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Mr. Snape: Does my hon. Friend agree that it is important that Sir David Davies bases his conclusionson engineering factors, rather than on financial considerations? As he is acknowledged to be an expert in engineering, will not his conclusions show whether it is sensible to go forward with TPWS, or some alternative system?
Mrs. Cryer: Yes, I agree with my hon. Friend. Clearly, the matter of cost will have to be considered, but that should be of negligible importance in comparison with considerations of railway safety.
The three enforcement notices that have been issued by the railways inspectorate are welcome, if somewhat belated. One prohibits the use of signal 109 at Paddington; the second requires Railtrack to introduce, within the next three weeks, additional controls at the 21 other signals passed at danger most frequently. The third will reduce risk at all remaining signals with a recent record of being passed at danger.
The Government's policy of getting people out of their cars and on to trains--or buses for short journeys--and of encouraging the movement of goods by rail freight rather than by heavy lorry has my full support, as I believe that it will prevent injuries and loss of life and improve the environment. However, to achieve those changes, passengers and the movers of goods must have confidence that the alternatives being promoted are cheap, reliable and safe.
If any of those three essential elements are lacking, our battle for the hearts and minds of commuters, families on the move and manufacturing industry will be lost, and the carnage of Ladbroke Grove will be repeated time and again on our roads. There may not be the same visual impact but, every day, families will be bereaved and individuals terribly injured. There must be a severe conflict of interest when an organisation is under pressure from shareholders to make profits and yet also has a duty of care for the safety of its passengers. I trust that the measures already announced and the advent of the Strategic Rail Authority will remove the possibility of such a conflict. I also hope that the Government will reconsider--even now--their commitment to the privatisation of national air traffic control in the light of the Paddington tragedy.
Mrs. Laing:
Will the hon. Lady give way?
Mrs. Cryer:
I am sorry, but I have finished.
Ms Claire Ward (Watford):
Like all hon. Members I want to offer my condolences to all those involved in the Paddington rail crash. I was shocked to hear of the crash: just two years after Southall, we were once again faced with a crash that would bring the safety of our railways into question. What dismayed me most was that the tragedy in Watford in 1996 seemed not even to have been taken into account, given what happened at Southall and Paddington. I have been further disappointed by the debate tonight; in all the speeches that I have heard about reports, about signals passed at danger--SPADs--and about safety, there has been not one mention of HM railway inspectorate's report into the Watford accident, a report that makes fascinating reading.
I was working in the constituency when that crash occurred, and I called for a public inquiry. I do not repeat that call; I am well aware that it is no longer realistic. However, I hope that the recommendations made in the Watford report and the circumstances of the Watford crash in August 1996 will be taken into account. I have made representations to the chairman of the Southall inquiry, and I hope that the report will be taken into account in the Paddington inquiry. Any recommendations made after Paddington and Southall should be tested against the circumstances of the Watford crash.
From what we know so far about Paddington, the similarities between that crash and the one in Watford are striking. People whose knowledge is much greater than mine suggest that those similarities are greater than the similarities between Paddington and Southall. Paddington and Watford had in common multiple SPADs--judging from the speculation that we have heard so far about Paddington. On 8 August 1996, a driver passed a red signal on the route from Euston to Crewe. The signal had been passed at danger several times. The crash resulted in the death of one person and injuries to 68 more. How must my constituents and the families of those who were involved in that crash feel about the fact that the subsequent recommendations of the inquiry report have not been acted on?
The report was published in April 1998, and I refer hon. Members--particularly my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions--to its recommendations. One of the issues regarding SPADs was that the British Railways Board group standard was superseded in March 1995 by the Railtrack group standard, which clarified certain duties and obligations that Railtrack and train operators were meant to put in place. That became effective in April 1995.
One of the key changes was a requirement that Railtrack should convene signal siting committees wherever a signal had been passed at danger more than once in 12 months or three or more times in a three-year period. Those circumstances certainly applied in the case of the Watford crash.
I want my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to question whether a signal siting committee was in operation in respect of the Paddington crash and whether previous SPADs reported at that junction had led to the convening of a signal siting committee. If they had, the committee might well have found that the signal was not easily seen by drivers. That was one of the issues that came out of the Watford crash. The report recommended that Railtrack should review its procedures to ensure
compliance with its own group standard in respect of the convening of signal siting committees. It was further recommended that the standard itself be reviewed so that following multiple SPAD incidents at any given signal, the SSC could assess all risk factors that could contribute to a SPAD incident. Had that happened after previous SPADs, we might not have got into the situation wenow face with Paddington. I cannot overstress my disappointment that the recommendations following the Watford crash do not appear to have been implemented by Railtrack yet.
I want to draw attention to other issues relating to the Watford crash. It was recommended that train drivers who repeatedly passed SPADs should have special training from the train operating company. I would be interested to learn whether my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State believes that that policy has been adopted by the TOCs since the recommendations were produced.
Her Majesty's inspectorate recommended that the TOCs audit their SPAD management systems to ensure that driving briefings are effective and that signal issues that concern drivers are pursued vigorously with Railtrack to provide satisfactory solutions. Over the past two weeks, several train drivers have said in the media that they have repeatedly reported signals that are difficult to see and where there are continual problems. I am concerned that, yet again, a recommendation that came out of the Watford crash that may well have prevented the Paddington crash has not been implemented. I would be interested to hear my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State's views on that.
This is a serious issue for my constituents. They faced the problems of the Watford rail crash and saw the deaths at the Southall and Paddington crashes. They wonder how many times this has to happen. How many reports, how many inquiries, how many different recommendations do we have to hear before something is done? I know that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has been working hard on these issues but I would like a specific answer on this report. If he cannot provide it to the House in his reply, I would like to hear from him in writing. Like most hon. Members, I will have to respond to my constituents, who are concerned that despite the crash in Watford, there are several similarities with the Paddington rail crash that have not yet been dealt with and recommendations that have not been implemented.
Of course, other issues are raised by the Watford rail crash and the report--especially the fact that nobody has been blamed for the crash. The driver was prosecuted and acquitted, but nobody--Railtrack or the train operating companies--has been called to account. The inspectorate made several recommendations, some of which have been implemented by Railtrack and the train operating companies. However, at the end of the day, no one has been held to account for the 68 people who were injured and the one woman who died in that accident.
I want to raise some wider safety issues with my right hon. Friend. During the past two weeks, we have heard much about whether Railtrack should continue to be responsible for safety. Railtrack cannot remain responsible for controlling all safety matters. As a result of the crash, public confidence in Railtrack is low.
I want to make one point about where that responsibility should lie. It has been suggested that it should go to the Health and Safety Executive. I have some
concern about that possibility. As we know, even if the HSE were responsible for setting those new safety standards, it would, through the railways inspectorate, investigate the circumstances of a crash. In the event that the safety standards were not fulfilled, the organisation that set them would end up investigating itself. Will my right hon. Friend carefully take that point on board?
So much blame is put on individuals--whether they are train drivers or company management. People who have been involved in crashes want to know two things: what happened and why it happened. Most important, they want to know that it will not happen again. We can blame a range of people--Railtrack or drivers--but we must all work together to ensure that these types of tragedy do not happen again.
8.50 pm
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