European Approaches
74. The emergence of an enhanced ESDI, therefore,
takes on a vital significance as a tangible symbol of Europe's
greater willingness to 'rebalance' the Alliance—whatever
form that may eventually take—and provides an essential
building block to the conclusion of a 'new transatlantic bargain'—whether
tacit or explicit—that the US is clearly seeking. The US
appears to have been reassured that an enhanced ESDI will not
undermine NATO and will not serve to exclude the US and other
Allies from key decision-making. Current US policy-makers within
the Executive (though perhaps not in Congress) appear to view
the enhancement of the ESDI as a positive advantage in the transatlantic
burden-sharing debate while for the Europeans, it represents the
prospect of greater military competence in operations that may
be deemed vital to their interests but in which US forces may
only be involved indirectly in back-up, surveillance or logistical
roles.
THE UNITED KINGDOM
75. The Committee was told that, from the UK's perspective,
the most promising way forward, that commands the greatest degree
of intra-allied consensus, seems to be in the development of a
'toolbox' of forces and equipment, maintained by NATO member states,
to which the European Union or the WEU would have some degree
of access; in which processes of consultation and decision-making
would be clarified and streamlined. European forces could be more
closely tied in to both NATO and WEU structures and genuine operational
capabilities increased. In June 1998 NATO Defence ministers agreed,
in the words of the MoD and the FCO—
to direct work to ensure that the key elements of
the implementation of the Berlin and Brussels decisions are in
place by the time of the Washington Summit. The results of this
work should be reflected in the updated Concept to enable the
practical development of the ESDI to continue in support of the
overall aims and evolution of NATO.[161]
The St Malo Declaration of December 1998 between
France and the United Kingdom—the two most important European
military players in this debate—stated plainly that—
Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react
rapidly to the new risks.[162]
While there may be some ambiguity between Paris and
London as to what constitutes 'strengthened' armed forces—whether
it implies the commitment of more defence resources, for example—and
while there was some cynicism in the public reaction to St Malo
that it did not go further, the direction of the final communiqué
and the concentration on specific military capabilities is entirely
consistent with the enhancement of the ESDI. However the St Malo
declaration also included reference to—
... the European Union will also need to have recourse
to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated
within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational
European means outside the NATO framework).
We regard the reference to means outside the NATO
framework with concern and believe that this element of the declaration
may mean different things to each of the parties.
76. The Prime Minister himself told the recent NATO
50th Anniversary Conference at the RUSI that—
The initiative I launched last autumn on European
defence is aimed at giving greater credibility to Europe's Common
Foreign and Security Policy. Far from weakening NATO this is an
essential complement to the Transatlantic Alliance. We Europeans
should not expect the United States to have to play a part in
every disorder in our own back yard. The European Union should
be able to take on some security tasks on our own, and we will
do better through a common European effort than we can by individual
countries acting on their own. Europe's military capabilities
at this stage are modest. Too modest. Too few allies are transforming
their armed forces to cope with the security problems of the 1990s
and the 21st century.[163]
77. It seems therefore that the government is keen
to investigate the possibilities for greater involvement among
the members of the EU in defence questions as a way both of helping
the Europeans to punch at their right weight in defence terms,
and as an ingredient in a more balanced transatlantic relationship.
In fact the United Kingdom has shown a marked reluctance to involve
itself in the debate on the institutional arrangements regarding
the ESDI, which the Secretary of State for Defence has called
"narrow and sterile".[164]
The Secretary of State stressed in his evidence to us that the
accent was on practicalities—
The fact is that we Europeans have spent an awful
lot of time debating institutions, creating institutions, creating
wiring diagrams which show you who would be involved, who would
not be involved, where the decisions are taken. Well, the stark
reality is, you cannot send a wiring diagram to deal with a crisis,
and what we want to do, and what I believe our allies are now
facing up to, is to address [the] capability gap.[165]
He also told the NATO 50th Anniversary Conference
that—
The trend in European defence budgets is downwards.
Pressure on public spending suggests that this trend could continue
...Without effective military capability to back up European foreign
policy goals, we are wasting our time. We risk being an economic
giant, but a strategic midget ... Institutional re-engineering
alone will solve little ...Our ultimate aim, therefore, is not
so much a European Security and Defence Identity but something
altogether more ambitious—namely a European Defence Capability.
78. On this basis, the government has pursued a number
of initiatives. Within NATO, the Secretary of State told us, the
UK has urged closer integration within some of the European multinational
forces that already exist—such as the UK/Netherlands Amphibious
Force, the Eurocorps, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, and among
the other mixed forces at corps level and lower.[166]
Further initiatives will flow, the government believes, from the
implementation of the Strategic Defence Review and the interest
that other European Allies have expressed in its process and outcome
as they embark on similar reviews.[167]
79. In moving this process forward, therefore, the
government has also been anxious to indicate what it should not
involve. The Prime Minister stressed that—
We decided that we should go beyond the Berlin arrangements
agreed by NATO in 1996 to give Europe a genuine capacity to act,
and act quickly, in cases where the Alliance as a whole is not
militarily engaged. In any particular crisis, the European Union
will develop a comprehensive policy. But within that, deployment
of forces is a decision for Governments. I see no role for the
European Parliament or the Court of Justice. Nor will the European
Commission have a decision-making role on military matters.[168]
In evidence to this Committee, the Secretary of State
for Defence stressed that both the British and French governments
assumed that defence questions must remain "intergovernmental".[169]
The Committee pressed the Minister of State at the FCO on the
question of whether EU institutions will become more powerful
in relation to defence questions. But Mr. Lloyd insisted that
there was "no pressure" to move from the present level
of the CFSP—
It is intergovernmental, it is not within the competence
of, for example, the Commission or some parallel organisation.[170]
The Secretary of State added that the government
was "not interested in some single European army,"[171]
and we endorse the government's determination to resist any increasing
pressure to move in this direction.
161 Ev p 91 Back
162 Ev
p 131: Declaration on European Defence, St Malo, 3-4 December,
para 4 Back
163 Speech
at the Royal United Services Institute, 8 March 1999 Back
164 Speech
to EU Ambassadors, 18 February 1999 Back
165 Q
315 Back
166 Q
314 Back
167 Q
315, Q 331 Back
168 Speech
at Royal United Services Institute, 8 March 1999 Back
169 Q
324 Back
170 Q
324, Q 327 Back
171 Q
329 Back
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