KOSOVO
53. NATO has taken the international lead on the
worsening crisis in Kosovo, drawing up its own resolutions in
support of UN resolutions previously adopted. The danger of a
Russian veto in referring matters relating to the Kosovo crisis
back to the United Nations Security Council has encouraged the
NATO powers to act on their own authority for subsequent attempts
to resolve, or ameliorate, the current crisis. In its statement
on 8th December 1998 the North Atlantic Council's Foreign Ministers
cited UN Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 as authority
for NATO's continuing endeavours over Kosovo—the air verification
mission (Operation Eagle Eye) and the build-up of the NATO-led
Extraction Force (Operation Joint Guarantor).[115]
These resolutions were again cited in the North Atlantic Council
Defence Ministers' session of 17 December 1998,[116]
and by the Secretary of State in his evidence to us on 24th March.[117]
54. Whatever the outcome of the Kosovo crisis, several
features of NATO's role in it are innovative. Firstly, the command
arrangements for the NATO-led force now assembling in Macedonia
may depart from previous practice. The NATO-led force will be
commanded by the Commander of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)
who is ultimately answerable to SACEUR, an American. It looks
likely that for the first six months of its deployment, the ARRC
will, in the first instance, be answerable to the major subordinate
commander CINCSOUTH—also an American. If confirmed, then
the command arrangements will be similar to those that were adopted
during the initial IFOR deployment in Bosnia. Nevertheless, on
this occasion the United Kingdom will be the single biggest contributor
to a force in Kosovo and the proportion of US troops within the
whole force will be somewhat lower than was the case in Bosnia.
In this case, however, the commander of the Kosovo force (KFOR)
will be the commander of the ARRC, General Sir Mike Jackson. At
the theatre level, therefore, US troops will be under a NATO command
which is led by a British officer and dominated by British HQ
staff officers. Though not historically unique, this arrangement
is out of the ordinary for contemporary US military deployments
and may represent something of a model for the future.
55. A second innovation concerns the way the NATO
force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has
been developed flexibly. The initial deployments were to create
an Extraction Force for the potential protection of the 1125 OSCE
verifiers in Kosovo. This force, however, has been supplemented
to be something more than an Extraction Force as originally envisaged
and now stands as the leading elements of a KFOR should it be
deployed in Kosovo. Whereas the IFOR deployment in Bosnia in January
1996 could draw upon the UN forces (UNPROFOR) that were already
in place and which had used large elements of NATO infrastructure,
in the case of a Kosovo operation no such existing framework exists
on the ground. NATO has therefore had to develop its force elements
as an exercise in "power projection". British, French,
German and some Italian units are now in place in FYROM and provide
a framework which can be supplemented up to higher operational
levels. In the British case an Armoured Battle Group is now fully
deployed. The battle group consists of a squadron of Challenger
tanks, a company of Warrior armoured infantry vehicles, an AS90
artillery battery, the Fourth Armoured Brigade Tactical Headquarters
and other supporting units.[118]
56. The British contingent presently numbers some
4,500 in this force, and in the event that there is a full KFOR
deployment in the province of Kosovo, will rise to some 8,000.
The British contingent will be the largest single contribution
in terms of numbers by virtue of the fact that Britain commands
the ARRC which adds something over 2,000 personnel to the total
deployed number.
57. This Committee will monitor the developments
carefully and we will ask the government to give us a considered
view at the end of NATO offensive action and after the first six
months of any peace enforcement deployment on how the arrangements
have worked in practice. We will wish to take evidence, inter
alia, on the military advice given to the North Atlantic Council,
the military assessment provided to UK ministers and the coordination
of political objectives and military strategy.
115 'Statement on Kosovo' Meeting of the NAC in Foreign
Ministers' Session N-NAC-2 (98) 143, 8 December 1998, para 2 Back
116 'Final
Communique' Meeting of the NAC in Defence Ministers' Session M-NAC-D-2
(98) 152, 17 December 1998, para 8 Back
117 Q
362, Q 385 Back
118 Ministry
of Defence Press Notices Back
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