| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
1.49 am
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Mr. Keith Hill): Let me begin, as is usual, by congratulating the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling(Sir J. Stanley) on securing the debate. I also thank him for raising this important subject and for letting me know in advance the key questions that he intended to raise, the answers to which I shall endeavour to provide.
Before I deal with the right hon. Gentleman's questions, and go on to summarise the Government's approach to rail safety in the light of the more recent appalling tragedy at Ladbroke Grove, it will benefit the House if I briefly describe the main aspects of the London Bridge rail crash of 8 January 1999. The accident occurred at about 17.25 at the Spa Road junction, near London Bridge station. The 15.51 Connex South Eastern service from Dover Priory to London Charing Cross collided side on with the 16.22 Thameslink Brighton to Bedford train. Four Connex train coaches and five coaches of the Thameslink train were derailed.
The accident caused severe disruption to rail services from London Bridge, Charing Cross and Cannon Street stations. Thankfully, there were no fatalities and only minor injuries to a small number of people: four were taken to hospital, but were not detained. Immediately after the accident, the electric current was cut off from all lines around the scene and the emergency services were called. Two hundred and eighty-two people were evacuated from the Connex and Thameslink trains.
However, another train--the 17.25 from London Bridge to Guildford--was trapped between London Bridge station and the accident site, from which about 100 people were also evacuated. The Health and Safety Executive report concluded that the evacuation of passengers from that train was not well organised. Some passengers were left to find their own way about half a mile along the track to London Bridge, and were fortunate to escape injury despite the electric current having been cut off.
In response to certain deficiencies in the training and experience of staff dealing with emergency situations, which became apparent during the HSE investigation, Her Majesty's inspectorate of railways has taken steps to ensure that those are fully addressed by the companies concerned. In particular, the Connex train operating companies have changed their emergency procedures to ensure that a responsible person is appointed to deal with each train affected by a major incident, and to arrange the evacuation of passengers where necessary.
Those, then, are the main features of the accident, and one practical upshot of the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the crash. Let me now turn to the questions raised by the right hon. Gentleman, which seem to me to fall into three groups.
First, the right hon. Gentleman asked specifically what explanation was given by the driver of the Connex train for going through the red light. The answer is that the driver continues to believe that he had a green signal and that he heard the bell for the automatic warning system associated with the signal. However, technical evidence and testing carried out as part of the inquiry proved that that could not have been the case. Weather conditions at the time were poor, with poor visibility. It is possible that that had an influence on what happened, but that is only speculation.
I should add that there is no record of any previous signals passed at danger--SPADs, as they have become known--at the Spa Road junction in question. The driver has been permanently removed from driving duties following the accident.
The second group of questions asked by the right hon. Gentleman relate to possible prosecution following the accident and to the publication of reports of investigations into it. The right hon. Gentleman asked why no papers in relation to the accident have been submitted by the police to the CPS, and also why no prosecution has been initiated by the HSE. The explanation is that the investigation of the accident was undertaken by an inspector from HMIR, which used its enforcement powers under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974. The police have not investigated the accident. It was HSE's assessment that there was no justification for a prosecution.
I should add that successful prosecution of individuals under section 7 of the 1974 Act requires evidence of a degree of negligence amounting to recklessness. A momentary lapse of concentration in an otherwise attentive individual does not normally satisfy that test. It was felt in this case that there was such a momentary lapse, and that other factors may have had an influence. There was, therefore, no justification for a prosecution. I should also remind the right hon. Gentleman of the failure of the attempted criminal prosecution of the driver in the Watford crash.
On the broader issue of publication, the right hon. Gentleman asked about the initial decision of the HSE not to publish a separate accident report. I am in no way seeking to minimise the seriousness of the accident near London Bridge but, as the right hon. Gentleman is aware, it is not the practice of the HSE to issue a separate public report except in the cases of the most serious accidents. In normal circumstances, therefore, the details of accident investigations such as that undertaken at London Bridge are published in Her Majesty's railway inspectorate's annual report. The report covering 1998-99 is to be published on 1 December. However, in the light of the understandable public concern aroused by the tragedy of Ladbroke Grove, it was decided that it was in the public interest to publish the full report on the London Bridge accident immediately, and it was published on 27 October.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked about the publication of the full report of the Railtrack internal investigation. That is essentially a matter for Railtrack, but he knows from earlier correspondence with my right hon. and noble Friend the Minister for Transport that Railtrack has said that it is producing a summary report for publication, subject to legal scrutiny and the agreement of the other parties concerned. I received confirmation today that it remains Railtrack's intention to publish that summary report.
Thirdly, the right hon. Gentleman asked connected questions about the installation of train protection systems. In particular, he asked why the train protection warning system, TPWS, would not be installed until the end of 2003. This is absolutely not the occasion to seek to score party political points, but it is perhaps a pity that the previous Government were not more proactive on the matter. This Government have worked as quickly as possible to find a practical solution, and the Railway Safety Regulations 1999, laid before Parliament on 10 August, require TPWS to be introduced and operational across the railway network by the end of 2003 at the latest. That date was chosen as a challenging but realistic target. Significantly, the industry has now agreed to investigate measures for accelerating that process. No alternative method of train protection could be installed in anything like that time scale.
On the installation of automatic train protection--ATP--on that part of the network operated by Connex, let me say this. ATP is currently installed on the Chiltern line, Heathrow Express and Great Western as a pilot scheme. In addition, it will be fitted to all the high-speed lines as they are upgraded: the west coast main line, the east coast main line, and Midland Mainline. The channel tunnel rail link will also get full ATP.
The right hon. Gentleman will be aware that my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister has asked Sir David Davies to report before the end of the year with his initial assessment of the effectiveness, practicability and cost of train protection systems. That information will be available to Lord Cullen, who is conducting the Ladbroke Grove inquiry, and Professor Uff, who is conducting the Southall inquiry, and they will jointly consider train protection systems. The Health and Safety Commission will advise the Government on any recommendations that they make.
The Deputy Prime Minister also agreed with rail industry leaders at the rail safety summit on 25 October an immediate programme of improvements designed to drive up safety standards in the wake of the Paddington rail crash. There was agreement in principle on a range of practical steps to rebuild confidence in the rail industry.
There will be a review of consistent standards of driver training by train operating companies. A nationwide independent confidential reporting system will allow all staff to phone in safety concerns. Implementation of TPWS on track and trains will be accelerated. The means to accelerate the development programme for ATP systems will be identified. There will be immediate investigation of all incidents involving SPADs to a common standard. There will be urgent action on the22 steps required by the Health and Safety Executive for reducing SPADs. Finally, a consistent approach to safety
management, embracing best practice, across the network will be established. A further rail safety summit will report on progress on 30 November.
In summary, therefore, the decision to introduce TPWS, the Cullen and Davies inquiries, the work being undertaken on SPADs and the rail safety summit held on 25 October, to be resumed on 30 November, all demonstrate this Government's overwhelming commitment to safety on our railways. We are now at a critical point, at which all those responsible for running our railways must endeavour to
create a new national safety culture that will enable all parts of the industry to work together to improve safety. Only then can we begin to rebuild the public's confidence in a safe and efficient rail industry.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |