House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Third Report

NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Why a new Strategic Concept?

10. 1989, the year of NATO's fortieth anniversary, saw the end of the post-war division of Europe and the Cold War. NATO's reaction to the change in Europe's security situation was contained in the 1990 London Declaration on a Transformed Atlantic Alliance, followed by the adoption at the 1991 Rome Summit of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Nearly ten years on, the political, economic and security situation in Europe has again changed beyond any prediction. Many of these changes were outlined by the Committee in our Report on the government's Strategic Defence Review last year,[10] and it would be superfluous to repeat them here. NATO can take much of the credit for the positive changes in Europe's security environment.[11] Over the past years it has embarked on initiatives aimed at increasing stability and security—such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Partnership for Peace (PfP), the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter—well beyond those envisaged in 1991. NATO has become, in the words of the Prime Minister at the opening of a recent Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Conference celebrating NATO's 50th anniversary, an "exporter of stability"[12] and it made possible the Dayton Peace agreement which brought an end to the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[13] So it is that, in the words of the MoD's Policy Director, the 1991 Strategic Concept is now looking "highly dated".[14] It did, however, point to a number of the new directions that NATO has subsequently taken, and—

... was not a bad response at the time because exactly how the world was going to develop was not entirely clear.[15]

The Alliance resolved at the Madrid Summit to devise a new Strategic Concept, to be valid for the next ten to fifteen years; the drafting process is still going on[16] and the new Strategic Concept is to be adopted at the Washington Summit. Events in Kosovo will influence the debate and may delay its adoption.

11. Amid all the remarkable changes of the past eight years, two trends stand out as particularly important to Europe's security. One is the increasing tendency for the United States to pursue its interests unilaterally where it has become frustrated with its allies, disillusioned with the limited operational competence and political compromises of the United Nations,[17] and when it is fired with an urgency to take on international problems, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction within Iraq and North Korea. This has had an increasing impact on NATO's strategic environment, and has shaped the terms of debate within the Alliance about the future of the 'transatlantic bargain', burden-sharing, military structures, new roles for the Alliance, and much besides. NATO's response has been to work towards reconfiguration around a new self-image: that of 'separable but not separate' capabilities for the European and North Atlantic Allies. The Alliance's development of a European Security and Defence Identity is discussed further below.[18]

12. The other major trend is Russia's fluctuating response to collective Western security policies. The best prediction that can be made about Russia is that it will remain unpredictable. It is still an open question as to whether Russia's humiliated armed forces will be reconciled to the civil state and reformed, whether they will melt away into private enterprise and criminal pursuits, or whether they will become a focal point for domestic and regional instability. Dr Mark Smith of the Conflict Studies Research Centre outlined for us four possibilities for Russia's future: the optimistic, that Russia will become a fully functioning market democracy; the likely, that it will continue to 'muddle through'; the pessimistic, that it will disintegrate into its constituent parts; or the disastrous, that an undemocratic, aggressive, anti-Western regime will come to power.[19] Whatever political direction it takes, for the foreseeable future it is hardly likely that Russia will have the motive or the capability to resurrect conventional theatre-wide military threats to the Euro-Atlantic area;[20] indeed, we think it implausible that Russia would seek to threaten any of NATO's 19 members by military means. But we do not rule out the possibility that a less friendly Russia could, for example, apply pressure to Partner countries and reduce stability in NATO's area of concern.

13. NATO cannot and will not grant the one thing that would bolster Russia's great power aspirations—a veto over the decisions of the North Atlantic Council. Despite all the initiatives for consultation between Russia and the West—many of which have been successful, including the NATO-Russia Founding Act[21]—and despite numerous aid programmes that have aimed to help the domestic reform process along, there is only so much that Western powers can do directly to reverse its economic downturn and repair the disarray within its domestic politics. Some of Russia's political élite continue to hold to an agenda that inhibits cooperation with Europe and the USA. Events in Kosovo have reinforced these perceptions. Relations between NATO and Russia absorb considerable political resources, and are clearly central to the wider security of Europe. We discuss these issues further below.[22]

14. It should not, however, be taken that the post-Cold War period is the first to see major debates about NATO's roles and structures. The Alliance has a history of diffusing internal dissent using compromise, concession and, on occasion, fudge. We may see many of these techniques utilised in the coming formulation of the Alliance's new directions. Many current internal debates have their roots in the early days of the Alliance: the transatlantic burden sharing question (which we discuss further later in this Report[23]) has been revisited many times since 1960, when President Kennedy first raised the idea of a 'twin pillar' NATO. Often disagreements have been between the American and European powers, including differing views on the role of West Germany in the early 1950s. The blow to France of that country's rearmament and accession into the Alliance was softened by the prohibition imposed—and self-imposed—on German development of weapons of mass destruction. Later that decade Europe had serious doubts on the apparent US monopoly on nuclear decision-making; again the eventual solution was a compromise. US missiles were deployed to Italy, Turkey and the UK under a 'dual key' arrangement and the strategy of flexible conventional and nuclear response was adopted to accommodate differing US and European interests.

15. The out-of-area debate is also nothing new. Though today often characterised as the US pushing to extend NATO's reach with the Europeans dragging their feet, initially the American Allies were ranged against the Europeans' desire to reassert control over former spheres of influence. For example, Portugal attempted to incorporate its African territories within the NATO area. We discuss the current out-of-area debate further below.[24] There have also been many internal divisions about action taken by Allies outwith the Alliance, from the Suez through Vietnam to the Gulf.[25]

10 Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, The Strategic Defence Review, HC 138 Back

11 Ev p 97 Back

12 Royal United Services Institute, 8-10.3.99. Conference website www.nato50otan.org Back

13 See First Report, Session 1997-98, Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, HC 403 Back

14 Q 6 Back

15 Q 6 Back

16 See paragraph 24 Back

17 Ev pp 102, 122 Back

18 See paras 62-95 Back

19 Private briefing Back

20 See Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, op cit para 106 Back

21 See para 98 Back