Select Committee on Agriculture Minutes of Evidence

Memorandum submitted by the National Federation of Badger Groups (L28)

1.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  2.  The National Federation of Badger Groups (NFBG), represents more than 20,000 people in 85 badger groups across the UK, who are concerned for the conservation, protection and welfare of badgers and the habitats in which they live.

  3.  The NFBG addresses all issues relating to badgers and works with, and provides information and advice to, other conservation and welfare groups, the police, statutory government bodies, MPs, the public and others.

  4.  Badgers are important cultural symbols in the fabric of the British countryside; they are protected by law and protected by the international Bern Convention because they are declining across the wider European continent; and they play a significant ecological role in the habitats in which they live.

  5.  The NFBG and its partners in the conservation and farming communities believes that the way forward is not the widespread slaughter of wildlife. A solution will be found only through an integrated approach which incorporates measures including a vaccine for cattle, an improved diagnostic test for TB in cattle, improved cattle husbandry and research which investigates transmission of the disease and the role of factors other than badgers.

  6.  The NFBG therefore warmly welcomes this inquiry by the Agriculture Select Committee and appreciates the difficult task which it faces. There is an enormous body of information to be digested and we hope to assist in this process by exposing the many flaws in the Government's current strategy to control bovine tuberculosis in cattle, and by providing potentially viable and effective alternative strategies.

  7.  The first section of this paper presents the NFBG's current policy position. It also highlights the fact that the Standing Committee of the Bern Convention, an international wildlife treaty to which the Government is a signatory, and which underlies all European and national wildlife legislation, has accepted that the UK has failed to adequately research alternative solutions to the TB problem. It has also called on the Government to stop the culling trial.

  8.  The second section reviews the recommendations contained in the Krebs Report. We particularly focus on areas of research which the Government either has no plans to address or is not addressing with sufficient rigour. The paper then identifies further issues which were not addressed in the Krebs Report because its terms of reference forced it to focus on badgers.

  9.  The third section addresses the Government's badger culling trial and explains the scientific, legal and ethical grounds for the NFBG's opposition to the trial. The NFBG has cut through the "sound science" frontage presented by the Ministry of Agriculture and demonstrates in this paper a staggering range of flaws and loopholes in the current search for a solution to the TB problem.

  10.  The fourth section discusses the need to conduct research into cattle husbandry and highlights the Government's lack of action on this issue.

11.  THE NFBG AND THE CURRENT POLICY POSITION

  12.  The National Federation of Badger Groups (NFBG) represents more than 20,000 people in 85 badger groups across the UK, who are concerned for the welfare and conservation of badgers and the habitats in which they live. It also provides detailed scientific and legal advice to its many partners in the nature conservation movement, who collectively have millions of members.

  13.  The NFBG is not an animal rights group with a narrow focus of interest on welfare alone. Badgers are important cultural symbols in the fabric of the British countryside; they are protected by law and listed by the international Bern Convention because they are declining across the wider European continent; and they play a significant ecological role in the habitats in which they live.

  14.  The NFBG has been involved with the bovine tuberculosis (TB) for some years. It was represented on the Government's Consultative Panel on Badgers and Bovine Tuberculosis and was consulted by the Krebs review team. We have held discussions with Ministers including Nick Brown MP, Minister of Agriculture and Jeff Rooker MP, Food Safety Minister, and have attended meetings with the Government's Independent Scientific Group.

  15.  The NFBG's Conservation Officer, Dr Elaine King, represents the NFBG in relation to the TB issue. In 1991, Dr King obtained a 2,1 (Hons) degree in Applied Biology from Brunel University. In 1996, she was awarded a PhD from Bristol University for her research into bovine tuberculosis in badgers and cattle. This research was funded by MAFF and was carried out with Professor Stephen Harris of Bristol University and Dr Chris Cheeseman of MAFF's Central Science Laboratory. Dr King has been employed by the NFBG since 1996.

  16.  The NFBG recognises the fact that farmers have been let down and largely misled over the issue and we have taken various steps to provide both Government and the farming community with objective and factual information.

  17.  Through our Farming and Badgers Advisory Group, we work in consultative partnerships with farmers who wish to care for their livestock in sympathy with the wildlife around them. We are therefore not "anti-farmer", but we are in favour of high animal welfare standards on farms.

  18.  The NFBG has also organised public meetings in the trial areas, to which MAFF, the NFU and farmers were invited. We have also given numerous presentations to groups of farmers in TB areas. While we will always agree to differ on some points, both "sides" accept that the way forward is through dialogue and an understanding of other people's views and concerns. The NFBG has therefore made every effort to communicate and work with farmers on what is such a complex and sensitive issue.

  19.  The NFBG is particularly concerned about the following aspect of the TB issue:

—  The determined focus on the badger as the primary cause of the TB problem is precisely the reason why the disease has remained a problem.

  20.  In each of the three independent scientific reviews, commissioned by the Government into the bovine tuberculosis problem, the Ministry of Agriculture has compelled the authors, through their terms of reference, to focus on "badgers and bovine tuberculosis" alone, at the expense of all other possible contributory factors. We know for certain, in the case of the Dunnet Report (Dunnet et al, 1986), that the Ministry even doctored the report to suit its own ends. Indeed, we were relieved to see that Professor Krebs managed to go beyond his terms of reference and highlight the other possible contributory factors to the TB problem—including other wildlife, climate and poor animal husbandry.

  21.  Yet despite the efforts of the Krebs review team, it is shameful that, even now, there has never been a holistic assessment of the bovine tuberculosis problem which considers equally the full range of possible contributory factors.

  22.  This blinkered approach by successive Governments and the Ministry of Agriculture, has failed individual farmers, conservationists and the wider public alike. The persistent references to "badgers and bovine tuberculosis" have even coloured the Select Committee's terms of reference for this inquiry, and it is not hard to see why.

  23.  Today, the Ministry of Agriculture is mistrusted by many who deal with it. One of Britain's few still-widespread species, with enormous popular cultural significance, is the subject of an immense programme of Government-orchestrated killing which can only damage the public's perception of the Government and the farming industry as being "sympathetic" to the environment.

  24.  In this paper, the NFBG explains why the badger culling trial is wrong. We call for a holistic policy approach to the management of bovine tuberculosis in cattle, which recognises:

—  the European conservation significance of badgers in Britain;

—  the widespread popular appeal and cultural significance of badgers in Britain;

—  that bovine tuberculosis is an environmental problem in the widest possible sense, and not merely a single species problem;

—  that the problem is only likely to be solved through an integrated package of measures, including a cattle vaccine, an improved diagnostic test for cattle and more research in order that we understand the disease fully; and

—  the public desire for a future for agriculture in Britain which is sympathetic to wildlife and the wider environment.

  25.  In so doing, we hope that the Agriculture Select Committee will ask of Ministers what possible policies might result from the Krebs experiment. As yet, none have been expressed which bear up under examination.

  26.  For example, Jeff Rooker, Food Safety Minister, has claimed that the Government has no plans to eradicate badgers. Instead, he suggests that their social group sizes could perhaps be reduced to improve their own health as well as that of cattle. Yet the Krebs experiment will not provide the information needed to implement such a policy.

  27.  The NFBG believes that the eradication of badgers from many parts of south western and western England and Wales may be inevitable. This will result from the Government's proposals to kill badgers coupled with some farmers' increasingly hostile regard for badgers, which is exacerbated by the current Government-sanctioned slaughter and more than two decades of the Ministry of Agriculture hailing badgers as the sole cause of TB in cattle.

  28.  The killing of thousands of badgers, the majority of which will not be infected, is ethically unacceptable when other possible measures remain unaddressed. The nature conservation and animal welfare movements— which we advise—will not accept it.

  29.  Nor will the wider public. The NFBG has already collected many thousands of signatures on a petition calling for the culling trial to stop. In particular, it is our view that the public will not tolerate the continued payment of 100 per cent compensation to farmers when TB breakdowns occur, when the farming industry itself, as the Krebs Report (Krebs et al, 1997) noted, ignores the guidelines on TB prevention laid down by MAFF and has failed to follow the Report's recommendation to investigate improved husbandry techniques itself. Compensation paid to farmers in 1997 was over £2 million.

  30.  A drastic regional depletion of badgers in their traditional stronghold, paralleled by poor husbandry practices on farms, will also destroy any claim the Government may make for having a responsible approach to nature conservation and farm animal welfare in the wider European context.

  31.  Most importantly of all, if the Government pursues its current policy we will find ourselves, in five years' time, no closer to a solution to the bovine tuberculosis problem than we are today. The British cattle industry, and the Government which supports it, will once again be the laughing stock of Europe, while taxpayers will answer for the Government's lack of foresight by paying compensation to farmers.

  32.  In conclusion, we regret that the present Government has chosen to follow a path which will take us no closer to a solution to the TB problem than we are today, but which will destroy our reputation for responsible nature conservation policies in Europe.

33.  THE BERN CONVENTION

  34.  The Government stands shamed by almost 40 European and African nations, who, in their role as signatories of the Bern Convention, called in December 1998 for the Government to stop the culling trial. The Government rejected their request on the very same day.

  35.  At the 18th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Bern Convention in Strasbourg, the NFBG, with the support of the international law firm Simmons and Simmons, demonstrated that the culling trial is in breach of Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Convention (NFBG, 1998).

  36.  The Convention is Europe's longest-standing wildlife treaty and the UK Government became a signatory in 1979. It is supported by almost 40 countries in Europe and Africa, and is enshrined in the EC by the Habitats Directive and in Britain by the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 and the Protection of Badgers Act 1992.

  37.  The badger is listed on Appendix III of the Bern Convention because it is a declining species in Europe and Britain is an international stronghold.

  38.  On 4 December, the Standing Committee adopted Recommendation No. 68, calling on the Government to:

—  postpone the implementation of the planned badger culling programme for a year;

—  explore other satisfactory solutions for effective control of bovine tuberculosis that do not involve badger culling;

—  inform the Standing Committee on what grounds it claims to be exempt from the provisions of Articles 7 and 8; and

—  inform the Committee on all relevant aspects, including legal provisions, that are at the base of the planned badger culling programme.

  39.  The Bern Convention Secretariat points out that, "Although the recommendations are not legally binding sticto sensu, their adoption is founded on good faith and their political and moral significance is fundamental".

  40.  The NFBG wishes to draw to the Select Committee's attention to the fact that Ministers were not informed of the significance of the Bern Convention or of the badger's important conservation status in Europe when they made their decision to proceed with the current trial.

  41.  On 11 November 1998, Minister of State, Jeff Rooker admitted to West Country Television that he was not aware of the Bern Convention. At a meeting with the Secretary of State for Agriculture, Nick Brown, on 12 January 1999, we were astonished to discover that he had still not been informed of the Bern Convention's ruling by his junior Minister or by his civil servants.

  42.  The NFBG also understands from recent press reports that Environment Minister, Michael Meacher MP, is opposed to the badger culling trial and was not properly consulted by colleagues in MAFF before the decision was made to proceed.

  43.  It is the NFBG's contention that rather than having a respectful and working relationship with their colleagues in Europe, Ministers are ignorant of their international obligations.

44.  AN ANALYSIS OF THE KREBS REPORT

  45.  This section reviews the NFBG's view of the recommendations contained in the Krebs Report. It particularly focuses on areas of research which the Government either has no plans to address or is not addressing with sufficient rigour. It then identifies further issues which were not addressed in the Krebs Report because its terms of reference focused on badgers.

  46.  (Figures in parentheses refer to paragraph numbers in the Krebs Report).

  47.   TB in humans (7.2.1)

  48.  The NFBG welcomes the fact that the Government is now communicating with the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) and cases of TB infection in humans, normally caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis, will be tested for bovine TB, caused by Mycobacterium bovis.

  49.   Cause of herd breakdowns (7.3.2)

  50.  The NFBG welcomes the fact that the previous form used for attributing the cause of herd breakdowns has now been updated (TB99 form). However it believes the questionnaire is not sufficiently rigorous to comply with the recommendations in the Krebs Report. Furthermore, the forms must be "ground-truthed" to ensure the data are reliable.

  51.   The design of an epidemiological questionnaire for wider research purposes

  52.  The epidemiological questionnaire was recommended by the Krebs Report so that TB-contributing factors other than badgers could be identified.

  53.  The questionnaire currently being piloted contains many questions which are "wooly", being qualitative rather than quantitative. It is not obvious what specific scientific questions are being addressed. It is also not clear how the results will be analysed to provide meaningful information.

  54.  As part of the piloting process, the questionnaire was sent to a range of individuals and organisations, including the NFBG, asking for comment on the forms. The NFBG provided constructive comments on the forms but has recently been informed that the piloting on farms and the external consultation process was simply to test the general layout of the form, rather than to test its scientific rigour. This is hardly a consultation process and nor is it scientifically sound.

  55.  The full methodology behind the questionnaire must be published in full after open consultation with the scientific community. Otherwise, we predict that the epidemiological questionnaire will be of limited value unless its methodology and management is drastically improved.

  56.  The NFBG respectfully requests that the Select Committee asks:

—  Whether Professor Krebs believes the new TB99 epidemiological questionnaire satisfies all his recommendations for a more transparent and objective questionnaire?

—  What specific questions will the questionnaire answer and how will the data be analysed and utilised at a practical level?

  57.   The use of the epidemiological questionnaire

  58.  The epidemiological questionnaire is not being implemented as the Krebs Report recommended. The Report recommended that data be collected from areas of high and low TB risk (7.5.7), in order that data from farms with high and low breakdown rates could be compared.

  59.  Instead, the Government is planning to target the questionnaire only on high risk farms. Low risk farms will only be surveyed if there is enough money left over. It will therefore not be possible to make a comparison between farms with high and low breakdown rates and the research will consequently provide little useful information.

  60.  We are also extremely concerned that the questionnaire shows an unnecessary bias in seeking information about badgers on the farms in question, yet includes relatively few questions on animal husbandry on the farm, even though this is identified by the Krebs Report as a potentially important factor.

  61.  Moreover, the Krebs Report recommended the epidemiological study be conducted outside the badger culling trial areas (5.7.3). Instead, the epidemiological study is being conducted inside the badger culling trial areas. The data derived from this will be distorted because the experiment will impose artificial conditions on these areas.

  62.   Other wildlife (7.3.4 and 2.2)

  63.  The Krebs Report specifically recommended that "the risk to cattle from other species should be assessed in the areas of high herd breakdown risks, taking account of four key factors:

—  prevalence of the disease;

—  the severity of the disease and its effect on infectivity;

—  abundance of the species; and

—  the extent of contact with cattle, including the movement range of the wildlife".

  64.  The Independent Scientific Group led by Professor John Bourne watered down this recommendation, requesting only that "data collected during the trial should include information on other potential wildlife sources of the disease. This should include accurate estimates of population density and disease dynamics".

  65.  Despite evidence that other wildlife represents a potential reservoir of infection, MAFF has so far not investigated other species with anything like the same rigour as it has applied to badgers.

  66.  The NFBG welcomes any new research initiative on this front provided that data are collected with sufficient rigour. Careful consideration must be given to the wildlife species to be investigated and to the methods of sampling utilised.

  67.  We wish to alert the Select Committee to the fact that the epidemiological questionnaire will not provide the answers needed on the role of other wildlife. Rather, the piloted questionnaire asks highly subjective and unscientific questions which are extremely unlikely to provide "accurate estimates of population density and disease dynamics", as recommended by the Independent Scientific Group.

  68.  The question regarding wildlife asks the farmer, "Approximately how often have you seen these species on your farm in the last 12 months? (Indicate Weekly, Monthly, Yearly, Never)". Information is then required on whether animals (including deer, feral cats, fox and mink) were dead or alive, whether they were observed in or near buildings, or elsewhere on the farm. If alive, it is asked if the animals appeared sick.

  69.   Future research on badgers (7.4.5)

  70.  The Krebs Report recommended that future research on badgers should include three priorities:

  71.   Badger surveys

  72.   Road traffic accident victim surveys (7.5.5)

  73.  At a meeting with Nick Brown MP, Minister of Agriculture and Jeff Rooker MP, Food Safety Minister, on 12 January 1999, it was confirmed that badger road traffic accident (RTA) victims will be sampled. However, sampling will not commence until the start of the new financial year. Furthermore, due to the high cost of badger post mortem examinations, badger RTAs will be sampled only in high risk areas.

  74.  The NFBG welcomes the resumption of RTA sampling.

  75.  However, badger RTAs should be sampled over the entire country to establish the relative levels of infection in badgers on a national level. RTA sampling on a national scale by MAFF ceased in 1989. The only badgers to be post mortem examined post-1989 were those killed by MAFF in badger removal operations and, more recently, by MAFF in the culling trial. This is clearly a biased sample and there is therefore no information on the current distribution and prevalence of TB infection in the wider badger population.

  76.  Local variation in risk (7.5.7)

  77.  The NFBG understands that the Government is attempting to determine the "correlates of local variation in risk" through the epidemiological questionnaire and through a separate research project. The NFBG will make detailed comment on this project when information is made available. In principle, we welcome the fact that efforts are being made to investigate local risk factors, including those which have previously been ignored. It is essential that the investigation includes all the other factors noted by the Krebs Report, including the presence of badgers, and TB prevalence in badgers, including the severity of the disease, cattle husbandry, climate and landscape variables.

  78.  Establishing transmission routes (7.5.11)

  79.  The NFBG welcomes the Krebs Report recommendation that "further consideration should be given to whether appropriate techniques can be developed to research this issue".

  80.  Consequently, we are extremely concerned that the Government has not yet announced whether it will be funding this vital area of research.

  81.   Molecular epidemiology (7.6)

  82.  The Krebs Report recommended that "molecular epidemiology is used to understand more about the badger to cattle transmission dynamics". It also recommends that molecular techniques are used to "analyse the spatial and temporal dynamics of the disease in badgers and other wildlife as well as cattle".

  83.  The NFBG welcomes this recommendation and understands that it is being implemented as part of an on-going programme of research at MAFF's Central Science Laboratory. We are concerned, however, that it is not yet clear whether the research extends to wildlife other than badgers.

  84.   Estimation of recolonisation times (7.8.9 and 7.8.15)

  85.  The Krebs Report called for further research on recolonisation times "in areas subject to both the reactive and proactive control strategies". We regret that the Government has not yet announced whether it will be funding this area of research. Given that the Government has assured the Bern Convention that it has no plans to make badgers locally extinct in the long term, it is imperative that this research is undertaken if the Government is not to remain in permanent breach of this international wildlife treaty.

  86.  This is particularly important when there is evidence that some farmers are killing badgers illegally. The NFBG is concerned that such farmers will also ensure that badgers are prevented from recolonising areas where MAFF has removed them as part of the culling trial.

  87.   Mathematical modelling (7.7)

  88.  The Government has not yet announced whether it will utilise the techniques employed in medical epidemiology or that it will "harness external expertise" and ensure "better liaisons between modellers and MAFF to ensure that data gathered are better able to meet research needs".

  89.   Future strategies (7.8.12)

  90.   Efficiency of badger removal operations (7.8.21)

  91.  The Krebs Report recommended that badgers are removed more rapidly once a herd breakdown is confirmed in cattle. This will be applicable only in the reactive areas of the trial, as the Government has adopted a policy not to kill badgers outside the trial areas.

  92.  We are extremely concerned about the animal welfare implications of such a policy, because the closed season for removal operations between 1 February and 30 April will still leave between 20 and 55 per cent of cubs to die below ground when their lactating mothers are killed.

  93.   Snares to trap badgers (5.6.8)

  94.  The Krebs Report recommended the use of snares to trap badgers in the trial but, following a high-profile media campaign orchestrated by the NFBG, the Government decided not to use snares in the culling trial. It also announced that experiments would not be conducted on captive badgers to investigate the welfare implications of using snares.

  95.  The NFBG produced an illustrated report for Ministers on the cruelty associated with snares. In addition, a 50,000 signature petition, calling for a ban on snares, was presented to Parliament on 1 July 1998, by Roger Gale MP, then Chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Animal Welfare.

  96.  The NFBG remains extremely concerned that the Government is currently using captive badgers to investigate "leg cuffs" or, more accurately, "leg snares". This work is being conducted with a view to using leg snares in the culling trial, but little information is currently available. If the Government is to claim that snaring badgers is acceptable, it can only do so if its experiments have been conducted openly in order to garner public confidence.

  97.   Independent Expert Group (7.8.23 and 5.6.14, 5.6.15 and 5.6.19)

  98.  The NFBG acknowledges that the "Independent Scientific Group" has been appointed and we have held meetings with the Group's chairman on two occasions.

  99.  However, we are concerned that the Group does not have members with more expertise in badger welfare, on farming practices and in dealing with the practical issues of bovine tuberculosis in badgers and cattle.

  100.  It is essential that the Group consults widely to ensure all practical issues are addressed thoroughly, but an effective consultation process is not in place.

  101.  The NFBG recommends that a mechanism is set up whereby interested parties can review and comment on the progress made on all recommendations in the Krebs Report, including the five-year experiment and research into cattle husbandry. Information should also be made more readily available on the method used, particularly in the trial.

  102.  The NFBG is concerned that, while the Independent Scientific Group has provided some answers to the NFBG's questions and concerns, it has failed to explain how it will ensure the results of the trial are statistically sound.

  103.   Culling outside TB areas (7.8.25 and 5.6.34 - 5.6.36)

  104.  The Krebs Report recommended that no culling should be carried out outside the "hot-spot" areas, as it would be of limited value and the NFBG understands that these recommendations are being implemented. However, we are concerned at the evidence that some farmers are killing badgers illegally, particularly outside the culling trial area. Wildlife crime is not a recordable offence under current Home Office rules, and it is therefore not only difficult to detect crimes against badgers but there is no national system to record the incidents.

  105.  Professor Bourne is concerned that illegal killing is a "sinister" issue, but we have not been able to establish how the Expert Group will statistically account for this in the experiment.

  106.   Diagnostic tests (7.9)

  107.   Diagnostic tests for Cattle (7.9.1 - 7.9.3)

  108.  We regret that the Government has not yet announced a research programme into a diagnostic TB test for live cattle.

  109.   Diagnostic tests for Badgers (7.9.4)

  110.  We regret that the Government has not yet announced a research programme into a diagnostic TB test for live badgers. The so-called "live test", a blood test for badgers is, at best, only 41 per cent sensitive and was abandoned by MAFF in 1996, part-way through a five year trial to test its effectiveness.

  111.   Vaccines (7.10)

  112.  Cattle vaccine (7.10.1)

  113.  The NFBG believes that the development of a cattle vaccine should be given a high priority by the Government.

  114.   EU legislation (7.10.9)

  115.  The Krebs Report recommended that, to satisfy EU legislation, a cattle vaccine must be developed alongside a diagnostic test which can distinguish between infected and vaccinated cattle.

  116.  It is not clear that the Government has yet addressed this problem and the NFBG recommends that it is investigated immediately.

  117.  In addition, the type of vaccine proposed for development will be a "sub-unit" vaccine which involves the use of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). The release into the environment of GMOs is strictly regulated. In addition, the vaccine will need to undergo rigorous trials to ensure it is not pathogenic to other wildlife, livestock and domestic animals.

  118.  Resources directed to vaccine development

  119.  The Krebs Report was critical of how few resources have been directed into vaccine research by the UK Government. Only £429,000 was allocated to vaccine research in 1997-98 out of a total TB budget of £16 million for TB control and £1.7 million for research.

  120.  The Krebs Report went on to state that "a vaccine for field trials could be available within 10 years... However achieving this timetable will require considerably more resources than the £0.4m a year currently spent by MAFF" (7.10.5). The latest Government figures state that £1 million per year will be spent on vaccine development, from 1999. The NFBG would therefore respectfully request that Professor Krebs is asked whether this sum is sufficient.

  121.   Biological control (7.11 and 6.5)

  122.  We regret that the Government has not announced a research programme into "techniques for reducing TB infection in badgers through biological control, for example using bacteriophages to destroyM. bovis in the environment", as recommended by the Krebs Report.

  123.   Data availability (7.12)

  124.  The NFBG endorses the recommendation that the Government should make a clear commitment to make data available at the earliest opportunity. However, it is important that balanced data sets are made available rather than just those which focus on badgers.

  125.   Research (7.13 and 1.7)

  126.  It is not clear what proportion of the research recommended by the Krebs Report has been contracted out. We understand that not all of the Krebs Report recommended research programme is being implemented and details about issued contracts have not yet been released. We regret that the Government and MAFF can find the time to publicise and implement the badger culling trial, yet it has so far been unable to publicise and implement the research which should be undertaken in other areas. This bias is unacceptable.

  127.   Imbalance in allocation of resources (7.13.2).

  128.  Krebs notes that more than nine times as much money is spent on TB control (£16 million per year) as is spent on TB research (£1.7 million per year) in Great Britain. There remains an imbalance in the allocation of resources. A major proportion of the TB budget is still being directed towards badger control (the culling trial) and testing. In 1999-2000 the total budget for TB control will increase from £16 million to £23 million. In contrast, the research budget has been increased from £1.7 million to £3 million. Thus, almost eight times as much money is being spent on TB control as on TB research.

  129.  The NFBG believes that considerably more resources should be directed towards research. Moreover, research should be focused on areas in addition to badgers. Unless this is implemented rapidly, no scientifically robust information on which to base publicly acceptable policies for the effective control of TB in cattle will be available.

  130.  The NFBG respectfully suggests that the Government is asked why significantly greater resources are being directed towards TB control rather than TB research.

  131.   Contributions from the farming industry (7.13.2)

  132.  In contrast to Britain, the New Zealand farming industry pays a levy which is directed towards TB control and research. It is not known whether the British Government has considered asking the industry to contribute financially, despite this being recommended in the Krebs Report. The NFBG believes that the farming industry should be expected to contribute towards the cost of controlling and understanding TB in cattle.

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Prepared 26 March 1999