Select Committee on Defence Third Report



COUNTER-PROLIFERATION

45. It is likely that NATO of the future will become more involved in measures to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The security threat to the Allies of proliferation was formally acknowledged by NATO in January 1994, and a decision was taken to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation. Yet very little tangible results have so far been seen.[90] Counter-proliferation is likely to be one of the topics to be touched upon in the new Strategic Concept. The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office told us that—

Britain would be very supportive of ... a weapons of mass destruction initiative within the context of NATO. That essentially is about information exchange. It is about pooling the knowledge that NATO members may have.[91]

But he also pointed out that—

There is also considerable activity taking place in different international fora in this whole area ... a lot of the important roles that need to be pursued ... will not be directly NATO responsibility because they are better done elsewhere. [92]

The US Deputy Secretary of State has outlined those areas where NATO does have a role—

We must find better, more efficient, more timely ways of sharing information and assessments so that our troops are properly protected from an enemy equipped with nuclear, chemical and biological arms, and we must improve our ability to deal with the consequences of a WMD attack against our civilian populations.[93]

The Pentagon has suggested, for example, that Allies cooperate in the creation of databases listing vaccine stocks, protection suits and medical centres.[94]

46. There is a certain ambiguity inherent in the phrase "non-proliferation": in NATO's sphere it applies mainly to in-theatre defence together with, as John Roper of Chatham House told us—

... what is described in our Strategic Defence Review as defence diplomacy.[95]

There have been concerns in some areas that NATO's taking on of a counter-proliferation mission would lead to creeping globalisation, including perhaps punitive strikes against those thought to be proliferators. For our part, we are aware of the high risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and would support NATO's adoption of a non-proliferation mission. But NATO must be aware of the limitations of its role in counter-proliferation: its principal objective in this area should remain the more even-handed prevention, or reversal, of proliferation through diplomatic means and the support, rather than duplication, of the work of other international organisations.


90  New Threats Await NATO, Defense News, Vol 14 No 11, 22 March 1999 Back

91  Q 306 Back

92  Q 306 Back

93  Royal United Services Institute, 10 March 1999 Back

94  New Threats Await NATO, Defense News, Vol 14 No 11, 22 March 1999 Back

95  Q 112 Back


 
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Prepared 13 April 1999