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Miss Begg: But how will we know the views of the Scottish quangos if we do not have them down to ask them questions? We cannot depend on press reports, as we know how accurate they can be; the hon. Gentleman himself was caught out today by the press. Obviously, we need to get the story from the horse's mouth, and if there is genuine concern among Scottish bodies about reserved matters in Scotland, we need to find that out. That will be the role of the Scottish Affairs Committee.
The hon. Member for North Tayside said that Scottish Members of Parliament do not have enough to do. This week, I have tabled questions to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Prime Minister and the Department of Trade and Industry. I have signed an early-day motion on the test ban treaty, and I have had a briefing from the Secretary of State for Social Security. I have been involved in a range of things in which I, as a Member of this Parliament from Scotland, have an interest. If Scottish National Party Members have no interest in reserved matters, I wonder what they have been doing for the past two years. There is a great deal more for Scottish Members to do than even I had anticipated. We have an important role.
Mr. William Ross (East Londonderry):
I have followed this debate with interest for most of the day. Scotland and Wales have been mentioned frequently, but Northern Ireland only rarely, possibly because devolution is yet to take place there. It is well known that the late John Smith, when Leader of the Opposition, intended to establish a common pattern of devolution for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with minor variations to take account of the different structures of local government. At that time, the present Prime Minister was shadow Home Secretary, and as such was closely involved in all discussions on the design of uniform structures for the three countries.
There is no such uniformity in the current position. Scotland has a Parliament with legislative and tax-varying powers; Wales an Assembly without tax-raising powers; and Northern Ireland a shadow Assembly, also without tax-raising powers. In Scotland, the First Minister chose to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats to deliver a workable majority; in Wales, the First Secretary decided to proceed with a minority Administration; but in Northern Ireland, under the legislation passed in the House, the First Minister designate has to lead a four-party coalition--some call it an unholy alliance. The Executive there is different from any other in not having collective responsibility. A more awkward state of affairs would be difficult to imagine or design.
I am sure that the Prime Minister would agree that it is often difficult enough to get Cabinet agreement with only one party involved; but of course he can sack those who
disagree with him, which cannot be done in Northern Ireland. A two-party coalition, even when the two parties share some goals and values, presents further problems. How on earth is the First Minister of Northern Ireland expected to deliver sound governance when he has four parties with widely different policies, aims, values and, indeed, methods, to satisfy?
What sort of decision making would result in Scotland if the Cabinet consisted of representatives of the Labour, Liberal Democrat, Conservative and Scottish National parties? How would Wales fare under an Executive comprising Labour, Liberal Democrat, Conservative and Plaid Cymru members?
Mr. Ross:
Perhaps we shall see about that in time.
How does anyone expect an enforced coalition of members of the Ulster Unionist, Democratic Unionist, Social Democratic and Labour parties and Sinn Fein-IRA to produce stable government in Northern Ireland? Why should such an arrangement succeed there when it has been rejected as a model for the remainder of the kingdom and, to the best of my knowledge, in the rest of the world? If such an arrangement were to succeed, future elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly would simply be redundant, as a four-party coalition would form the Executive as long as the Assembly continued in existence. Let us not forget that all that is on the assumption that Sinn Fein-IRA can be persuaded to decommission or, to be more brutal about it, to surrender their weapons. The Gardai at least seem to be doing rather better in that respect at the moment, and we welcome that.
Once again, the Government's policy on Northern Ireland represents the triumph of hope over experience. They have a vague idea of how they want things to work and believe that they know how they should work, but when it comes to putting the theory into practice, a yawning chasm opens up.
I want to consider the effect of devolution on the oversight of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. When the devolution order comes into force, if it ever does, responsibility for all matters relating to Northern Ireland, other than excepted and reserved matters, will be transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Ministerial responsibility for those transferred matters will pass from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to Northern Ireland Ministers who are supposed to be accountable to the Assembly.
Ministerial responsibility for excepted and reserved matters will remain as at present and will continue to be discharged by the appropriate United Kingdom Minister. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will thus retain responsibility for a wide range of important policy areas, including security, policing, criminal law, public order, prisons, human rights, equality and payments into the Northern Ireland Consolidated Fund. The Secretary of State will also assume responsibilities in relation to the British-Irish Intergovernmental Council and will have a continuing interest in the British-Irish Council.
Under the terms of Standing Order No. 152, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee's areas of oversight that are related directly to the expenditure, administration and policy of the Northern Ireland Office and other matters within the responsibility of the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland will change automatically in line with the changed responsibilities of the office and the Secretary of State. Thus transferred matters will fall automatically outside the Committee's terms of reference--although the finance that will flow to those particular expenditures will come from the United Kingdom tax revenues. I shall say more about that later.
The establishment of devolved Administrations in three areas of the United Kingdom marks a major constitutional shift, and I believe that people throughout the United Kingdom--and particularly those in Northern Ireland--have not yet fully grasped the long-term downstream consequences. We are departing from the traditional British model of an unwritten constitution, whereby change is gradual and evolutionary, and arriving at a written constitution. An inevitable consequence of this shift is that future Government decisions will be more open to legal challenge, as occurs under the federal system of the United States, in Canada to a lesser extent and in Australia.
Any discussion of the procedural consequences of devolution must take account of the United Kingdom's only previous experience: the Stormont model under which the government of Northern Ireland was conducted between 1921 and 1972. Under the devolved Stormont parliamentary system, which was established in 1920--another system was set up in Dublin, but never functioned--the central Government retained certain functions. Under present devolution arrangements, specified bodies have been given several specified powers. So the approach is very different: in the latter example, certain things are devolved and, in the original example, certain things were retained. Those who have examined the original arrangements--the present Secretary of State for Wales has had to consider them in relation to Northern Ireland in the past year--will know that certain things were transferred that should not have been. I believe that the present system is much better.
Hon. Members must recognise that all elected bodies try to increase their powers. The most recent example--we do not have to look far to find it--is the European Union and its efforts to increase its scope and powers. It would be naive in the extreme to expect our devolved assemblies to behave any differently. It will inevitably diminish the power and influence of the House of Commons as elements in those devolved bodies seek constantly to probe and push the boundaries of their powers, and to extend them in all sorts of ways and in all directions where a Government have competence.
If hon. Members read the speech of the hon. Member for North Tayside (Mr. Swinney), they will see that he has spelled out clearly the nationalist methodology. I am familiar with it and other hon. Members will rapidly become accustomed to it. The hon. Gentleman is, after all, a nationalist: his party believes in a Scotland that is free from any oversight by this place. Members of the Welsh parties undoubtedly feel the same. Anyone who thinks that those folk will behave any differently from Irish nationalists is living in a dream world. Indeed, these assemblies came into being not because this House had an overwhelming wish to devolve powers but because it was necessary owing to pressure on the ground. I live in the real world, not the fairytale vacuum that sometimes seems to accompany these debates in the House.
The Scotland Act 1998 includes over 30 powers to make subordinate legislation. Of these, 26 are subject to procedure in the Westminster Parliament only, and normal scrutiny arrangements will continue to apply. A further four are subject to procedure in the Scottish Parliament only. The procedures which it adopts for consideration of these orders are a matter for itself. Of particular interest are the five powers that are subject to procedures in both the Westminster and Scottish Parliaments. This approach has been used where both Parliaments have an interest. The relevant powers include the adaptation of cross-border public bodies, the transfer of property of cross-border public bodies and the regulation of the Tweed and Esk fisheries. I think that others will emerge later. These powers will require co-ordination between the two Parliaments and between appropriate Ministers of the Crown and the Scottish Executive. It is not possible to determine what precise arrangements will be required until the Scottish Parliament has determined the scrutiny procedures that it will adopt.
Some interesting comments were made in the memorandum from the Leader of the House and it is worth re-reading it carefully. Among other things it said:
"In order to consider instruments subject to parliamentary procedures both at Westminster and in the devolved assemblies, there will have to be some form of liaison between the scrutiny committees of those bodies to avoid the possibility of different conclusions being reached on, say, vires. The scrutiny arrangements will not apply to any instruments made in Edinburgh or Cardiff which do not need to be laid at Westminster."
There are so many hundreds of these instruments passing through the House that inevitably there will be questions. No one should imagine that the more nationalist elements in the assembly parties in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will let slip any opportunity to portray any proper scrutiny by Westminster as inappropriate interference in their affairs. Such tensions are not only likely; they are as inevitable as the sun rising tomorrow morning.
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