Transatlantic Attitudes
69. There appears, therefore, to be a growing consensus
in European capitals that the European powers have to address
the question of their deployable defence capabilities and the
circumstances in which they might be used, and perhaps strike
a new bargain with the USA. Within NATO, the European powers account
for more than 60% of the Alliance's population and over 60% of
its armed forces personnel. On paper, European-NATO countries
collectively spend on defence the equivalent of around two thirds
of the US defence budget (although proportionately probably more
of the European spend is allocated to NATO).[153]
President Clinton has sought approval from Congress for a 4.4%
increase in the US defence budget for 1999-2000, the first real
terms increase since 1991.[154]
Yet it is generally agreed that the European Allies possess much
less than the capability of the US, partly because of the duplication
of capabilities between European states. The issue of equitable
burden-sharing (not just of costs, but also of capabilities) within
NATO has been politically sensitive between the US and the Europeans
since the foundation of the Integrated Military Structure (IMS).
There has never been a generally agreed way in which to gauge
the relative contributions of the US and Europe, and the debate
has been characterised as—
... dominated by myths, emotion and special pleading.[155]
However, in the present international environment,
where the challenges to European security do not manifestly share
the risks equally among NATO members in the way that was commonplace
during the Cold War, it is perhaps inevitable that burden-sharing
issues should take on renewed importance. In the US the debate
can become very heated—
... a lot of it on false premises, certainly if you
hear the debate about Bosnia,
as one British official commented.[156]
With the new emphasis on NATO's new missions, the calculation
of burden-sharing will no longer revolve around the performance
of a single major Alliance function, and it will be more difficult
than ever to measure respective burdens inside an evolving Alliance
that finds itself in such an uncertain security environment. But
as the US Deputy Secretary of State recently said, it—
... is a fundamental and enduring truth: the well-being
of the United States depends in large measure on what happens
in Europe: the US will not prosper without an economically vibrant
Europe; the US will not be safe without a secure and peaceful
Europe. That said, most Americans recognize that the phenomenon
of "Europe" is not static. Rather, it is organic. In
the nature and composition of its institutions, even in its geographical
scope, Europe is constantly reinventing itself; it is, in the
vocabulary of Euro-speak, both deepening and broadening. As Americans
watch the evolution of Europe, we have our own hopes, and sometimes
our own apprehensions, about where the process will lead. We want
to see Europe define its identity and pursue its interests in
a way that not only preserves, but that strengthens, the ties
that bind your security to ours, and, of course, ours to yours.
70. It is evident that there exists a growing consensus
for the Europeans to increase their physical and organisational
competence to respond to the growing security challenges they
face. The MoD's policy director told the Committee that—
... the weight of the European military capability
... [contributed] to the Alliance is not commensurate with [Europe's]
political weight ...[157]
And the Assembly of the WEU has said that—
... we now find ourselves in a situation of dependence
and imbalance that is extremely disadvantageous to Europe and
even to our American partners.[158]
An enhanced ESDI in some form—whether or
not it is developed exclusively within NATO, or in some other
arrangement involving more closely the EU—continues to have
significant, potential, practical defence benefits.
71. In evidence to us, officials confirmed that the
government agreed on the need to 're-balance' NATO—
... to actually help cement the Alliance because
as anybody who visits Washington knows, whether there is a burden-sharing
debate in the UK or in Europe, there is always one in Washington
...[159]
and as the US Deputy Secretary of State confirmed—
We're in favor of ESDI. We want there to be a capability
within the Alliance whereby the European members can address and
solve problems without always requiring US combat involvement.
That's in everyone's interest ... But as with every aspect of
modernizing and adapting NATO, this particular innovation, ESDI,
carries with it risks and costs; and it carries with it an obligation
for the highest possible degree of transparency and consultation.
If ESDI is misconceived, misunderstood or mishandled, it could
create the impression—which could eventually lead to the
reality— that a new, European-only alliance is being born
out of the old, transatlantic one. If that were to happen, it
would weaken, perhaps even break, those ties that I spoke of before—the
ones that bind our security to yours.
We concur. Under no circumstances must the development
of the ESDI, now or in the foreseeable future, be seen to be an
attack on the transatlantic nature of the Alliance.
72. Current preparations for the establishment of
a KFOR taking place in FYROM represent a potentially significant
step forward for ESDI initiatives. France and the UK were the
leading players in establishing so promptly an Extraction Force
in FYROM to act as the ultimate guarantee of the safety of OSCE
monitors. Both countries were prepared to do this without the
explicit military support on the ground of US forces and have
taken the lead in planning for the transformation of this force
into a potential KFOR. Though it is very unlikely that the Europeans
would see a full KFOR operation as feasible without the involvement
of US ground troops, it is clear that London and Paris both want
to use this operation to send a message to the rest of NATO that
tangible ESDI contributions are now appropriate. The Secretary
General of NATO recognised this in his recent speech at the Royal
United Services Institution when he said—
The Kosovo Implementation Force should also be the
start of yet another new feature of how we manage security today;
it should be the start of a stronger European role in NATO. The
Kosovo peace implementation mission, should it materialise, will
have far greater European input, and will even be led by a European
- a NATO first. ¼
Such a new bargain does not mean 'less America' it simply means
'more Europe'.[160]
73. The Kosovo crisis also demonstrates that the
six nation Contact Group—consisting of the US, Russia, the
UK, France, Germany and Italy—is rapidly emerging as a form
of European security council, certainly on matters relating to
current instabilities in the Balkans. NATO is drawing significant
authority from discussions taking place in the Contact Group and
has demonstrated that it is struggling to articulate a new relationship
between itself and the United Nations. The authority under which
NATO operates in Kosovo will crystallise the debate about the
legal basis for future NATO operations in areas of Europe and
its periphery, where Article 5 jurisdiction is not relevant.
153 Q 36 Back
154 International
Herald Tribune, 4 January
1999 Back
155 NATO
Burden Sharing: Past and Future,
Professor Keith Hartley and Professor Todd Sandler, 1999 Back
156 Q
99 Back
157 Q
98 Back
158 Assembly
of the WEU's Draft Plan for Action, A Time for Defence Back
159 Q
99 Back
160 Speech
at Royal United Services Institute, 9 March 1999 Back
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