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Mrs. Beckett: I am well aware that it is the instruction, perhaps, and certainly the preference, of Opposition Members to make constant references to stealth taxes. However, there seems to be a flaw in the argument on this occasion. First, something can hardly be described as being handled by stealth when the relevant information was available in a parliamentary answer of 15 March. I know that not everybody reads Hansard with great assiduity, but this cannot really be described as keeping something secret.
Secondly, not only is it not stealthy but it is not a tax. The Government's overall package of proposals, including the abolition of the entry fee on national insurance contributions, the introduction of the 10 per cent. starting rate of tax and the cutting of the basic rate, more than compensate for any rise in the upper earnings level. The hon. Gentleman's question was well phrased but, I fear, ill targeted.
Madam Speaker:
Order. We shall now take the second statement.
Mitrokhin Archive
1.14 pm
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Jack Straw): With permission, Madam Speaker, I wish to make a statement about the Mitrokhin archive and other related issues.
On 13 September, when the House was in recess, I issued a written statement concerning the activities of the KGB and its agents which had been brought to light by the Mitrokhin archive. A copy of the statement has been placed in the Library of the House.
The archive material relates to activities spanning several decades, from 1917 up to the mid-1980s. A book by Mr. Mitrokhin and Professor Christopher Andrew drawing on the archive was published in September, prompting extensive media coverage. That in turn raised questions about how the archive had been used.
In the light of those questions, I announced on 13 September, with the agreement of the Prime Minister, that the Intelligence and Security Committee had been asked to conduct an inquiry into the policies and procedures used by the intelligence and security agencies in the handling of the Mitrokhin material. I am very grateful to the right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King), the chairman of the committee, and his colleagues for taking on that important work.
My right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and I will carefully consider the committee's report and ensure that as much as possible of it is made public. It may, however, be helpful to the House if I set out today some of the essential background.
Vasili Mitrokhin worked for almost 30 years in the foreign intelligence archive of the KGB where, at great risk to himself, he made notes of the contents of the highly secret files that passed through his hands. Over many years, he thus assembled a huge collection of material, some in manuscript and some typed.
In 1992, after Mr. Mitrokhin had approached the UK for help, our Secret Intelligence Service made arrangements to bring Mr. Mitrokhin and his family to this country, together with his archive. As there were no original KGB documents or copies of original documents, the material itself was of no direct evidential value, but it was of huge value for intelligence and investigative purposes.
Thousands of leads from Mr. Mitrokhin's material have been followed up worldwide. As a result, our intelligence and security agencies, in co-operation with allied Governments, have been able to put a stop to many security threats. Many unsolved investigations have been closed; many earlier suspicions confirmed; and some names and reputations have been cleared. Our intelligence and security agencies have assessed the value of Mr. Mitrokhin's material worldwide as immense.
Much of the media coverage in September concerned Mrs. Melita Norwood. My statement of 13 September summarised the history of the Security Service's knowledge of Mrs. Norwood spanning half a century, and the decisions that were taken in her case. The handling of her case will plainly form part of the inquiry that is now under way by the Intelligence and Security Committee. For the convenience of the House, however, I shall briefly summarise what I spelled out in September.
Mrs. Norwood was first vetted for access to Government secrets in 1945, when she worked for the British Non-Ferrous Metal Research Association. Although there were concerns about her in 1945, there were insufficient grounds at that time to warrant withholding her clearance for access to sensitive documents. Further investigation, however, led to her vetting clearance being revoked in 1951. She had not in practice had authorised access to Government secrets after 1949.
An extensive investigation of Mrs. Norwood in the 1960s led the Security Service to conclude that Mrs. Norwood had been a spy in the 1940s, but the service also concluded that there was no usable evidence that could be used in court to support a prosecution against her.
When Mr. Mitrokhin's notes of the KGB archive material became available to British intelligence in 1992, those notes further confirmed the suspicions already held about Mrs. Norwood's role as a spy. However, the Security Service again concluded that that material did not on its own constitute evidence that could be put to a UK court. Moreover, a judgment was made at that time that the material needed to remain secret for a period. There were many leads to more recent espionage to be followed up, particularly in the countries of a number of our close allies, which could have been jeopardised by premature disclosure. In summary, the key decisions in the Norwood case were made in 1945, 1951, 1966 and 1992-93.
The House will be aware that questions on prosecutions for espionage, as for any other alleged crime, are a matter for the prosecuting authorities and the Law Officers, not for the Home Secretary of the day.
As I made clear in my 13 September statement, the papers relating to Mrs. Norwood were submitted to the Attorney-General in the spring of this year, but he concluded that 1992 had represented the last opportunity for the authorities to proceed by way of a criminal investigation and possible prosecution, and that there was therefore no decision for him to take. I can, however, tell the House that, in the light of Mrs. Norwood's recent statements, the papers in this case are currently being studied again by the prosecuting authorities. I understand that four other cases, covering the Mitrokhin archive and related matters, are also being considered.
Let me now turn to the decision which was taken to make publicly available information from the Mitrokhin archive. Although the material has been in the custody of the Secret Intelligence Service since 1992, it was and remains the property of Mr. Mitrokhin. It was always his intention that the material should be published, but Mr. Mitrokhin agreed to co-operate with the major operation by our security and intelligence agencies, which I have outlined, to use the information first for investigative purposes.
I understand that, by 1996, investigations in the UK and elsewhere had reached a stage where it was possible to agree to start the process to meet Mr. Mitrokhin's wish to see the story revealed. Given the nature of his notes, it was concluded that this could best be done through an historical analysis.
In March 1996, the right hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC, the then Foreign Secretary, agreed in principle that Professor Christopher Andrew of Cambridge university
should be invited to co-author, with Mr. Mitrokhin, an historical study of those aspects of the archive which cover KGB activities against the principal western states. I understand that Sir Malcolm agreed with the recommendation that an interdepartmental committee of officials should consider whether any of the information in the material needed to be withheld from publication. I also understand that Sir Malcolm imposed a condition that any allegations of criminal behaviour against individual persons should not be made public unless those individuals agreed or they had been prosecuted and convicted.
The Government were informed in late 1997 of the plan to publish the archive, and concurred. In 1998, the Secret Intelligence Service entered into confidentiality agreements with Professor Andrew and the publishers, Penguin. These were intended to ensure that still sensitive material was not published.
In the interests of national security, the Security Service has, over the years, carried out many investigations into allegations of espionage, based on intelligence which it has acquired. But allegations, or even good intelligence, are not proof of criminal activity. They are instead the basis for investigative work designed to prevent further damage to the interests of the country. They may in turn help in the end unearth evidence solid enough to put before a court.
The publication of news articles and television programmes about the Mitrokhin archive and the East German Stasi records has led some people to ask that the Government should publish a list of all those against whom allegations of spying and complicity with the KGB and the Stasi have been made. There are, however, compelling arguments against doing so which have been accepted by successive Governments.
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