NATO'S FORCE STRUCTURE
Conventional Forces
30. Sir Michael Alexander also told us that—
... the military requirements of the two roles [of
collective defence and collective security] are different: over
a period providing the force structures, the planning and the
equipment needed for crisis management and humanitarian tasks
will tend to downgrade the provision made for defence tasks.[56]
31. However, the Policy Director of the MoD told
us that—
... as we concluded in our national debate about
the Strategic Defence Review, for the foreseeable future the types
of forces that we believe are necessary both for ... a collective
defence scenario and for responding to crises on the periphery
... are the same ... essentially.[57]
NATO is undergoing the same debate on so-called 'high
intensity' versus 'low intensity' capabilities that the UK faced
during its Strategic Defence Review. On that question, we concluded
that, despite the changed nature of operations in which the UK
is likely to become involved—
... it is essential to retain well-equipped forces
capable of fighting and winning in the most demanding types of
conflict.[58]
The same conclusion, that we must retain the capability
to engage in high-intensity warfare as well as to participate
in less intensive operations, is applicable to NATO's force structure,
although we regretfully may have to accept that some members will
continue to have conscript forces primarily configured for Article
5 operations that will not be deployable for less intensive operations.
32. The MoD described the military capabilities the
Alliance must have available to it to fulfil the full range of
its new missions. In particular its forces need to—
- be structured, trained and equipped for combined,
joint missions;
- be held at readiness levels which will allow
the full range of missions to be undertaken in a timely manner;
- have the sustainability necessary to support
extended and possibly concurrent operations; and
- be structured to permit, where necessary, longer
term military capability to be built up by reinforcement, regeneration
and reconstitution.[59]
These are very similar to the capabilities required
of the UK armed forces under the SDR. We are encouraged to
note from our meetings with them that many of our Allies have
observed with approval the reconfiguration of the British armed
forces since the end of the Cold War and the SDR; and that many
are either actively reconfiguring their armed forces for precisely
the types of capability that NATO is likely to require in future,
or putting in hand review processes which are likely to lead to
this conclusion. We hope that other Allies will follow. As
the MoD told us, while retaining an overall capability—
The Alliance should continue to plan for the full
range of missions through a single defence planning process and
a single spectrum of military capabilities,[60]
33. The new Strategic Concept's definition of NATO's
future roles will feed into NATO's defence planning[61]
via the revision of the Alliance's top-level, central military
planning document (the current one being MC400/1). Thus the
new Strategic Concept must provide a clear steer as to the capabilities
required by the Alliance over the next ten to fifteen years.
34. NATO has already been moving towards a more mobile,
joint and modern force structure, for example through its Combined
Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept.[62]
A new Command Structure for NATO is to be implemented in 2002-03.
It will involve a major reconfiguration of commands, including
a reduction from 65 headquarters to 20, designed to deliver better
joint operations. Two strategic commands, Strategic Command Europe,
based in Mons, and Strategic Command Atlantic, based in Norfolk,
Virginia, are responsible for overall planning and direction and
conduct of all Allied activities within their areas. Strategic
Command Europe will have two subordinate regional commands, Regional
Command North, based in Brunssum, and Regional Command South,
based in Naples; Strategic Command Atlantic has three, Regional
Command West, also based in Norfolk, Regional Command SouthEast,
based in Lisbon and Regional Command East, based in Northwood.
Reporting to the Regional Commands in Europe are eleven Component
Commands and Joint Sub-Regional Commands (including Component
Command Nav North based in Northwood). Reporting to SC Atlantic
are two additional headquarters, HQ STRIKFLTLANT and HQ SUBACLANT.
Significant force reductions, including a 25 per cent reduction
in the total number of Alliance ground combat units, a reduction
of over 45 per cent in the peacetime strength of NATO's land forces
in the Central Region, a reduction of over 10 per cent in the
number of naval combat units assigned to NATO and a decrease of
over 25 per cent in the total number of combat aircraft assigned
to NATO have been made.[63]
NATO has moved from its original 'layer cake' strategy of deploying
international corps along the former inner German border. According
to General Klaus Naumann, the Chairman of the Military Committee—
The overriding imperative in developing a new structure
was that it be mission oriented. It needed to provide NATO with
the capability to cope with the full range of Alliance roles and
missions, from its traditional mission of collective defence to
new roles in changing circumstances.[64]
We approve the Alliance's moves towards restructuring
its forces for the modern world; as the Secretary of State for
Defence said—
... it is only by getting force planning right that
we give ourselves the option of really being a force for good
in the world.[65]
35. But while applauding the modernisation initiative,
we note that under the process the UK has lost a major Command:
Allied Command Channel. Nevertheless, the command of the Allied
Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the sharing of the
posts of DSACEUR and Chief of Staff at SHAPE with Germany, and
the UK's holding of the post of DSACLANT[66]
should ensure that the UK continues to have a strong and appropriate
influence on the Alliance's military structure.
56 Ev p 119 Back
57 Q
14 Back
58 Eighth
Report, Session 1997-98, op cit para 205 Back
59 Ev
p 89 Back
60 Ev
p 89 Back
61 Q
24 Back
62
CJTFs are intended to facilitate crisis management and peace support
operations by providing the necessary flexibility for short-notice
deployment of specifically-tailored forces. Back
63 NATO
Factsheet: NATO's New Force Structures Back
64 NATO's
New Military Command Centre,
General Klaus Naumann, in NATO Review, Spring 1998 Back
65 Speech
at the Royal United Services Institute, 10 March 1999 Back
66 Letter
from MoD, 5 March 1999 Back
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