NATO's Strategic Interests
16. The definition of NATO's broad strategic interests
that will be enshrined in the new Strategic Concept, will have
to be debated before and at the Summit. Four factors stand out
as key issues in this debate. First, NATO will have to continue
to be capable of honouring its mutual territorial defence commitments
under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,[26]
now along a new set of borders after enlargement. This remains
the Alliance's core function,[27]
despite the fact that the Article 5 guarantee has never been triggered,
and even though Article 5 threats are unlikely to come from the
same source as they did in the past.
17. Second, NATO has a strategic interest in developing
effective policies towards a very broad range of security challenges:
from 'new' security issues, such as terrorism, information warfare
or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including
to sub-state groups; through contingencies such as the need to
provide crisis management, humanitarian aid or provide forces
to enforce or monitor peace deals, such as we may see in Kosovo;[28]
to enabling cooperation on issues such as the need to deal with
environmental degradation or the military implications of the
'millennium bug' as contributions to stability in countries outside
the Alliance that are important to European security. We examined
the issues of asymmetric threats, the Revolution in Military Affairs
and Information Warfare in our Report on the Strategic Defence
Review.[29]
It is clear that NATO will have to develop strategies to address
these developments. It is evident that there have been differing
views over how far NATO should go in these directions. However,
NATO will in the longer term have to grapple with the problem
of how broad a range of security concerns it is prepared to take
on, and what resources its members are prepared to devote to them.
Although the Alliance must maintain its ability to provide collective
defence for all its members, their territorial integrity seems
unlikely to be directly threatened in the near to medium term
future, and coping with the other diverse challenges to European
stability and prosperity will be an immediate preoccupation.
18. Third, NATO must develop a firm strategic purpose
along its borders: NATO has policies in relation to individual
countries and in dealing with their requests for membership, but
it is difficult to discern a strategic purpose in terms of policies
towards the sub-regions of Europe, in particular, and most urgently,
the Balkans. However, the Alliance cannot afford to allow the
current focus on its eastern borders (where most of its new members
are likely to come from) to distract it from its other borders.
19. The current crisis in Kosovo indicates the continuing
instability of south eastern Europe and the increasingly evident
dangers of destabilisation spreading into the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Albania and even further afield, perhaps
as far as the former Soviet Union territories. This raises the
risk igniting old conflicts between other states in the region.[30]
This crisis demonstrates even more vividly than the 1992-95 Bosnian
war that instability in one part of Europe constitutes a threat
to European peace in general.
20. NATO has already established a strategic purpose
to the North and South of its membership area. Although recently
emphasis has shifted towards the 'arc of crisis' encompassing
the Balkans and middle East, and NATO's interaction with the South
has slowed somewhat, a new approach has been outlined towards
the Western Mediterranean to help maintain stability in North
Africa and address the immediate security concerns of France,
Spain and Italy;[31]
in the Eastern Mediterranean NATO's purpose is to contain tensions
which threaten its unity.[32]
The recent rebuff of Turkey by the European Union makes the former's
relationship with and engagement within NATO all the more important.
Our predecessor Committee looked at many of these issues in the
last Parliament[33]
and emphasised the importance of NATO's dialogue with its southern
neighbours, including military cooperation and liaison.[34]
NATO will clearly have to continue its efforts to engage in the
Mediterranean region, particularly in the light of increased instability
in the Balkans.
21. In the North, the effects of the end of the Cold
War have certainly been felt, though in the context where Norway
and its Scandinavian partners still have to live close to an overwhelmingly
bigger power—Russia. NATO's strategic purpose in relation
to Northern Europe remains consistent, and its strategic interests
are little changed from the days of the Cold War, though they
can be pursued in a rather more relaxed way at present. Nevertheless,
the delicacy of addressing issues surrounding the future security
of the Baltic states should not be underestimated. NATO's relations
with the other non-aligned states in this area—Finland and
Sweden—must also be handled with great care. The trend of
events in the Northern region may—in the light of NATO's
'open door' policy—demand resolution in more definite terms
in the not too distant future.
22. Fourth, NATO must remain capable of managing
security in Europe. NATO's role in building a solid security order
across the continent is central, but not exclusive. As the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) described to the audience at
the recent RUSI conference on NATO's 50th Anniversary,[35]
the range of actors with which NATO is required to cooperate has
vastly increased since the end of the Cold War. It must therefore
provide the necessary cement to keep its members bound together
in a deepening 'security community', while helping them individually
to work with other security organisations, individual countries
and groups of countries, for the benefit of European security
as a whole. This is a far more challenging task than was the case
during the Cold War as the rationale for NATO is extended beyond
collective defence, in a continent of multi-layered and overlapping
security arrangements. Failure to meet this challenge would be
just as serious as a failure to address any of the other three
broad security interests mentioned above.
23. The MoD outlined the government's overall approach
to the drafting of the new Strategic Concept in a memorandum to
the Committee, reiterating comments made following our Report
on the Strategic Defence Review. The government, we were told,
wishes to see a NATO which—
- embodies and maintains the transatlantic relationship;
- prevents renationalisation of defence;
- contributes to managing other key relationships
and engages Russia;
- remains an effective and flexible military instrument
for dealing with threats and challenges to our security;
- through engagement with other countries in the
region, spreads stability and democratic values; and
- acts as Allies' primary forum for consultation
on all issues of security concern.[36]
26 See Appendix 1 Back
27 Ev
p 89 Back
28 QQ
356-399 Back
29 Eighth
Report, Session 1997-98, ibid, paras 164-172 Back
30 QQ
374 Back
31 NATO's
Mediterranean Dialogue: Brussels Summit Communiqué 8.12.98,
para 10. The non-NATO states participating in the Mediterranean
Dialogue are Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia Back
32 See
also NATO's Role in the Mediterranean, Report by the Mediterranean
Special Group of the NAA, 25.8.97, available on the Internet via
www.naa.be, and Defence Committee's Third Report, Session 1995-96,
NATO's Southern Flank, HC 300 Back
33 Third
Report, Session 1995-96, op cit Back
34 ibid,
para 41 Back
35 Speech
at the Royal United Services Institute, 9 March 1999 Back
36 Ev
p 89 Back
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