Examination of witnesses (Questions 60
- 79)
WEDNESDAY 10 FEBRUARY 1999
MR KEVIN
TEBBIT, MR
COLIN BALMER,
AIR MARSHAL
SIR JOHN
DAY and MR
JOHN HOWE
Mr Cann
60. Don't hold your breath!
(Mr Tebbit) Well, I regret that I have to say
that that precise date of full operational capability is still
classified and I am not in a position to give it to you. That
is by agreement with our partners as well in that particular consortium.
Mr Hancock: Well,
would it be fair to say that that date is now somewhat further
away than was first imagined?
Mr Cann
61. Fifteen years ago.
(Mr Tebbit) I think the Eurofighter project is
extraordinarily successful. I was at Wehrkunde over the weekend
and the Germans and the Italians were very, very positive indeed
about this and were looking forward to not only getting it in-service,
but to selling it to other people. I do not feel any negative
things about Eurofighter; I think it is a tremendous aircraft.
I cannot add anything to the actual date that I have given you.
Perhaps Mr Howe could answer.
(Mr Howe) There is only one point. The date is
later than originally envisaged, yes, because we all know that
the programme has been subject to delays, particularly in relation
to the decision-taking processes in the different countries involved,
but I just repeat what Mr Tebbit said, that it is a highly successful
project and is producing a product in which the air forces have
a high degree of confidence. We have had a history of delays largely
owing to the decision taking process of the various partners.
Mr Hancock
62. What are the cost implications on the
defence budget of (1) the delay of the first half squadron and
first squadron in service and (2) the cost implications of the
RAF having to maintain planes for maybe longer than they anticipated
to make up for the gap before Eurofighter is operational?
(Mr Tebbit) I do not think the problem is so serious
and significant as to talk about cost implications in that way.
I do not know if Mr Howe can be more precise.
(Mr Howe) No, I would not want to be more precise
than that. It is undoubtedly the case that the timely delivery
of the projects is a very important objective of our Smart procurement
performance because delay does lead to costs in ways that one
cannot always trace if something has run on and you do not realise
the economies of bringing in efficient new equipment. As a general
point of course it carries costs. I cannot quantify it in the
Eurofighter case.
Chairman
63. Can I say, Mr Tebbit, Mr Howe, we have
begun our annual inquiry into Eurofighter by requesting a great
deal of information from the Ministry of Defence and when that
comes we will formalise and regularise our inquiry. But as Eurofighter
is by far and away the most expensive commitment of the Ministry
of Defence and because there has perhaps on one or two occasions
in the past been a slight slippage in deploying them with ever
such a tiny increase in cost as originally anticipated and every
now again one or two occasions when a broad sheet does not quite
meet the initial expectations I am looking forward to beginning
this inquiry. No doubt the first question we are going to ask
is when is the bloody thing going to be up in the air?
(Mr Tebbit) I will not waste the Committee's time
by giving you the lecture about Smart procurement and precisely
why that is essential to what the Government is now trying to
do because the problem of getting equipment to cost, time and
quality has been a major problem which is why it is central to
the defence review. Unfortunately we cannot change that overnight.
Mr Hancock
64. No, I am sure you cannot, much though
I am sure you would like to.
(Mr Tebbit) Yes.
65. Can you tell us what you feel about
the C130J and the problems that programme is experiencing? Are
you still on target for delivery and operational use of those
aircraft or is there going to be slippage there?
(Mr Howe) There is delay owing to the technical
problems encountered by the contractor of the programme, yes.
I cannot give you a precise quantification of it.
66. What does that mean in time? Are they
going to be a year late, two years late?
(Mr Tebbit) I think there were some technical
difficulties during the flight trials programme. It is about a
year late.[1]
(Mr Howe) About a year late.
(Mr Tebbit) Thirteen months, that sort of time
on the latest schedule.
67. What about the updates for the information
systems for the Sea Harriers and Sea Kings? That was programmed
for 2000-02 for the Sea Harriers and for the Sea Kings 2002-04.
Are they still on target?
(Mr Tebbit) There has definitely been some slippage
in those areas but I think they are still on target for 2004 which
represents a slipped date.
Mr Hancock: What are
the cost implications?
Chairman
68. I think most of the cost implications
are on Lockheed Martin. Perhaps you can give us a paper on that.
(Mr Tebbit) We are not having to pay for it until
then.
Chairman: That is
a luxury in the MoD.
Mr Hancock
69. To satisfy my own constituents, the
update on Swiftsure and Trafalgar submarines?
(Mr Howe) The reasons for the delay to the update
were simply to fit in with the update programme rather than problems
with the technical side of the modifications.
70. Were they not fitted in previously in
the programme when we were given a date?
(Mr Howe) Yes, and there have been adjustments
to the dockyard programme but not delays arising from difficulties
over the project itself.
71. So other things are being done in the
dockyard other than these submarines, is that what you are saying?
(Mr Howe) Yes, there has been a reshuffling of
business in the dockyard.
72. There has been no opportunity for these
updates to take place, is that what you are saying?
(Mr Howe) I am saying there has been a reordering
of the business in the dockyards, yes.
73. Commercial business or Ministry of Defence
business?
(Mr Howe) Ministry of Defence business.
Mr Hancock: Okay.
I will come back to my other question later.
Chairman: Do you want
to carry on with the questions on equipment procurement?
Mr Hancock: I would
rather leave it there because I want to come back.
Chairman: Okay. Mr
Hood.
Mr Hood
74. As a tool of "Defence Diplomacy"
you have available a Defence Military Assistance Fund as identified
in paragraph 213 of the Report and Annex D of the Report which
gives the details. What is the tie-up between the MoD subsidy
and the number of people from foreign forces trained by us? Some
of the cases do look rather odd. Russia, for example, has a £1.3
million subsidy but only five personnel receiving training.
(Mr Tebbit) There is no direct relationship between
the numbers of the people there and the actual money which is
shown against the countries. That figure that you have got there
of £1.3 million is mainly supporting a project which is resettling
Russian officers and there are about 1,600 of them resettled under
that programme so it should not read as if it is only five people.
Basically the money can be funded either by DMAF or partly by
other sources DMAF, by the FCO or by the Department for International
Development or indeed by the country concerned. There is no linkage
between the amount of money shown and the number of people involved.
In this particular case, the Russian one, it is one of the best
projects that we are doing. It is a drop in the ocean but it is
practical and it is specific. It is training Russian officers
for resettlement which is very valuable and one of the sorts of
things we can still do. It is very difficult to do things with
Russia these days because of the extent of bankruptcy and simple
organisational difficulties. This is one area where we have found
the possibility of good engagement. It is not just five people.
Mr Brazier
75. You furnished us with figures for the
strengths and manning shortfall for Service personnel at the end
of the last financial year, 1997-98. For example, there is an
Army shortfall of 4,700 personnel. Has the position improved or
worsened just looking at the Army for a second? Has the position
improved or worsened since then and why?
(Mr Tebbit) The overall position on the Army is
really like this: we are still losing people at a rate which is
too high, we are improving quite sharply our recruiting performance,
I think by 18 per cent against last year, but at the moment the
recruits are not yet coming through in sufficient numbers to turn
this one around. At the moment the figures are still going backwards
although we do have more recruits in the pipeline. What that means
is that at the moment the trained strength went down by about
600[2]
from April to the end of December. I got the latest figures I
could for you on that.
76. Thank you.
(Mr Tebbit) On the other hand, the untrained strength
in that period has gone up by 1,200. In other words, in training
we have 1,200 more soldiers than last year and once these move
into the regular strengths we will start seeing the turn around.
77. Just focusing for a moment on the retention
figures, obviously you are quoting cumulative figures, so to speak,
the snapshot, but thinking in terms of actual wastage levels,
are wastage levels getting worse, staying the same or getting
better? Are we losing more people per month who are PVR-ing, for
example, or less than we were a year or two ago?
(Mr Tebbit) I think the wastage levels are marginally
worse. I think it is about 3.5 per cent at the moment. I do not
know if one of my colleagues has got the figure there, I am sure
we have got it with us at this meeting. We are by no means sanguine
about that. The precise wastage numbers are not dramatically different
from before but they are worrying, the trends are not turning
up yet. We are putting in place a major programme to try to improve
retention. Do you want me to go through some of the elements of
that?
78. Yes. Just before you do so could I ask
the equivalent question on the Navy and Air Force. How are the
numbers looking for retention in the Navy and Air Force at the
moment?
(Mr Tebbit) I think better in the sense of the
Navy and similarly with the Air Force although there are problems
in specific areas and important ones, like pilots, fast jet pilots,
and navigators. Just to go back on the Army, I do have the figure.
The current loss rate is 3.9 per cent and is rising, slightly
higher than 1996/97 and 1997/98. Sorry, that is officers. On soldiers,
it is 6.9 per cent and also rising, again slightly higher than
in previous years, so this is not encouraging. We have got more
trainees in the pipeline which will more than compensate for the
shortfalls we are seeing, but we do need to retain them.
79. Absolutely because new recruits through
the door are no substitute for losing your crucial middle-ranking
officer and NCO ratings.
(Mr Tebbit) Absolutely not.
1 During 1997-98m, the C130J programme slipped by 13
months. As at 10 February 1999, total Slippage against the original
In Service date was 22 months. Back
2 Note by witness: figure should read 800. Back
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