Russia
98. The transforming relationship between NATO and
Russia was formalised in the NATO-Russia Founding Act[200]
of May 1997, which includes commitments to consultation on Euro-Atlantic
security issues; promotion of transparency and confidence-building
measures; the peaceful settlement of disputes; the strengthening
of the OSCE; and closer military cooperation between the signatories.
The Founding Act has been praised by the Russian Ambassador to
the UK as—
... provid[ing] extensive opportunities for creating
an atmosphere of trust in Europe.[201]
The Founding Act also included provisions for the
establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC),
which is a forum for consultation and cooperation and the development
of joint initiatives. It will, in the words of Sir Michael Alexander,
have to deal with—
... all the twists and turns which lie ahead in the
NATO/Russia relationship.[202]
It was clear from our visit to Moscow that the
road ahead for NATO and Russia will be neither straight nor smooth.
99. Our discussions in Moscow brought home to
us the extent to which attitudes to NATO are as much a badge of
political expediency as a product of reasoned analysis of the
threats to Russia's interests. While the fissure between the liberal,
democratic, western-oriented elements of the political elite and
the nationalist, isolationist supporters of a distinctive Russian
or Slavic course is one that runs through almost all other areas
of policy, it seems there is only one set of attitudes towards
NATO, hostility of a greater or lesser degree. However, the practical
continuation of political and military cooperation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in support of the Dayton and Paris agreements and
the efforts by NATO and Russia to maintain a joint approach to
the crisis in Kosovo are encouraging in the light of concerns
that Russia's objection to NATO's enlargement would lead to the
breakdown of cooperation in practice.[203]
None of our interlocutors in Moscow were able to point to an area
of NATO-Russia relations which would have been changed in practical
terms if the accession of the Visegrad Three had not taken place.
100. Nevertheless, it was clear from our discussions
that it is possible that the NATO-Russia relationship could become
yet more problematic in future. Russia has in the past threatened
to withdraw from or reduce cooperation in response to NATO's proposed
enlargement, US/UK action in the Gulf in 1998 and NATO's involvement
in Kosovo. This last factor was at the forefront during our visit
in March, and was reinforced by Prime Minister Primakov's sudden
aborting of his visit to the USA on 23rd March. Even those of
our interlocutors who were relatively sympathetic to NATO's case
predicted a dramatic slump in NATO-Russia relations if there were
air strikes against Milosevic in Serbia. A statement by the Federation
Council (the Upper House of the Federal Assembly) on 26 March
expressed a widely-held Russian view that—
This action is tantamount to an erosion of the basis
of the contemporary international law order ... a most flagrant
violation of the UN Charter, of the generally accepted norms and
principles of international law. Attempts to justify the air raids
by references to "the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe"
are absolutely groundless ... The North Atlantic Alliance has
actually usurped the authority of the Security Council of the
United Nations and violated its own Charter which allows the use
of force by the Alliance in precise conformity with the UN Charter
... NATO's unilateral action runs counter to the whole complex
of decisions and measures taken by the Contact Group, OSCE and
the United Nations which served in the last months as a basis
for active efforts aimed at achieving a settlement in Kosovo on
the political track.[204]
The new Strategic Concept therefore has a role much
greater than setting out the mission statement for NATO's military
planners. It must provide the platform from which NATO can seek
to explain itself to Russia—and it cannot begin to do that
if it cannot explain itself to itself.
101. Representatives of the Russian government have
themselves complained that it—
... is kept unaware of even the basic elements of
the drafts [of the new Strategic Concept] discussed,[205]
and that the new Strategic Concept cannot be viewed
as simply an internal Alliance matter,[206]
although the Russian Deputy Defence Minister appeared to suggest
that he had seen a draft. The key issue to be addressed
in the new Strategic Concept as far as Russia is concerned will
be NATO's move towards a more global role. Discussions on its
mandate were a central concern of our interlocutors in Russia.
Russia has expressed 'serious concerns' at the possibility of
NATO extending its global reach 'without any constraint from the
UN Security Council',[207]
and the Russian Ambassador to the UK has stated that NATO's declaration
of its willingness to use force in Kosovo in 1998 was a 'transgression'
of 'the sanctity of international law'.[208]
Discussions of this problem again revealed to us the extent to
which foreign and security policy issues tend to be viewed through
the prism of concerns about domestic policy. We were told by a
high-ranking official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that
"Russia cannot act as a proponent of separatists anywhere
in the world". The reasons were made clear enough—the
fear of secessionist insurrection among the republics of Central
Asia and the North Caucasus is a constant preoccupation of Russian
politicians, and the analogy with Kosovo's demands for independence
seem all too obvious to them.
102. We also found the political situation in Russia
in a state of some flux. As the power of the President wanes,
the power of the Duma (Parliament) is growing, and this is acting
as a brake on reform. The present government is looking increasingly
transitional as the country approaches parliamentary elections
at the end of this year, and presidential elections no later than
the middle of next year.[209]
103. The financial crisis of 1998 may also have weakened,
if not discredited, many of those associated with a 'European
course' in Russia and strengthened those who see Western models
and values as inapplicable to Russian conditions and harmful to
Russia's interests. Although some of these forces have supported
the government of Prime Minister Primakov, we were encouraged
by his representatives' evident recognition that consultation
and cooperation with the West, along with observance of treaty
commitments, remain the most practical means of advancing Russian
interests in the current security environment. However it would
be short-sighted to overlook the possibility that a less reasonable
coalition of forces might gain power in future, and our meetings
with members of the Duma made clear that the forces opposing rapprochement
with NATO certainly predominate in that body.[210]
We were also concerned by some evidence of increasing anti-semitisim
and an at times irrational anxiety about Muslims. Although NATO
appears to be viewed with indifference by the majority of the
Russian people, opposition to its continued existence remains
a potent rallying cry for the forces of reaction.[211]
104. NATO's fundamental interests are that Russia
remains at peace with itself and its neighbours, that it remains
committed to a democratic course and to internationally recognised
standards of human rights, that it sustains its integrity as a
coherent state able to implement arms control and other treaty
commitments and that it continues to develop its relations with
NATO on the basis of consultation, transparency, reciprocity and
equality. Particularly at this critical time of internal difficulty,
we think it important to stress that it is for Russia to decide
how to realise these principles. The challenge for NATO is to
persuade Russia, whatever its government, that it will gain more
from respecting these principles than it will from contravening
them.
105. Russian politicians are inclined to view the
Washington Summit as a triumphalist celebration of a Cold War
victory, and fear that the new Strategic Concept will mark a retreat
from the development of NATO as a political organisation to an
explicit prioritisation of military force as a legitimate instrument
of diplomacy. Their fears should not be dismissed as groundless
and the drafters of the new Strategic Concept would be well-advised
to consider very carefully how they can foreground the principles
of cooperation and negotiation and make clear that the use of
military force in support of political objectives (however worthy
those objectives may be) is a last resort.
106. Enlargement also featured prominently in the
conversation of the politicians we met in Moscow, and in a generally
unfavourable light.[212]
However, our assessment of reactions to the actual accession of
the three new Members (which took place on the very eve of our
arrival) was that it was now accepted, however reluctantly, as
a fait accompli. As one former military officer who is
now a member of the Duma commented, "If a bride swaps one
bridegroom for another, it isn't always clear which is the lucky
one".[213]
But all our interlocutors were agreed on two points—that
the time at which Russia could be reconciled to the accession
of a former constituent parts of the USSR to NATO was a long way
distant, and that anxiety about the approach of NATO's borders
to the western borders of Russia would be greatly increased by
the stationing of foreign forces in the new members' territories.
We have more to say on the first issue in our later section on
enlargement. On the latter point, NATO has already stated that
it has no plan, no intention and no reason to station forces (either
conventional or nuclear) in the new members' territories, and
we see no reason why this commitment should not be embodied in
the new Strategic Concept. However, enforced stationing of
troops in Serbia would make it even more difficult to convince
Russians of NATO's good intentions.
107. During and after the Washington Summit,
NATO will therefore face four major challenges in its relationship
with Russia. The first, in the words of the NATO-Russia Founding
Act, will be to 'give concrete substance' to the Act's provisions
and mechanisms. However, as we learned on our visit, and as is
acknowledged by the Russian Ambassador to the UK—
... both sides approach almost diametrically the
role and place of NATO in the construction of the system of European
security.[214]
The Russian government has not disguised its view
that NATO should evolve into a component of a comprehensive European
security system—
... a united Europe free from dividing lines,[215]
which would give Russia a de facto veto over
the way in which NATO interpreted and honoured its treaty commitments.
Our interlocutors in Moscow repeatedly called for a strengthening
of the prerogatives of the OSCE, whose leading members might form
a European Security Council in all but name.[216]
(As discussed above,[217]
it can be argued that the Contact Group is beginning to take on
this function.) In the longer term, the Russian position is that—
... there should be no closed élite club-type
groups of countries in [the Euro-Atlantic] space.[218]
108. NATO has consistently supported collaboration
with the OSCE, and we support further strengthening of this body,
and it has also been open to measures which would enable that
organisation to play a fuller part in crisis prevention and management,
as well as in post-conflict conciliation. But in the Founding
Act's own terms, which Russia has accepted, the Alliance has also
consistently opposed steps that would 'provide NATO or Russia
in any way with a right of veto over the actions of the other'
or which would 'infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or
Russia to independent decision making and action'.[219]
Russia cannot have it both ways on this question, however. While
it asserts its right to untrammelled freedom of action in establishing
its security mechanisms on its southern and eastern borders,[220]
it seeks to assert a predominant role in Europe's own security
arrangements on its western borders. For its part the Alliance
has never interposed itself in security mechanisms that Russia
and its CIS[221]
partners have established on a voluntary basis.
109. The most practical means of 'giving concrete
substance' to the Founding Act lie in the mechanisms under the
Permanent Joint Council which were beginning to function before
Russia withdrew cooperation with NATO after the start of air strikes
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's armed forces on 24
March. Even so, it was still unclear how many of them were likely
to fulfil their potential. Were these mechanisms to be brought
fully to life following the Washington Summit, they could have
three positive effects. First, they could provide the most effective
means of breaking down stereotypes on both sides (stereotypes
about which our own prejudices were certainly challenged by our
visit) and expanding knowledge of NATO in Russia's security establishment.
They could supplement high level consultation with working relationships
between entities and individuals with 'hands on' responsibility
in areas ranging from law enforcement to defence industry conversion.
Moreover, as a first step to creating a common security culture,
they could create institutional networks with an interest in ensuring
that differences in policy did not lead to estrangement. NATO
has developed a 'bottom-up' security culture, which makes decisions
not only by consensus but for the most part at committee level.
Most of the Russian political élite has yet to appreciate
this, let alone appreciate that the best way to influence NATO
is to participate in it. Dr Irina Isakova writes that—
In some cases the Alliance was too slow to react
to Russian proposals for cooperation,[222]
and this should not recur. If NATO seeks to strengthen
cooperation with Russia, not to say democracy and pluralism within
Russia itself, it must invest as much effort in developing relationships
with institutions as with high level officials.
110. The second major challenge for NATO will
be to exert a positive influence over the development of Russia's
security policy and the direction of its military reform. The
National Security Concept approved by President Yeltsin on 17th
December 1997 is (from a NATO perspective) a broadly positive
document which recognises that—
... the threat of large-scale aggression ¼
is virtually absent in the foreseeable future
and which notes significant opportunities to ensure
Russia's national security by 'non-military means'.[223]
But the characterisation of NATO enlargement as 'a threat to its
national security' is one of many statements which suggest that
there is still a disturbing gap between Western intentions and
Russian perceptions of them. Although Russia's desire to preserve
nuclear deterrence at a time of relative conventional military
weakness is understandable, we are disturbed by a policy which
assigns primacy to nuclear weapons in 'preventing both nuclear
and conventional large-scale or regional wars'. Finally,
we are concerned at the risks that the large number of Russian
'force ministries',[224]
the deterioration in service conditions and training, and the
partial degradation of command-and-control systems might pose
to the management of conflicts.[225]
Russia's military doctrine, the condition of its armed forces,
as well as their employment, will continue to remain important
factors in European security. NATO has compelling reason to support
policies designed to produce militarily effective and defensively
structured armed forces that are firmly controlled by democratic,
civilian authority.
111. On our visit to Moscow we saw one concrete and
small-scale example of the benefits of bilateral cooperation in
this area. We were able to attend the graduation ceremony at a
college outside Moscow[226]
for a number of former military officers who had completed a retraining
conversion course to prepare them for civilian employment. This
was part of a joint German-UK funded initiative, currently funded
by the UK to the tune of £1.2 million per year.[227]
Our reception, and the reactions of the course participants, were
a very vivid demonstration of the immense benefits such programmes
bring in cementing relationships with the ordinary people of Russia,
and demystifying the ogre of NATO as it is presented in much populist
propaganda. We recommend that this programme should continue
to be funded and improved, for example by helping such former
military officers to set up small businesses. It should serve
as a model for other initiatives for practical, grass-roots cooperation
with Russia in resolving the problems of the legacy of the Cold
War.
112. The third and related challenge in a less
certain political climate will be to ensure Russia's continued
adherence to arms limitation, verification and non-proliferation
regimes. Apart from Russia's failure to ratify START II, which
as we saw in Moscow largely reflects disagreement between the
executive and parliament,[228]
there are several areas of concern. First, Russia has taken only
limited steps to implement US-Russian presidential undertakings
to eliminate several categories of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
A May 1998 meeting under the auspices of the PJC failed to provide
any illumination on the disposition of 10,000 to 12,000 weapons
in this category. Second, if the interest expressed by some officials
in developing 'third-generation nuclear weapons' with limited
collateral effects were realised, it would not only raise questions
about Russia's interpretation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
it might have reciprocal effects in the United States, which abandoned
acquisition programmes for new nuclear delivery systems in 1991.
Third, we are concerned by the influence of those inside official
structures as well as outside them who believe that proliferation
of missile technology offers a cost-effective means of expanding
Russian influence and earning much needed foreign currency. We
strongly favour early (albeit much belated) Russian unconditional
ratification of the START II treaty and the early commencement
of START III nuclear disarmament negotiations with the United
States and NATO.
113. In turn, we believe that NATO should not
minimise two areas of concern to Russia. The first is legitimate
frustration at the pace of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) revision.[229]
Again, this was a constant theme of our discussions in Moscow.
Nobody contests the view that the 1991 Treaty has ceased to accord
with military reality. The Founding Act rightly calls for adaptation
'as expeditiously as possible', bearing in mind that the new Treaty-Limited
Equipment ceilings should ensure equal security not only for NATO
and Russia, but for all States Parties, including newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union. We favour early, re-negotiation
of the CFE Treaty limits. The second area of concern is ballistic
missile defence (BMD). The growth of interest in this area, particularly
on the part of the United States, is driven by third-country missile
programmes among potential 'rogue states' rather than by Russia's
force posture. But no matter how often this point is made, we
again heard frequently in Moscow that BMD programmes that appear
to contravene the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty run the risk of
triggering dramatic changes in Russian policy, damaging as those
might be to Russia's own long-term economic interests. Pressures
on NATO to acquire ballistic missile defences and on Russia to
proceed down the path of nuclearisation are likely to grow rather
than diminish. It will require imagination and restraint to respond
to them in ways that do not damage fundamental mutual interests.
114. The fourth challenge will be the maintenance
of cooperation in the Balkans. Whatever agreements are ultimately
reached on the ground, the likelihood is that the region will
remain a zone of instability and of anxiety to both NATO and Russia.
The risk of alienating Russia stems less from divergent geopolitical
interests—although these were much discussed during our
visit to Moscow—than from more internal factors, among the
principal ones being a fear of insurrection within the borders
of Russia. President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Primakov have
therefore opposed the use of force by NATO against Serbia: not
because it might fail to achieve its political end, but because
it will appear to demonstrate to a wider Russian public that NATO's
rhetorical commitment to equality of treatment is not borne out
in practice. We recognise that NATO policy must be influenced
by other considerations as well as these: not only the intrinsic
humanitarian dimensions of the conflict, but the perils which
this conflict poses to a region bordering a long-standing NATO
member, Greece and a new NATO member, Hungary, as well as many
of NATO's Partners.[230]
Forceful measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
will provoke a strong public response from Russia, and NATO should
be prepared to respond with rational argument. The challenge will
be to preserve, behind the scenes, the mutual will to continue
diplomatic cooperation in the Balkans, maintain the integrity
of the Contact Group and continue military cooperation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
115. It must be remembered that, despite their differences,
NATO and Russia have already made much progress together. As the
Russian Ambassador to Britain told us, they have—
... together rid the world community of a heavy burden—the
global confrontation between two opposing political systems which
was the main driving force of the Cold War.[231]
Michael MccGwire has described the dangers inherent
in any breakdown of cooperation; such a breakdown—
... could negate Western attempts to contain conflicts
such as those in the former Yugoslavia. It could bring to a halt
the process of dismantling Russia's nuclear arsenals.[232]
The fundamental interest of both NATO and Russia—lasting
security in the Euro-Atlantic area—remains the same; they
are—
... two separate, balancing entities with a common
interest in stability in Europe,[233]
NATO must ensure that its new Strategic Concept as
well as its policy towards future NATO enlargement are as sensitive
as possible to Russian concerns—
... NATO's policy will have to be formulated flexibly
and with due regard for the evolving situation in Russia.[234]
116. NATO's relations with Russia are constrained
by Russia's internal mood and its attitude to sometimes unrelated
global events. To maintain the maximum influence possible, NATO
will need to give clarity to its policies and goals, especially
when they diverge from Russia's, and develop relationships with
individuals and institutions who see the value in practical, case-by-case
cooperation. This has so far proved difficult in practice, but
NATO must redouble its efforts. NATO action to end the ethnic
cleansing of Kosovo by Serbia will undoubtedly be portrayed by
elements within Russia as a rehearsal for further NATO operations
on the borders of the Russian Federation, or even within it. The
diplomatic effort to persuade Russia that it is not the focus
of an aggressive NATO strategy to further weaken its influence
will become accordingly harder. Even after the air strikes had
begun, however, the Russian government was making positive efforts
to broker a peace deal in Kosovo. The first thing we could do
is to re-emphasise to Russia that it is still welcome to attend
the NATO Summit, and that debate about the Alliance's strategy
in the Balkans is not closed. We express the hope that Russia
will attend the Washington Summit; this would be a powerful boost
to future cooperation. But even if Russia does not, we favour
security cooperation between NATO and Russia being strengthened.
200 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, available on
the Internet at www.mod.uk/policy/nato/enlargement/founding_act.htm Back
201 Ev
p 140 Back
202 Ev
p 120 Back
203 Third
Report, 1997-98, para 34 Back
204 Appeal
by the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation to the Parliaments of the World, 26 March 1999 (unofficial
translation) Back
205 Ev
p 139 Back
206 Statement
by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Munich,
February 1999 Back
207 Ev
p 139 Back
208 Ev
p 139 Back
209 Embassy
briefing, 14 and 15 March 1999 Back
210 Meetings
with Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, The Duma, 15 and 16
March 1999 Back
211 Briefing,
NATO Documentation and Information Centre, Moscow, 16 March 1999 Back
212 Meetings
at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, 15 March
1999 Back
213 Meeting
with Duma Defence Committee, 16 March 1999 Back
214 Ev
p 138 Back
215 Statement
by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Munich,
February 1999 Back
216 Ev
p 139 Back
217 See
para 73 Back
218 Statement
by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Munich,
February 1999 Back
219 NATO-Russia
Founding Act, part II Back
220 Meeting
at HQ of CIS, 16 March 1999 Back
221 Commonwealth
of Independent States Back
222 Relations
with Russia: go slow, don't spoil the illusion,
RUSI Journal Feb/March 1999 Back
223 Russia's
National Security Concept Back
224 Ministries
which control armed forces Back
225 Meeting
at Defence Ministry, 15 March 1999 Back
226 Scholkovo,
17 March 1999 Back
227 MoD
briefing Back
228 Meetings
with Duma Defence Committee and Ministry of Defence, 15 March
1999 Back
229 The
CFE limits certain types of military equipment. It provides for
information exchange and a rigorous inspection regime, with a
Joint Consultative Group made up of state representatives conferring
on any problems. The Treaty's objective is to reduce existing
imbalances in the number of major conventional weapon systems
in Europe so that capabilities for launching a surprise attack
or large-scale offensive are limited. Back
230 QQ
356-359 Back
231 Ev
p 137 Back
232 Ev
p 108 Back
233 Ev
p 120 Back
234 ibid Back
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