The Future of the ESDI
90. On the basis of progress so far, a 'Berlin Plus'
concept may emerge from the Washington Summit which would represent
a significant step in the direction of more effective burden-sharing
within the Alliance. Equally, work and expenditure on the Defence
Capabilities Initiative—which is intended to identify key
European weaknesses that need to be addressed—would demonstrate
the determination of the Europeans to take ESDI initiatives seriously.
The US Deputy Secretary of State expressed the hope that—
Looking back over the calendar of 1996 through 1999,
we will also see a map featuring a clear, straight, well-lit path
leading from Berlin to St Malo to Washington to Bremen and to
Cologne.
An Atlantic Alliance, enhanced by a greater ESDI,
will, we believe, allow NATO to operate more effectively in a
strategic partnership with the US both in and outside the European
region as situations arise. As US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright put it in December 1998—
Our interests are clear: we want a Europe that can
act. We want a Europe with modern, flexible military forces that
are capable of putting out fires in Europe's backyard and working
with us through the alliance to defend our common interests. European
efforts to do more for Europe's own defence make it easier, not
harder, for us to remain engaged.[186]
The differences in emphasis which we have outlined
above lie behind all current discussions of potential new missions
for NATO, and although the Washington Summit will address them,
it is unlikely that they will finally be resolved there. Officials
have suggested that the new Strategic Concept should avoid being
overly precise as to the contingencies for which NATO prepares.[187]
We recommend, however, that the UK should press for a clear
statement of support for the development of the ESDI to be included
in the new Strategic Concept. As The Economist expressed
it, fairly starkly—
America's interest in transatlantic co-operation
will be proportional to Europe's willingness to face future challenges:
poison gas, germ warfare, rogue [states'] missiles, ethnic wars
on—or a little beyond—NATO's periphery... The alliance
will not survive, in any solid sense, unless Europeans and Americans
do some hard, honest talking about their division of labour.[188]
91. In this difficult situation the United Kingdom
has a potentially important role to play. In the wake of discussions
in November and December 1998, the Prime Minister,[189]
the Foreign Secretary[190]
and the Secretary of State for Defence all went out of their way
to incline towards Washington's emphasis. This still leaves a
great deal to play for, since recent arguments have become considerably
more heated in the run-up to the April Summit. However there is
an implicit bargain in the decision to make a reality of the ESDI—and
the UK should understand the significance of that bargain. We
set out below some of the key outcomes required of the Washington
Summit which we believe would demonstrate that this profound shift
of policy was merited.
92. First, we support the UK government's emphasis
on measures to reinforce Europe's military capability, and agree
that these should be the priority in the development of the ESDI.
As the Secretary of State for Defence has said—
... the key military assets required for the type
of peace support operation that [the Europeans] may face, in particular
air assets, are overwhelmingly American ... and we frequently
neglect the vital logistical tail that would be required to sustain
our armed forces over a long duration far from home.[191]
We hope that the Washington Summit will produce
a convincing plan, based on the findings of the Defence Capabilities
Initiative, to bring our European Allies' force structure into
line with NATO's new missions. We believe
that this will, inevitably, require some reconsideration of the
thorny problem of role specialisation within the European forces.
We hope that the Washington Summit will lay the foundations
for a mature reconsideration of measures to improve complementarity
and interoperability amongst the European Allies' armed forces,
and will embody a recognition that this will involve further pooling
of national resources, with the trade-offs that such a development
implies. To underpin these changes, we would see great
advantage in the Washington Summit announcing the creation of
a second, European-led, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.
93. Second, while the military dimension of the ESDI
should, we believe, take precedence, the Summit should not simply
fudge the institutional questions. It seems that the Allied governments
have finally decided that the WEU has run its course, and has
become an impediment to the development of the ESDI rather than
an aid. Even the Assembly of the WEU seems set to suggest that
procedures be set up to—
... give the European Council a real military operational
capability by transferring to it WEU's decision-making and command
capability,
leading eventually to the setting of—
... a schedule for the gradual integration of the
WEU into the EU.[192]
This should in part be seen as a tribute to the efforts
of the WEU to reinvent itself since the Berlin Summit. But that
said, we would see advantage in the Washington Summit producing
a clear statement of NATO's view on the proposed integration of
the WEU and the EU.
94. In our Seventh Report of last session, we noted
that it was regrettable that for the last several years, while
the US defence industry had significantly restructured, little
had happened in Europe until very recently, and concluded that
the imbalance between the industries of the US and Europe required
urgent attention. We endorsed the government's view that it remains
a matter for the industries whether and how they restructure.
Only the industries concerned can determine what links—with
firms in the US as well as in Europe and elsewhere—will
generate business synergies. We also concluded that it would not
be in the UK's national interest for Europe to give any hint of
building some sort of 'fortress Europe' while industry in Europe
is restructured, because that could create barriers in the US,
and we urged the UK Government to use its influence in Europe
to avoid any undue European-preference policy emerging. We
believe these conclusions hold good for any moves to bring industrial
restructuring within the ambit of the ESDI.[193]
95. A stronger European Security and Defence Identity
could strengthen the Alliance and reinforce its transatlantic
dimension. We believe that by making Europe more capable of acting
without the USA in defence of its own interests it will, paradoxically,
make the USA more ready to remain within the Alliance and work
with its European Allies. We would support any move which would
have the effect of bringing closer transatlantic cooperation,
and which might as a consequence make unilateral military action
by the USA less likely. But the advantages of a strengthened ESDI
do not lie only to the West. Russia finds the EU a much more natural
partner in developing European security cooperation than it does
NATO. The EU has a fundamental role to play in securing, through
political and economic means, the stability of Europe.
186 Madeleine K. Albright, 'The right balance will secure
NATO's future', Financial Times, 7 December 1998, p 22 Back
187 Q
62, Q 66 Back
188 Economist
12 December 1998, p. 20 Back
189 Tony
Blair, 'Time to Repay the United States', The New York Times,
13 November 1998. Back
190 The
Independent, 9 December 1998,
p.14 Back
191 Speech
to the WEU Assembly, 1 December 1998 Back
192 Assembly
of the WEU Draft Action Plan: A Time For Defence Back
193 Seventh
Report, Session 1997-98, Aspects of Defence Procurement and
Industrial Policy, HC 675, p xxix Back
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