EIGHTH REPORT
The Agriculture Committee has agreed to the following
Report:—
SEA FISHING
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The fishing industry in the United Kingdom is
often represented by itself and others as an industry of victims.
It has unquestionably undergone radical change in the last twenty
years and this process is set to continue as new ways of working,
pressure on stocks, consumer choice, wildlife protection and environmental
demands bring further pressures to bear. Nevertheless, many in
the industry are already finding ways of continuing to fish profitably
and successfully and many others could be helped to do the same
in the right policy framework. Restructuring within the industry
is driven not by the Government but by the market, by intense
competition leading to pressure on licences and quotas, and by
the growing acceptance of the need to match catching capacity
to the state of the stocks. Fishermen, scientists and managers
all share an interest in sustaining fish stocks. Yet this common
interest is often masked by disputes over stock assessments and
by the regulations imposed by Government to enforce the management
mechanisms set under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The cost
of management both to fishermen and to the public is extremely
high in comparison to the contribution of the industry to the
United Kingdom economy. Some £108m of public money every
year is spent on enforcement, research, scientific support, fisheries
grants, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and other administrative
tasks. Of this, expenditure directly attributable to the UK catching
sector alone equates to approximately 7 per cent of the value
of the fishing industry[1]
but a much higher proportion of the value of the catch. This may
be less than the level of public spending on competing fishing
industries but it remains a matter of genuine concern whether
expenditure on fisheries is worthwhile and well directed.
2. Despite this level of public finance, the fishing
industry in the UK believes it has suffered from political neglect
or mistreatment over the years. Its relatively low national economic
and political importance and its fragmentary nature with its activities
scattered between many small ports ensure that it is rarely at
the top of the national political agenda. The industry feels it
has lurched from one policy to another, with ever increasing numbers
of regulations. The lack of consistently reliable data because
the science, although improving rapidly, is not yet sufficiently
sophisticated to deliver it and the different perspectives and
priorities north and south of the border, coupled with the ability
of fishermen to switch effort onto new stocks which themselves
rapidly become threatened, means that policy almost necessarily
tends to be one of improvisation. This means that regulations
have multiplied as Ministers have sought to control the exploitation
of increasing numbers of stocks as they are targeted commercially.
The resentment of the industry towards this approach has been
heightened by its perception of the more supportive attitude of
other European Governments towards their fishing fleets. UK fishermen
see their counterparts receiving financial assistance to modernise,
to build new boats, to meet new charges and to install new equipment
while they are expected to pay for the privilege of accepting
increasing restrictions on their activities. As a consequence,
significant sections of the industry are defensive, looking to
the past rather than the future and resisting the changes that
are necessary if they are to develop into a modern competitive
fleet.
3. There are many in the industry who have broken
with the past. They have invested in technology, in vessel licences
and the right to catch fish and have negotiated new ways of selling
their product. Others lack the money or incentive to follow suit.
These fishermen will either leave the industry, continue to fish
in ageing vessels, or, more happily, move into niche markets,
perhaps concentrating on sustainable fishing methods. We recognise
that this is a multi-speed, many layered industry, with substantial
variations between areas of the country and between individual
fishermen. Its heterogeneous nature, however, only strengthens
the case for a strong, clear policy framework for the entire industry
and an agreed set of objectives against which any policy should
be judged. Our own conclusions based on this inquiry suggest
five essential objectives of any fisheries
management system. It should:
- promote sustainability of resources, to safeguard
the long term success of both the stocks and the industry;
- ensure that the stocks are exploited in the
most efficient way, so that fishermen are not drawn into a race
for fish;
- encourage the profitability and competitiveness
of the fishing industry from vessel to retailer;
- minimise both the cost to the public purse
and the level of Government intervention; and
- minimise the complexity of regulation while
maximising the responsibility for that process given to the industry
consistent with securing compliance.
In some of these respects we are not our own masters,
being dependent, particularly for the second, on European decisions
under the Common Fisheries Policy. Yet there are other important
criteria which the Government should consider, such as rationalising
the fleet, securing a way of life for the more vulnerable fishing
communities where there are few alternative sources of employment,
and maintaining fishing centres with the necessary concentration
of services and facilities. These depend upon the Government first
deciding on the type of industry it wishes to see and the level
of intervention it wishes to retain. We support the concept of
regulation by the industry itself as far as is consistent with
the acknowledgement that there is a common interest in protecting
the sea and its resources. However, our overriding concern is
that the Government establish a settled, transparent long-term
strategy for management of fisheries which takes into account
the competitive position compared to other EU countries and within
which the industry can plan, confident that any necessary changes
will apply equally and be introduced fairly, with proper consultation
and with regard to clear and agreed objectives. There is a very
bright future for the UK sea fishing industry and the Government
has to play its part in helping to bring this about.
4. On 3 August 1998 we announced an inquiry into
sea fishing in the UK to examine "the current economic circumstances
and future prospects of the industry, and of different sectors
within the industry, including developments in the structure and
composition of the UK fishing fleet and the fish processing industry,
and in marketing arrangements and prices". Against this general
factual background we called for written evidence focusing on
"the following specific issues affecting the UK sea fishing
industry and on recent or prospective UK Government and European
Union policy initiatives relating to them:
(a) the scope, efficiency
and effectiveness of sea fisheries research, especially in assessing
the status of commercial fish stocks, including evaluation of
its cost-effectiveness;
(b) means of financing
and implementing restructuring of the UK fishing fleet, including
decommissioning schemes, and financial aid for new building and
modernisation, so as to assist those involved in the industry
to adapt to changing circumstances; and changes in the shape of
the industry as a result of the increasing trade in the buying
and selling of fishing licences and quotas;
(c) the efficiency and
effectiveness of regulation, monitoring, inspection and enforcement
arrangements for sea fishing within UK waters, including the introduction
of designated ports of landing and progress in introducing satellite
monitoring of fishing vessels; the costs and means of financing
fisheries inspection and enforcement; and the efficiency and effectiveness
of such measures in other EU Member States".[2]
We made it clear that we would not repeat the substantial
work undertaken by the previous Agriculture Committee in 1992-93
on the effects of conservation measures on the UK sea fishing
industry, with its focus on the Common Fisheries Policy. This
precluded consideration of the CFP as a whole, although we have
inevitably breached this rule upon occasion.
5. We have received over 70 written submissions and
have held five oral evidence sessions at Westminster. To hear
a greater diversity of views, we have also taken formal evidence
in Cornwall and Peterhead and made informal visits to Newlyn,
Grimsby, Aberdeen and Shetland in the course of which we met many
active participants in the fishing industry. In addition, we went
to Spain, in order to compare the management of the fishing industry
in another Member State, and to Iceland which is often cited as
being at the forefront of fisheries management. Finally, given
the central importance of the CFP to the industry, we went to
Brussels to meet officials from Directorate-General XIV of the
European Commission. We would like to take this opportunity to
offer our sincere thanks to all those who have contributed to
this long inquiry either through formal submissions or informal
discussions.
6. We have also benefited from the assistance of
our two specialist advisers for this inquiry, Mr Robert Allan,
former Chief Executive of the Scottish Fishermen's Federation,
and Dr Andrew Palfreman, Senior Lecturer in the University of
Hull Institute of Food Health Quality. We are grateful to them
for their advice and for sharing with us their deep experience
of the industry. Our conclusions, of course, are our own.
7. Since our inquiry began, there have been constitutional
changes in the UK which affect many aspects of the government
of Scotland, Wales and potentially Northern Ireland. The fishing
industry is not exempt from these developments. As fishing is
a devolved matter, responsibility for monitoring fisheries management
and enforcement in all parts of the UK no longer rests with the
select committees of the Westminster Parliament. Most of our recommendations,
therefore, are primarily directed at the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food and deal with matters in England, although
we hope that, just as we have examined the wider issues, more
general implications will be drawn from our observations for the
fishing industry throughout the UK. Where reserved matters are
concerned, for example on negotiations within the European Union,
MAFF retains lead responsibility for the determination of UK policy
and so of course in these instances our recommendations apply
to the UK as a whole.
8. The Report is structured as follows. In Section
II, we describe the current state of the industry, from the number
of vessels to the sale of fish to the consumer, and the basic
management structure applied in the UK. The fishing industry can
be controlled either through the management of stocks and catches,
through the management of effort or through a combination of both.
In Section III, we examine the first of these through the process
of research into stocks, the setting of quotas and the relationship
between fishermen and scientists. In Section IV, we discuss two
methods of managing effort through the restructuring of the fleet,
first Government and EU schemes, such as decommissioning or aid
for new build, and secondly, the trade in licences and quotas.
Section V looks at the regulatory regime, how compliance is monitored
and enforced, and specific issues of current concern, such as
the installation of satellite monitoring equipment and the designated
ports scheme. Section VI examines the marketing and processing
of fish from the quayside to the supermarket and describes ways
in which the fishing industry must adapt to meet the demands of
the consumer. Section VII offers our overall conclusions on the
future of sea fishing in the UK, while Section VIII draws together
all our main conclusions and recommendations for ease of reference.
1 Qq 999-1000. Back
2 Agriculture
Committee Press Notice No. 36,
Session 1997/98, 3 August 1998, as amended by Agriculture Committee
Press Notice No. 2, Session 1998/99, 17 December 1998. Back
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