NATO's Nuclear Posture
36. Nuclear weapons remain a key element of NATO's
strategy. Alliance nuclear policy since 1977 had been to
ensure that nuclear weapons in NATO's armoury were held to the
minimum number necessary for deterrence.[67]
All decisions on nuclear capabilities were taken with an eye to
the east: in 1983 Alliance policy was to
... preserve the peace through the maintenance of
forces at the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact
threat.[68]
However, by the dying days of the Cold War, the Alliance's
1989 Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament[69]
was arguing that
... the fundamental purpose of nuclear forcesboth
strategic and sub-strategicis political: to preserve the
peace and to prevent any kind of war.[70]
Although under START I and in the context of the
1991 Strategic Concept nuclear forces have been greatly reduced,
and their role less emphasised, this valuation of the Alliance's
nuclear forces as essentially political has prevailed to this
day,[71] and the 1991
Strategic Concept reiterated that
The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of
the Allies is political: to preserve peace and to prevent coercion
and any kind of war.[72]
37. The redrafting of the Strategic Concept has been
seen by some, including the new German government, as an opportunity
for the Alliance to reassess its nuclear policy in the light of
the changed strategic circumstances. Some proponents of disarmament
argue that while nuclear weapons are irrelevant to most of the
threats that NATO may now face, nuclear proliferation might yet
pose a threat to Allied countries. They argue therefore that non-proliferation
should be paramount among NATO's security objectives, and that
NATO's emphasis on the political value of nuclear weapons is counter-productive.
Ambassador Thomas Graham of the Lawyers' Alliance for World Security
argued that the goal of non-proliferation could be best pursued
by NATO lowering the political importance of nuclear weapons by
adopting a 'no first use of nuclear weapons' policy.[73]
38. However, declared policy on the use of nuclear
weapons may in fact be secondary to the question of how the Alliance,
no member of which possesses chemical or biological weapons, would
respond to any attack on its territory with these categories of
weapons, although it is possible that any such attack would not
come directly from another state. One proposal is to adopt a 'no
first use of Weapons of Mass Destruction' policy (which would
allow NATO a nuclear response if attacked with chemical or biological
weapons). Ambassador Graham in a meeting with the Committee argued
that for NATO to attack with nuclear weapons any of the non-nuclear
states that are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT)[74]
would be in violation of the legal obligations of the UK, the
US and France under the NPT. He suggested that such a policy was
likely to damage non-proliferation efforts.[75]
Ambassador Graham pointed out that under international law, responses
must be proportionate and the provision under international law
of belligerent response could apply under which international
commitments are waived once there has been such an attack, thereby
not negating the case for a declared policy of no first use of
nuclear weapons.
39. However, the Secretary of State for Defence argued
that a declaration of no first use
might actually be the opposite of encouraging or
reassuring and might detract from the concept of deterrence. Deterrence
is essentially based on the doubt that is in any potential aggressor's
mind, which has to be kept as uncertain as possible. A declaration
of "no first use" would simplify any potential aggressor's
planning because the clear implication would be that that potential
aggressor could mount a substantial conventional, or a chemical
or biological assault, without any fear of a nuclear response.
So to add that into it would, we believe, be more dangerous than
to leave the uncertainties that basically underpin the deterrent
posture at the present moment.[76]
We only note that this doctrine of 'mutual uncertainty'
requires both potential aggressors and NATO to live with the uncertainties
about a potential attack by weapons of mass destruction and a
potential nuclear response. In our report last year on the Strategic
Defence Review, we recommended that the government restated and
brought up to date the UK's strategic and sub-strategic
nuclear strategy.[77]
In its response, the government agreed that it should take an
early opportunity to do so.[78]
We look forward to this statement, particularly if it clarifies
the sub-strategic role of Trident. However, the Secretary
of State told us that he believed that a 'no first use' policy
... might actually be the opposite of encouraging
or reassuring ... [and] would simplify any aggressor's planning
... It was something we ruled out. Most of our Allies have also
ruled that out.[79]
But he told us that NATO's review of its nuclear
posture was ongoing and that
... the Alliance after Washington should look, as
we do, at existing nuclear posture; and make adjustments to some
aspects of that to take into account contemporary circumstances.[80]
It seems that the debate about NATO's use of nuclear
weapons policy among Allied nations has been resolved for the
time being,[81] and that
the policy will remain unchanged in the new Strategic Concept.
While we recognise that nuclear weapons remain central to NATO's
strategy, the Alliance's nuclear policy will continue to evolve,
and we welcome open debate upon it.
40. Sir Michael Alexander wrote that
NATO would do well to follow the example of the SDR
and, alongside a continuing reduction in the number of nuclear
warheads deployed and in their potency, pursue a policy of greater
transparency about the numbers, capabilities and roles envisaged.
In the long run ... even greater transparency offers the best
hope of controlling the dangers posed by military nuclear technology
... NATO should make "greater nuclear transparency"
one of its slogans.[82]
We agree that greater nuclear transparency by
NATO could only be beneficial.
67 NATO's Evolving Role from Cold War to the New Security
Environment, Mark Stenhouse,
in Jane's NATO Handbook 1991-92 Back
68 The
Montebello Decision, October 1983 Back
69 Adopted
by the Heads of State and Government at the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Brussels May 2930, 1989 Back
70 Comprehensive
Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, para 23 Back
71
NATO's strategy is no longer centred on the possibility of the
nuclear escalation of conventional war, or directed against a
specific threat. Between 1991 and 1993, NATO reduced the number
of sub-strategic weapons available for forces in Europe by 80%;
under START I and II, the Alliance's strategic weapons will also
be vastly reduced. NATO declared in 1996 that it had no intention,
no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory
of new member countries, nor any need to change any aspect of
NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy, and that it did not
foresee any future need to do so. Back
72 1991
Strategic Concept, paragraph 54 Back
73 This
idea has also been pursued by the German Foreign Minister, Joschka
Fisher. Back
74 The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commits nuclear weapon
states to engage in disarmament and not to use, or threaten to
use, their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories; and
commits those non-nuclear signatories not to attempt to obtain
nuclear arms. The nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT
are the UK, the US, France, Russia and China. India, Pakistan,
Cuba and Israel have not signed the NPT. Back
75 Ev
p 113 Back
76 17
February 1999, Q 308 Back
77 Eight
Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para 152 Back
78 Sixth
Special Report, Session 1997-98, Government Response to the
Eighth Report of the Defence Committee, HC 1198, para 28 Back
79 Q
308 Back
80 Q
308 Back
81 Q
308 Back
82 Ev
p 122 Back
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