option before us today.
"The Commission may make such arrangements as it considers appropriate to facilitate the decommissioning of arms."
I repeat:
"such arrangements as it considers appropriate to facilitate"
decommissioning.
"the operation of the institutions"
of the agreement, but the legislation leaves out many of those institutions. It leaves out the civic forum, the Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission, the commission on policing and the revue of criminal justice. They are also institutions of the agreement. There is a simple message here, which I hope will have some appeal to Labour Members--one out, all out.
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