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10 pm
Dr. Palmer: Our difficulty in this debate is that the end to the conflict in Northern Ireland ultimately depends not so much on the individual terms of the Good Friday agreement or any additional terms that we may seek to impose, but on a development of trust between the parties.
I shall illustrate my point with the example given by the right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King). If he, as a Conservative Member, were found to have in his home a weapon, perhaps a hunting rifle, I, as a Labour Member, would not feel threatened by him because it would never occur to me that he would use his weapon in a violent fashion. If, however, the right hon. Gentleman were in the habit of issuing violent threats and was known to support terrorist activity, I would feel a sense of deep unease when I met him even if I did not know that he had a weapon at home or whether he had voluntarily given up such a weapon, and I would be reluctant to work with him in a common Government. That is the basic problem faced by the Ulster Unionists, as well as by Sinn Fein and every other party in Northern Ireland.
The difficulty that we face with the amendments is the same as that with the previous group of amendments--they seek to home in on, and to harden, a specific aspect of the agreement that is known to cause difficulty to a particular section of those involved in the process. That is why the amendments appear to be partisan and unhelpful.
If General de Chastelain, considering the overall picture, judges that we are making genuine progress towards a civil society in Northern Ireland from which the threat of violence is banned, that will be a crucial step forward. It would be wrong if an amendment that we passed tonight forced the disruption of that process and the end of the Good Friday agreement. Conversely, if General de Chastelain detects that, on one side or another, there is no genuine commitment to the agreement and to peace, and that one party is not serious about the process, that will be a serious matter that will effectively end the process, regardless of whether a rifle or a pound of Semtex has been given up.
Decommissioning is important, as we have all stressed several times, but it is one of a wide range of factors. I believe that, if we had nailed down the decommissioning aspect of the agreement, the critics of the agreement, whom we greet regularly on the Opposition Benches, would be raising other aspects of it because of their basic distrust of the other side, for reasons that we can understand, and their reluctance to reach an agreement with a commitment to a peaceful settlement. The amendment is understandable, but it is unhelpful
because it seeks to solidify a particular aspect of the agreement at the expense of the more fundamental question of whether we can trust the parties.
Mr. Öpik:
I fully agree with the need for a timetable for decommissioning, but having heard how the right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) first savaged and then praised the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Dr. Turner), I hesitate before I draw the Tory shilling.
Everybody agrees that we need a timetable. On Second Reading, the issue hinged on whether the Government or an independent body should set the timetable. Both could work, but the Government are suggesting that an independent body, in the form of General de Chastelain's commission, should set the timetable, and I am inclined to agree, for one crucial reason. General de Chastelain has built up enormous credibility with both sides, and individuals and parties have sought to accept him as an effective, independent arbiter. Given the tensions that will unquestionably arise when the timetable is set, it is reasonable to allow General de Chastelain's independent commission to choose the route and the wayposts.
I am therefore a little concerned that the amendments, if agreed, would demand us to do the job. As I said on Second Reading, much of this is about not principle but judgment. Therefore, there is space for people to differ. I still think that de Chastelain is probably in a very strong position to make this happen.
Amendment No. 5 summarises what we would all like: a process that leads to May 2000 as the point of complete decommissioning. If right hon. and hon. Members are looking for a copper-bottomed assurance, I say once again that that deadline is it. We--as well as, indeed, the failsafe mechanism--are attempting to ensure that we end up with the desired result in May 2000.
Putting that aside, I commend to the Government amendment No. 2, which I tabled. This is a matter of process. Clause 1 is so drafted that it requires the Decommissioning Commission to report a failure but not to specify its exact nature. Amendment No. 2 would put that right. Suggesting that may sound a little pedantic, but given the absolute necessity for us to be extremely clear at every point in our deliberations and, given the danger of any latitude in the Bill's terminology, I ask the Government to take seriously those five or six words, which would tidy up exactly what the Decommissioning Commission is expected to report.
Mr. Wilshire:
I was desperately keen to make a speech on Second Reading about the prostitution of democracy by allowing armed terrorists into government, but sadly, I was not called. I suspect that, if I tried to make such a speech now, I would promptly be ruled out of order. I shall therefore resist that temptation and speak instead to amendments Nos. 31 and 33, which stand in my name.
Amendment No. 31 would achieve what other people have tried to achieve: confirm a timetable specifying when things must happen. Amendment No. 33 would specify what must happen before any sanctions that are imposed can be lifted.
In fairness, I should remind the Committee that I voted against both the Good Friday agreement and Second Reading. I do not want there to be any misunderstanding about where I am coming from. None the less, I accept the democratic will of the majority, which is of course
more than one can say about Sinn Fein-IRA. The key reason for being against both the Good Friday agreement and this Bill is that they duck the issue of decommissioning. The Good Friday agreement fudged the question in the hope that it would go away--but it has not--and the Bill tries to do exactly the same.
I have listened intently throughout these debates to what others have said, and note that the Bill is supposed to provide a failsafe guarantee that decommissioning will occur. But, on Second Reading, the Secretary of State said that the Government do not control the timetable--I believe that those were her words. I also listened carefully to the explanation that General de Chastelain controls the timetable. Then I heard it explained that General de Chastelain has not specified a timetable. Rather than going down the route of what exactly he did say, I shall leave it to the words of the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson), who spelled out in detail exactly General de Chastelain's real position.
In the end, all that I have to go on are the words of the Prime Minister. If I understand him correctly, he has told us several times that, if we pass this Bill, there will be a commitment to disarm within days and a start to proper decommissioning within weeks, to be completed by May 2000.
For the purpose of the debate, I am prepared to take the Prime Minister at his word. That is why I have tabled amendment No. 31. The Prime Minister said that there will be a commitment within days, and I take days to mean less than a week. If the agreement comes into effect on the 15th, I see no reason why we should not specify 22 July, which is days away, not a week, for a commitment. If that is what we are being offered, surely we can write it down.
We were told that there will be a real start within weeks. To me, weeks mean less than a month. If there is to be a start within weeks, that means that it must be before 15 August, which is why I put that date in my amendment. If the Prime Minister is telling us the truth, there is no harm in accepting the amendment.
We are told also--it is in the Good Friday agreement--that the completion of decommissioning will be by May 2000. It therefore seems simple to me to specify 30 April. That is how I arrived at that date.
Tokenism will not do.
Mr. Mallon:
I remind the hon. Gentleman that the date specified in the agreement is 22 May 2000.
Mr. Wilshire:
I hear what the hon. Gentleman says and he is right to correct me. If I could table an amendment to an amendment, I would willingly accommodate him. I hope that he accepts that the principle applies. Instead of 30 April--
Mr. Mallon:
I made the point because the hon. Gentleman so clearly stated what days and weeks mean to him. The one date that we could be accurate about is the one specified in the agreement, which the hon. Gentleman got wrong.
Mr. Wilshire:
We are old sparring partners and I hear what the hon. Gentleman says and take it on the chin. I shall not pursue the matter, but I shall pursue the issue of tokenism.
It is crucial that we do not say that a start equals one bullet. It seemed logical to me to specify 25 per cent. of all arms by 15 August, but it could be another figure. If the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) wanted to challenge me on that, I would allow him to do so.
Amendment No. 33 deals with what must happen before any breach of the conditions can be rectified. Clause 2 merely provides that the Secretary of State can specify when the process comes to an end. That is not good enough. There must be clear indications of what has to happen before the Secretary of State can use the powers set out in the Bill. The date in the amendment is wrong, so if the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh wants another go, I shall willingly give way to him.
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