| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
The Prime Minister: We are trying to achieve proper standards, but it is important for countries to protect their own boundaries, and to protect themselves against illegal immigration--and, indeed, unlawful asylum. What is required is a balance. We want to establish proper standards in regard to the way in which people are treated and received, but we do not favour harmonisation. What we favour is the adoption of some common procedures, and the introduction of proper minimum standards; but, as a result of what we negotiated at Amsterdam, we retain integrity over our own borders.
Mr. William Thompson (West Tyrone): I welcome the Prime Minister's initiative to try to get France to take in British beef, but does he recognise that its refusal to do so is strictly against the spirit of the European Common Market? Furthermore, such action turns people away from wanting to be closer to Europe.
When the Prime Minister raised France's refusal to accept not only beef into France, but lorry transit through the country, did he also raise the severe allegation that France is subsidising its pig farmers behind the back door and is giving other subsidies to its farmers?
Why have we to wait for another meeting of the Scientific Committee before France takes in British beef? If it can get away with that, why cannot another country raise another objection, which would mean that we would have to wait further?
The Prime Minister:
The only proper recourse is through the law. The hon. Gentleman has said that the French action is against the spirit of the law. It is against the letter of the law. That is why we are taking the action that we are taking. As I said earlier, it is only because we are part of the European Union that we have any power to take action against the French.
In respect of transit, as a result of the temporary agreement that we have secured with the French, transit is now allowed, so that obstacle has been cleared, but that does not alter the fact that we still do not have clearance of British beef in Europe. We will carry on fighting the case until we win it.
Mr. Denzil Davies (Llanelli):
In view of the Prime Minister's fairly recent answer on that pompously named project the corpus juris, I hesitate to ask another question, but will he please tell me whether, during the deliberations on crime and justice, the corpus juris was discussed at all and whether the recommendation by those who wrote the project that there should be a European public prosecutor was discussed?
The Prime Minister:
No is the short answer on corpus juris. There are people who talk about having a European public prosecutor. That is essentially to root out fraud in the European Union, but we have not agreed to that and there is no active proposal on it.
Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle):
When the Prime Minister was at the European Council, did anyone draw to his attention the fact that, since he told the House
As Germany holds 3,400 tonnes of gold and has said that it will not sell any of it, will the Prime Minister now abandon his Government's plan to reduce Britain's gold reserves to less than one tenth of that amount?
The Prime Minister:
The hon. Gentleman is back to the old gold conspiracy again. We took the decision for sensible reasons. As for selling Britain's reserves, the one party that I will not take lessons from in the matter is the party that gave us the exchange rate mechanism debacle, where we lost more reserves in one day than this country has ever known.
Mr. Mike Gapes (Ilford, South):
It was reported in the press that, during a break in the proceedings at Tampere, some of the Heads of State and Government visited the Lenin museum in Tampere. Is the Prime Minister aware that that museum contains one of the few surviving documents--the treaty of Brest Litovsk--that was signed by Stalin, Lenin and Trotsky? Can he think of any three Conservative politicians who will be able to sign any document jointly?
The Prime Minister:
No is the answer to that. I should also say that I was not one of those who visited the Lenin museum.
Madam Speaker:
On that note, we shall move on to the next statement.
The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Mr. John Prescott):
Madam Speaker, I wish, with permission, to make a statement about the horrific railway accident that happened at Ladbroke Grove junction on the approach to Paddington station on 5 October, when, at 8.11 am, the Great Western train from Cheltenham collided with the Thames train leaving Paddington. The House will be aware that, last week, my noble Friend the Minister for Transport made a statement in another place.
I am sure that the House will wish to join me in expressing deepest sympathy to the families and friends of those who lost their lives and hoping for the fullest possible recovery of those who were injured.
Immediately, we asked how such an accident could happen and how we could prevent such a thing from ever happening again. The latest casualty figures are 30 fatalities--including both drivers--and 245 injured. It was the worst rail accident in Britain since the Clapham Junction accident in 1988, when 35 people died.
Once again, the vigour, courage and professionalism demonstrated by our emergency services--fire, police, medical and health and safety staff--were outstanding. The emergency services' reaction was the product of constant training and planning, enabling them to perform in a manner of which I know that the whole nation wants to express its appreciation.
A striking feature of the appalling event was the remarkable reaction of ordinary people who were nearby at the time. Railway workers, staff from the local supermarket, others working nearby and, of course, survivors of the collision rushed to help those in distress without regard to their own safety. In the midst of horror, their selfless behaviour was a testament to human courage and willingness to reach out to others during a crisis. I am sure that the House will wish to join me in paying tribute to them all.
In addition to investigations by Railtrack and the railway inspectorate, there is to be a full public inquiry into the Paddington crash, under the chairmanship of Lord Cullen. I am pleased that Lord Cullen has agreed to take on the task and begun his work so promptly, visiting the site on the day of his appointment. He will, of course, soon have the benefit of the Southall inquiry, to which we attach the highest importance.
Lord Cullen will be examining the causes of the tragic accident, and also the wider issue of the overall safety regime in the railway industry. He will, inevitably, take some time to complete his work, but the Government will do all that we can to remove any obstacles to progress and ensure that we avoid the type of delay that the Southall inquiry experienced.
On Friday, 8 October, Her Majesty's chief inspector of railways issued interim findings on the causes of the crash. Subject to final confirmation, we now know that the Thames train passed a red signal before travelling a further 700 m into the path of the Great Western train. The automatic warning system on board would have applied the brakes if it had not been cancelled by the driver.
The chief inspector of railways has made it clear that, whatever the immediate causes of the tragedy, they should be considered as symptoms of a more general problem in the organisation of an effective railway safety regime.
I am determined to ensure that the industry takes firm and urgent action to reduce greatly the number of signals passed at danger--so-called SPADs. There has been considerable concern about SPAD incidents. Although the number of such incidents had been falling--from almost 1,000 in 1991, to just under 600 in 1997--last year it increased to 643. Consequently, last month, the railway inspectorate published a report detailing actions companies were required to take to strengthen safety systems. The chief inspector has my full support in that.
On 7 October, the railway inspectorate wrote to the train operating companies, instructing them to re-brief all drivers on the location of suspect signals and ways of avoiding passing signals at danger, and to review their driver training and arrangements for monitoring performance.
On 8 October, the inspectorate issued three enforcement notices. The first prohibits the use of signal SN109--the signal passed at danger by the Thames train--until Railtrack takes effective action to prevent further trains from passing it at danger. The second requires Railtrack to introduce by 6 November additional controls at 21 other signals passed at danger more than seven times in the past eight years. The third requires Railtrack by the same date to produce plans to reduce the risk at all other signals with a recent history of being passed at danger.
Meanwhile, I have asked for a weekly report to be sent to me on the number of SPADs. The chief inspector of railways has reported to me that, in the seven days after the accident, there were 16 SPAD incidents on the network. That is consistent with the average weekly numbers for October over the past three years. I have asked the railway inspectorate to produce a monthly analysis of SPADs which will be placed in the Library of the House.
The concern about SPADs has been increased by last night's incident at Lewes, where a Hastings passenger train collided with an empty train. There were 11 passengers plus driver and guard on the Hastings train, and all were safely evacuated. Fortunately, no one was hurt. Railtrack promptly informed the Health and Safety Executive, and an inspector from the railway inspectorate arrived on the scene.
The initial report from the HSE indicates that the train left Lewes station against a red stop light, and although the signaller at Lewes put out an emergency general stop call via the cab secure radio network, he was unable to prevent a collision. The likeliest explanation is that a number of errors by the platform staff at Lewes and the train crew combined resulted in a signal being passed at danger. The railway industry intends to carry out an internal inquiry. Meanwhile, the HSE is continuing to investigate, and we await its conclusions.
These incidents have led to a lot of discussion about train protection systems. Indeed, the inspectors consider that the Paddington accident would have been prevented had the train protection and warning system been installed. In 1989, the Hidden inquiry into the Clapham crash recommended the network-wide fitment of automatic train protection, although no workable system
was available in Britain at that time. No decision to implement this recommendation was taken, except on a pilot basis.
When this Government came to office, the Health and Safety Commission--aware of my close interest in the area--expressed concern that the industry was not making sufficient progress on either of the two key rail safety issues of the day: namely, the development of train protection systems and the withdrawal of mark 1 slam-door rolling stock.
We made it clear to the HSC in January 1998 that it should bring forward whatever regulations it considered necessary to improve safety on the railways and to reduce the incidence of signals passed at danger. Those regulations--signed by me on 30 July--will introduce train protection across the network and will bring forward by two years the elimination of mark 1 rolling stock.
The regulations require the early introduction of the TPWS and the continued use of ATP where it is already operational. The regulations do not preclude the introduction of further ATP, especially on our high-speed rail network. In fact, ATP is already operational on the Great Western line, the Chiltern line and the Heathrow express. It is being introduced on the channel tunnel rail link and the west coast main line, together with the east coast main line and the midland main line when they are upgraded. There is a balance of systems on our railway network.
There has been much discussion in the media and elsewhere about different types of train protection systems, and a great deal of misinformed opinion and differing technical advice has added to the confusion. I want to identify the safest and most appropriate options for use on our railways. I have therefore asked Sir David Davies, president of the Royal Academy of Engineering, to assess and report back to me on the effectiveness, practicability and cost of train protection systems, and also on how best to reduce the present number of SPADs.
The Paddington incident has of course given rise to a large number of other questions not related to signals being passed at danger. They include the safety of the rolling stock and emergency equipment in case of fire; the behaviour of automatic central door locking; the type of diesel fuel; and the design of the track configuration and signalling.
We would all like instant answers on those issues. They will be examined thoroughly and properly in the investigations into the crash. I trust that the House agrees that it would be wrong to leap hastily to conclusions. Of course, should right hon. and hon. Members wish to raise any specific points, I shall ensure that they are drawn to the attention of those conducting the investigations and the public inquiry.
Concerns have been expressed since privatisation about fragmentation leading to a blame culture. Particular concern has been expressed about the wide range of responsibilities that reside in Railtrack's safety and standards directorate.
Last year, at my request and in line with a recommendation of the Transport Sub-Committee, the HSC began a review of the issue. Its interim report reached my office on the day of the Paddington crash. The report raises serious concerns about the rail industry, largely relating to priorities and decisions on safety standards, approval of the operators' safety cases,
safety audit, incident investigation and the adequacy of strategic research. It states that those issues should be explored further.
As a consequence I acted immediately, and at my request the Health and Safety Commission has appointed a specialist team to investigate those concerns and advise on any action required. I am glad to say that Railtrack has publicly welcomed that initiative.
I am minded to transfer the main functions of Railtrack's safety and standards directorate out of Railtrack, but where those functions are best located requires careful consideration. The answer must be one that ensures greater coherence on safety and does not, through disrupting safety management, result in an increase in risk.
The chief inspector of railways is keeping me informed of the progress of his investigations into the Paddington crash. He hopes to have sufficient additional information from the various tests and examinations now under way to be able to make a second interim report shortly.
I asked for an early report on action undertaken by Railtrack to improve safety on the approach to Paddington station, both in the short and longer terms. Although the emergency services have completed their work and the track has been cleared, Railtrack will reopen Paddington station only when the railway inspectorate is satisfied that it is safe.
There will be some restrictions on services, in particular at peak times, notably because of the closure of the approach to signal SN109. The actions that I have taken since the Paddington crash have been designed to enable the fullest possible investigation of the causes of this appalling accident and the best ways of preventing it from happening again. They should ensure that the decisions that need to be taken will be properly informed, thoroughly considered and as prompt as possible. In the meantime, whenever it becomes clear that a measure needs to be taken, we shall take it. Neither shall we hesitate to introduce legislation to the House, should that be required.
I have summoned the managing directors of all the passenger and freight operators, the shadow Strategic Railway Authority, the Rail Regulator, Railtrack and the general secretaries of the rail unions to a meeting next Monday to thrash out any immediate and additional steps that can be taken to improve safety. In particular, we shall discuss the HSE reports on SPADs and Railtrack's safety and standards directorate.
4.15 pm
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |