CONCLUSION
79. Of the 18 objectives we set ourselves at the
beginning of the 1997-98 Session, we assess ourselves to have
achieved or overshot our target on 9. On a further three, we have
put in hand the necessary steps to implement our objective. On
a further three, all relating to the annual reporting cycle, the
normal pattern of work was disrupted by the Strategic Defence
Review process. One was not applicable during the year in question,
and one was not met at all. We succeeded in considering only one
Executive Agency (DERA) during the Session.
Figure 5
Achievement against objectives
NO. |
SUBJECT
|
ACTION |
TIMING |
OUTTURN
|
1 |
Statement on the Defence Estimates
|
To take evidence and report in time for debate
|
Annually (May to August)
|
Not published due to SDR
|
2 |
Budget/public expenditure survey
|
To take oral evidence from the Secretary of State immediately after spending plans are announced
|
Annually (November)
|
Subsumed into SDR and CSR for relevant period
|
3 |
Chiefs of Staff
|
To meet each informally
|
Once a year (at least)
|
Evidence taken formally
|
4 |
Front line forces
|
To visit one unit of each service
|
Once a year |
Met |
5 |
Support units
|
To visit one unit of each service
|
Once every 18 months
|
Not met |
6 |
Statutory Instruments
|
To consider important ones and possibly take oral evidence
|
On laying |
Met
|
7 |
Public appointments
|
To consider significant ones and possibly take oral evidence
|
As they occur |
N/A |
8 |
MoD Performance report
|
To take note |
Annually |
Subsumed within SDR
|
9 |
British forces on operations at Brigade (or equivalent) level and above
|
To visit (2/3 days)
|
Once a year |
Met |
10 |
Gulf War syndrome
|
To monitor developments, take evidence and report
|
Once a year/ as events require
|
Met |
11 |
Northern Ireland
|
To visit (3/4 days)
|
Once every two years
|
Met |
12 |
Defence agencies
|
To take oral evidence on annual report
|
Two agencies per year
|
One agency considered
|
13 |
Defence Committees of major European countries
|
To meet/visit |
Once every two years for France, Germany & Italy (possibly within NAA/WEU)
|
Germany visited |
14 |
USA Congressional Committees in the field of national security
|
To meet/visit |
Once a year (possibly within NAA)
|
Met |
15 |
Major procurement projects
|
To monitor developments and seek regular written or oral evidence
|
Annually (Eurofighter, CNGF, Challenger 2)
|
Work in hand |
16 |
Resource Accounting and Budgeting
|
To monitor MoD's progress and take part in the choice of performance measures
|
By the end of the Parliament
|
Work in hand |
17 |
Defence manufacturers
|
To visit/be briefed by UK defence manufacturers
|
One a year |
Met
|
18 |
Replies to parliamentary questions
|
To monitor refusals to give information and consider taking evidence in private
|
Once a year |
Met in part/work in hand
|
We have re-adopted these objectives, with some minor
variations, for the current session.
80. There have been parliamentary committees engaged
in the scrutiny of defence policy since the reign of Edward III.
It is now twenty years since the 'new' select committee system
was established. Much progress has been made since then, but these
committees are no longer new, and we believe that the time has
come to review their function and role, building on the experience
of our own operations and on that of committees elsewhere in the
democratic world. We consider, therefore, that while we have discharged
our duties to the House reasonably effectively, within the terms
of our remit under Standing Order No. 152 and the general powers
given by the House to its committees, those powers are not themselves
at the final stage of their development. We have commented elsewhere
on the need for a more formal involvement of the committees in
the development of legislation at the earliest possible stage,
where circumstances allow. Moves have been made in their direction,
but they need to be developed and entrenched. We have taken it
upon ourselves to examine the MoD's output of delegated legislation,
but we are forced to do this in a context where the House's procedures
for scrutiny of delegated legislation are woefully inadequate.
Nothing has been done to implement the wise recommendations made
in this area by the Procedure Committee nearly three years ago.[73]
We have also, on our own initiative, decided to hold quasi-confirmation
hearings of major public appointments, but Parliament has nothing
approaching a right of veto, or even a right to consultation in
these areas, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer has placed
the relationship between the Treasury Committee and the Bank of
England's Monetary Policy Committee on a more formal footing.
Again, these powers need developing. We have also commented on
the Procedure Committee's inquiry into Financial Procedure, to
which we have given evidence. We hope that it recommends ways
of tying the Committees more firmly into the financial procedures
of the House. We have also commented on the exercise of the Crown
Prerogative in relation to treaty ratification. The Modernisation
Committee is pressing ahead with reforms to the ways in which
the House works. It is important that, before long, the role of
Select Committees and their powers are comprehensively examined
to produce recommendations on how they can be enhanced in pursuit
of the government's declared aim of making Parliament more effective.
73 Fourth Report from the Procedure Committee, Session
1995-96, Delegated Legislation, HC 152 Back
|
