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Miss Anne McIntosh (Vale of York): The Deputy Prime Minister has placed great emphasis on the early use of a train protection and warning system. However, on 8 October, in the first interim report from the Health and Safety Executive, it clearly emerged that automatic train protection equipment was part of the pilot scheme and was fitted to the Great Western train. However, the equipment has a great history of unreliability and in this instance, it was switched off. Could the DeputyPrime Minister please make it an early priority to ensure
that that equipment and the train protection and warning system are tried and tested, and operational as early as possible?
Mr. Prescott: Since that terrible tragedy--which Professor Uff is investigating at the moment, and we must await his report--actions have been taken to ensure that those systems are properly implemented and not isolated in the way that was suggested. However, we must await the report, as it has also been suggested that the driver was not familiar with that kind of system and that it had been isolated for a good period. That is another example of the fact that the automatic train protection system is not necessarily 100 per cent. operative on what we call the bolt-on system.
If ATP is put on new track--as has been done in many parts of the continent, especially on the French railways, on our own new European rail link and on the Heathrow connection--where it is specifically designed, it works very well. The difficulties tend to come with the bolt-on systems that we have. That is a difficulty that all Secretaries of State for Transport have had to face--how to balance the high-speed automatic train protection that we want to see brought in against other factors. In some cases, even if there was a workable system and I tried to bring it in, it would take 10 years to do so, whereas the one that we are now dealing with--the TPWS--can be introduced by 2003 and will reduce 70 per cent. of these incidents. I think that is a good decision to take.
Fiona Mactaggart (Slough):
I represent a constituency in which five people who were killed in the incident worked, and the people of Slough are concerned to ensure that lessons are learned fast. They appreciate the message of sympathy and the speed with which the Deputy Prime Minister has acted in the matter.
However, we should not focus only on technology. I had a meeting with representatives of a local train operating company only two weeks before the episode, and learned that many drivers and signal operators had only quite recently been recruited, because of the difficulty of recruiting people to these posts in south-east England. Will my right hon. Friend examine the training of new appointees to the train operating companies to ensure first, that there is sufficient expertise and secondly, that sufficient attention is paid to the safety ethos of the railways?
Mr. Prescott:
We should not be over-concerned with technology, although it does have a role to play. What we want is an effective rail system. Even with the best technology in the world, we require to take into account human error, caused either in servicing or working the system. Indeed, in a perfect world, the automatic warning system on a train would stop that train, because the warning has to be cancelled and if it is not cancelled within a few seconds, it will stop it. However, incidents still occur when drivers cancel it and there is a collision--for whatever reason. There are various systems that, if implemented, could actually stop the train itself--that is why we talk about automatic train protection systems.
However, my hon. Friend makes a very sound point about the training and recruitment of drivers. She will be aware that, when the industry was first privatised, an awful lot of drivers were taken out of the industry and there were considerable redundancies--largely because it
was thought that there would be a decline in the rail system for one reason or another, but the opposite occurred. Now, there is a desperate need to increase the number of drivers--indeed, we came to an agreement with the industry on getting 800 new drivers this year.
The time it takes to train a driver is also an important question: under British Rail, there was a single training period, but now there are varying training periods and different systems used throughout the industry. Those factors cause me concern, although I make no judgment about their safety, and it is an issue that I shall take up with the industry on Monday.
Mr. Norman Baker (Lewes):
I am sure that the Deputy Prime Minister will join me in thanking the emergency services for their speed and efficiency in attending the incident in Lewes. I am relieved that, unlike the horrific accident at Paddington, no one was killed in last night's incident. However, the fact is that two trains crashed at Lewes, and my constituents will be horrified to learn that there have been 643 incidents of trains passing a red signal--almost two such incidents a day--in the past year. My constituents in Lewes and elsewhere expect a safe train system, but they do not believe that they have one.
When will measures be in place to ensure that no train anywhere on the British network will be able to pass a red light, as happened in Lewes last night and on many other occasions over the past year in this country? According to the press release issued this afternoon by Connex, the train operating company that runs trains through Lewes, not only did a driver pass a danger signal, but
Mr. Prescott:
I am sure that the whole House identifies with the hon. Gentleman and his constituents in Lewes, and wishes to express great appreciation of the emergency services. From speaking to people involved in such accidents, I have learned that, terrible though the circumstances are, the one comfort is the knowledge that the emergency services will be there quickly to help. That does real credit to those services and I am delighted to have another opportunity to express our appreciation. The circumstances in Lewes were difficult, and we are all pleased that no one was injured there.
The 643 so-called SPAD incidents are a source of great concern, and it is no comfort to know that that total has come down from more than 900 incidents. We must do all we can to reduce that number. I shall place a report on the incidence of SPADs in the House of Commons Library, but it must be seen in perspective. Approximately 70 per cent. of incidents involve distances of less than 50 yd, and sometimes the train has gone over by only one, two or 10 yd, whereas the safety margin built into the system is something like 150 yd. I want to give the House a precise picture of the seriousness of the problem.
I want to prevent every such incident from occurring, and I am sure the House does as well. That is why we paid such close attention to the Health and Safety Commission's
report, which contains 22 recommendations to Railtrack and the train operating companies on ways in which to improve the record. On Monday I shall discuss with the industry how those recommendations can be implemented and how we can get something done.
During my inquiries into automatic train systems, I have been told that if the signal has gone red--even if that is a failure of the signal--the train cannot be moved if the automatic train system is on; therefore, sometimes such systems have to be isolated to enable the train to be moved. There are circumstances when technology fails, but the train has to be moved. We have to avoid the easy option of simply cancelling a warning system and getting into the habit of thinking, "It's yellow, it's yellow, so it's bound to be green." Sometimes, the signal is yellow, yellow and then red, and that is when problems arise. We have to do all we can to avoid such difficulties.
Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours (Workington):
I have only a brief question, unlike many of those asked today. When will we stop the system of penalties and fines that operates between the train operating companies and Railtrack, which clearly has implications for safety?
Mr. Prescott:
We are reviewing several penalties and fines, and the new franchise negotiations are seeking to find a better way of dealing with those kinds of problems. The shadow Strategic Rail Authority has been appointed to provide an overall system that meets the requirements of a better railway rather than simply talking about sanctions, fines and penalties. However, make no mistake, any breach of safety will be met with heavy fines for companies. If companies are not operating proper rail safety systems, they must face the possibility of losing their licences.
Mr. David Rendel (Newbury):
The Deputy Prime Minister said that drivers may occasionally override and pass through a series of yellow signals before coming to a red signal and overriding it also. Is that scenario not made more likely because the warning that the driver receives in his cab at a red signal is precisely the same, both audibly and visually, as the warning for a yellow signal? If the warning given to the driver for a red signal were made different from that for a yellow signal, it would surely make the sorts of accidents to which the Deputy Prime Minister refers much less likely.
"a safety device to remind the driver to check the signals was not used."
What steps will the Deputy Prime Minister take to ensure that, once the necessary safety systems to make drivers aware of red signals have been implemented, drivers cannot override or cancel those systems and that the systems will be fail safe? We cannot have drivers cancelling signals that are there to protect them and the public at large.
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