House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Third Report

NATO's Nuclear Posture

36. Nuclear weapons remain a key element of NATO's strategy. Alliance nuclear policy since 1977 had been to ensure that nuclear weapons in NATO's armoury were held to the minimum number necessary for deterrence.[67] All decisions on nuclear capabilities were taken with an eye to the east: in 1983 Alliance policy was to—

... preserve the peace through the maintenance of forces at the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat.[68]

However, by the dying days of the Cold War, the Alliance's 1989 Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament[69] was arguing that—

... the fundamental purpose of nuclear forces—both strategic and sub-strategic—is political: to preserve the peace and to prevent any kind of war.[70]

Although under START I and in the context of the 1991 Strategic Concept nuclear forces have been greatly reduced, and their role less emphasised, this valuation of the Alliance's nuclear forces as essentially political has prevailed to this day,[71] and the 1991 Strategic Concept reiterated that—

The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and to prevent coercion and any kind of war.[72]

37. The redrafting of the Strategic Concept has been seen by some, including the new German government, as an opportunity for the Alliance to reassess its nuclear policy in the light of the changed strategic circumstances. Some proponents of disarmament argue that while nuclear weapons are irrelevant to most of the threats that NATO may now face, nuclear proliferation might yet pose a threat to Allied countries. They argue therefore that non-proliferation should be paramount among NATO's security objectives, and that NATO's emphasis on the political value of nuclear weapons is counter-productive. Ambassador Thomas Graham of the Lawyers' Alliance for World Security argued that the goal of non-proliferation could be best pursued by NATO lowering the political importance of nuclear weapons by adopting a 'no first use of nuclear weapons' policy.[73]

38. However, declared policy on the use of nuclear weapons may in fact be secondary to the question of how the Alliance, no member of which possesses chemical or biological weapons, would respond to any attack on its territory with these categories of weapons, although it is possible that any such attack would not come directly from another state. One proposal is to adopt a 'no first use of Weapons of Mass Destruction' policy (which would allow NATO a nuclear response if attacked with chemical or biological weapons). Ambassador Graham in a meeting with the Committee argued that for NATO to attack with nuclear weapons any of the non-nuclear states that are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[74] would be in violation of the legal obligations of the UK, the US and France under the NPT. He suggested that such a policy was likely to damage non-proliferation efforts.[75] Ambassador Graham pointed out that under international law, responses must be proportionate and the provision under international law of belligerent response could apply under which international commitments are waived once there has been such an attack, thereby not negating the case for a declared policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.

39. However, the Secretary of State for Defence argued that a declaration of no first use—

might actually be the opposite of encouraging or reassuring and might detract from the concept of deterrence. Deterrence is essentially based on the doubt that is in any potential aggressor's mind, which has to be kept as uncertain as possible. A declaration of "no first use" would simplify any potential aggressor's planning because the clear implication would be that that potential aggressor could mount a substantial conventional, or a chemical or biological assault, without any fear of a nuclear response. So to add that into it would, we believe, be more dangerous than to leave the uncertainties that basically underpin the deterrent posture at the present moment.[76]

We only note that this doctrine of 'mutual uncertainty' requires both potential aggressors and NATO to live with the uncertainties about a potential attack by weapons of mass destruction and a potential nuclear response. In our report last year on the Strategic Defence Review, we recommended that the government restated and brought up to date the UK's strategic and sub-strategic nuclear strategy.[77] In its response, the government agreed that it should take an early opportunity to do so.[78] We look forward to this statement, particularly if it clarifies the sub-strategic role of Trident. However, the Secretary of State told us that he believed that a 'no first use' policy—

... might actually be the opposite of encouraging or reassuring ... [and] would simplify any aggressor's planning ... It was something we ruled out. Most of our Allies have also ruled that out.[79]

But he told us that NATO's review of its nuclear posture was ongoing and that—

... the Alliance after Washington should look, as we do, at existing nuclear posture; and make adjustments to some aspects of that to take into account contemporary circumstances.[80]

It seems that the debate about NATO's use of nuclear weapons policy among Allied nations has been resolved for the time being,[81] and that the policy will remain unchanged in the new Strategic Concept. While we recognise that nuclear weapons remain central to NATO's strategy, the Alliance's nuclear policy will continue to evolve, and we welcome open debate upon it.

40. Sir Michael Alexander wrote that—

NATO would do well to follow the example of the SDR and, alongside a continuing reduction in the number of nuclear warheads deployed and in their potency, pursue a policy of greater transparency about the numbers, capabilities and roles envisaged. In the long run ... even greater transparency offers the best hope of controlling the dangers posed by military nuclear technology ... NATO should make "greater nuclear transparency" one of its slogans.[82]

We agree that greater nuclear transparency by NATO could only be beneficial.

67 NATO's Evolving Role from Cold War to the New Security Environment, Mark Stenhouse, in Jane's NATO Handbook 1991-92 Back

68 The Montebello Decision, October 1983 Back

69 Adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels May 2930, 1989 Back

70 Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, para 23 Back

71 NATO's strategy is no longer centred on the possibility of the nuclear escalation of conventional war, or directed against a specific threat. Between 1991 and 1993, NATO reduced the number of sub-strategic weapons available for forces in Europe by 80%; under START I and II, the Alliance's strategic weapons will also be vastly reduced. NATO declared in 1996 that it had no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member countries, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy, and that it did not foresee any future need to do so. Back

72 1991 Strategic Concept, paragraph 54 Back

73 This idea has also been pursued by the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fisher. Back

74 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commits nuclear weapon states to engage in disarmament and not to use, or threaten to use, their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories; and commits those non-nuclear signatories not to attempt to obtain nuclear arms. The nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT are the UK, the US, France, Russia and China. India, Pakistan, Cuba and Israel have not signed the NPT. Back

75 Ev p 113 Back

76 17 February 1999, Q 308 Back

77 Eight Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para 152 Back