Ukraine
117. Ukraine became an independent state and
member of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991.
Since March of this year, it now shares a border with two NATO
members—Hungary and Poland. We visited Kyiv in the immediate
aftermath of their formal accession, where we held discussions
with representatives of the Defence and Foreign ministries, the
National Security and Defence Council and of the Parliament, the
Supreme Rada.
118. The Washington Summit is likely to underscore
the view that Ukraine is a 'pivot' in European security. NATO
not only has a stake in Ukraine's independence and friendship
but, as with Russia, in its beneficial internal development. A
secure and economically successful Ukraine will advance NATO's
security objectives in several key respects.
119. First and foremost are the intrinsic benefits
of stability in a country bordering two NATO members,[235]
as well as two other Partnership countries who have applied for
membership.[236]
Second and almost as important, a Ukraine achieving its official
goal of 'full integration' into Europe is likely to have a beneficial
effect on Russia, strengthening those who believe in the feasibility
of a European course. Furthermore, a Ukraine moving closer to
NATO also has the potential to reinforce Turkey's role in NATO
and the wider security of the region.
120. Perhaps the greatest contribution made
by Ukraine to European security was the country's unilateral nuclear
disarmament, codified by the US-Russia-Ukraine Tripartite Agreement
of January 1994, which led to the removal of the last of over
500 tactical and 1,600 strategic nuclear warheads by June 1996.[237]
Ukraine has acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as
a non-nuclear state. It was the first country of the former Soviet
Union to join Partnership for Peace,[238]
and has conducted over 100 exercises under PfP and 'within the
spirit of PfP'. Although the June 1996 Constitution enshrines
the country's neutrality, the Ukraine government has been generally
supportive of NATO's enlargement, and its November 1998 State
Programme of Cooperation with NATO categorises NATO 'as the most
effective structure of collective security in Europe'. Ukraine
has also taken comprehensive steps to develop 'strategic partnerships'—and
resolve border disputes and minority problems—with neighbours,
most recently with Romania.[239]
We pay warm tribute to Ukraine for all these significant actions.
121. On the front of civil reform within Ukraine,
there has recently been some erosion of economic progress. There
has been an increase in its indebtedness, and criminality and
corruption in the economic sphere remains a problem. The government
has yet to establish, let alone entrench, a civic and legal culture
and degree of transparency conducive to effective state authority,
open market relations and improved living conditions.[240]
Ukraine's National Security Concept[241]
expresses the view that these problems might, in combination,
constitute a threat to Ukraine's security. While on our visit
we discovered very positive attitudes towards NATO and Europe
among representatives of the government,[242]
there are those who express concern at the growing influence of
those who perceive some kind of 'union' with Russia as the solution
to Ukraine's problems. If their influence grows (and it was apparent
amongst some of the parliamentarians we met), NATO may find that
its policies carry less weight than they have in the past.
122. Ukraine's security and defence establishment
is, as we discovered, vastly more pro-Western than its Russian
counterpart, and has institutionalised cooperation in ways that
will be difficult to reverse. The NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive
Partnership,[243]
signed in Madrid on 9 July 1997, builds upon a web of cooperation
which already existed. This cooperation is strengthened by the
bilateral UK-Ukraine MoD Programme of Cooperation, second in scale
only to that maintained between Ukraine and the United States.[244]
But NATO must ensure that its programmes address Ukraine's specific
security needs and that they are seen to do so. Three areas are
possibly in need of even greater attention than they have received.
123. First, more needs to be done in helping
Ukraine rationalise its national security system. As the Deputy
Defence Minister reminded us, in 1991 Ukraine did not inherit
an army, but a force grouping—without a Defence Ministry,
General Staff or central organs of command-and-control.[245]
Since then, Ukraine has made enormous progress, not only in 'reforming'
an army, but creating one. The National Security and Defence Council—that
part of the Presidential administration that 'coordinates and
controls the activity of executive bodies in the sphere of national
security and defence' and whose Secretary we met in Kyiv—is
staffed and led by individuals who understand the importance of
creating not only a system of democratic, civilian control, but
a transparent system of planning, programming and defence budgeting.[246]
The Ministry of Defence and General Staff whom we met also appeared
to recognise the need for further reform, if somewhat reluctant
to surrender more control to civilians. These efforts, however,
are still at a relatively rudimentary stage and have yet to be
reinforced by consistent political direction, competent parliamentary
oversight and in-depth civilian expertise. Moreover, in Ukraine
as in Russia, there has been a worrying proliferation of 'force
ministries' and insufficient coordination between them. As a Partner
and sovereign state, it is of course up to Ukraine to define the
form and level of cooperation that suits its interests. Nevertheless,
we hope that the Working Group on Defence Reform established under
the Distinctive Partnership will define clear objectives in this
area.
124. Second, NATO has made only sporadic attempts
to meet concerns about defence industry conversion and the retraining
of retired and decommissioned servicemen. In this area as in the
other two, we doubt whether high-level meetings and conferences
will produce results on their own. Even if on a small scale and
within modest budgetary outlays, cooperation should be continuous,
conducted at working level and on site. What matters is to create
models of success which Ukrainians can build upon, and the example
which we experienced in Russia[247]
serves as an excellent model to be pursued in Ukraine.
125. The third factor is Ukraine-NATO cooperation
in Civil Emergency Planning first instituted in 1992. Since then
cooperation has expanded to include a Memorandum Of Understanding
on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness, the NATO-Ukraine
Working Group on Civil Emergency Planning, the appointment of
a representative from the Ministry of Emergency Situations to
the Ukrainian Mission to NATO, the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic
Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a number of crisis management
exercises. To a country still suffering the effects of the Chernobyl
catastrophe (and which devotes more resources to Chernobyl than
to any single item in its state budget), the issue has profound
psychological as well as practical importance. It is also of direct
importance to national security. Ukraine's National Security Concept
identifies ecological factors as one of six 'main potential threats'
which individually or in combination could endanger the state.
We believe there are other countries in Central and Eastern Europe
which face similar problems and perceive that in this field Ukraine
has at least as much to teach as it has to learn.
126. Finally, there is an area of development which
lies somewhat outside the focus of this Report and of our area
of concern, but which we believe deserves mention. All the valuable
efforts which NATO has made to integrate Ukraine into stable European
security arrangements could be vitiated if we fail to assist Ukraine
to become a prosperous, free-enterprise economy. Our self-interest
and our moral obligations coincide here. As we stated above, Chernobyl
remains a massive drain on Ukraine's resources. That legacy is
no fault of the present government or people of Ukraine, and we
should not forget their heroic efforts to mitigate the potential
world-wide effects of the disaster, or the terrible legacy with
which they still have to deal. We heard on our visit their perception
of the failure of the EU or other institutions to support their
moves to close the other reactors at Chernobyl and build replacement
power stations. We believe the failure to support this and other
areas of Ukraine's economic development is unwise. NATO-Ukraine
cooperation risks being vitiated by the widespread perception
in Ukraine that international economic aid has been miserly.
127. We were told on our visit to Kyiv, several
times in different words, that Ukraine does not share Russia's
geopolitical and strategic interests.[248]
Its government does not accept that Russia has a zone of interest
distinct from NATO's, which must allow it to be the predominant
power in the Baltics, Central and Eastern Europe and the Transcaucasus.
A speech by the Secretary of the National Security and Defence
Council to a NATO Conference which took place during our visit
to Kyiv, sums up this position—
... the door of the Alliance should remain open for
all countries that express the wish to join it ... In Washington
we should receive a clear signal that the former Soviet Republics
along with former Warsaw Pact members should not be left alone
with the problems of providing for their own security ... Ukraine
welcomes development of the dialogue between Russia and NATO ...
At the same time, we are genuinely surprised that an influential
part of the Russian political elite, while declaring their support
for developing cooperation between the Russian Federation and
NATO, is trying with all their might to obstruct developing relations
of the Alliance with the other CIS countries, and primarily with
Ukraine ... We view such an approach as a glaring example of a
'double standard' policy towards Ukraine and NATO that is aimed
not at cooperation but rather at confrontation ... Development
of cooperation with the Alliance is based primarily on Ukraine's
desire to ensure its independence, democratic development and
territorial integrity, to strengthen external guarantees for national
security, and to counteract the emergence of new threats to peace
and stability in the Central and East European region, of which
it is an inseparable part ... In this connection, it should be
noted that there has been no instance on the part of NATO or its
member states of a hint of any territorial claims on Ukraine.
At the same time we are all witnesses to the recurrent claims
on the part of some politicians from the fraternal Slavic nation
and our strategic partner—the Russian Federation. Consequently,
the leadership of Ukraine cannot but take these factors into account
in formulating the country's foreign policy course ... Ukraine's
cooperation with NATO is therefore in line with the strategic
course of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures
... though Ukraine is not now raising the issue of joining NATO,
it reserves the right ... to become a member of any military-political
structure ... The decision to join any military-political structure,
including NATO, is an inalienable right of any nation, and nobody
can veto this sovereign right. Attempts to draw new 'red line'
spheres of influence across the map of Europe ... are unacceptable.
But it is committed to working with Russia. Mr Horbulin
went on to say in the same speech—
... It goes without saying that Ukraine's European
and Euro-Atlantic integration can in no way can be conducted at
the expense of narrowing mutually beneficial cooperation with
the Russian Federation ... The Ukrainian-Russian relationship
is an important component of European security architecture, and
its status affects the stability of the entire European continent.
We believe that all of Europe would benefit from
a close, growing relationship between the Russian Federation and
a secure and independent Ukraine. But it is also clear from our
visits to Moscow and Kyiv that this relationship is likely to
remain problematic. The 1998 financial crisis has been exploited,
even within parts of Russia's government, to raise hopes that
a Slavic Union of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus is a realistic prospect.
As we found in Kyiv, these views exist in Ukraine as well, but
even a communist-led government might be cautious in advancing
them too far, given the attachment of much of the population to
Ukrainian sovereignty and the strength of national feeling in
the country as a whole.[249]
Russia's own internal problems have meant that, the last 12 months
have been a time of retreat after a period of potential breakthroughs
in relations, which culminated in the Inter-Governmental Accords
on the Black Sea Fleet, the Interstate Treaty of Friendship and
Partnership, the lifting of double taxation on Ukrainian goods
and the respective visits of the two state Presidents. NATO
must approach the Ukraine-Russia relationship with subtlety and
discretion. Nevertheless we should leave no doubt that Russia's
respect for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity is
not a bilateral matter, but a fundamental interest of the Alliance
and a requirement of international law.
128. NATO established close partnership relations
with Ukraine not because of developments in Russia, but because
Ukraine was ready for them; similarly the UK-Ukraine Bilateral
Programme had reached a high level of activity well before a bilateral
programme with Russia was established. Nonetheless, the Kosovo
crisis may complicate the NATO-Ukraine relationship, although
we hope its negative effects will persist only in the short term.
A government which has loudly trumpeted the peacefulness and defensiveness
of NATO is bound to feel vulnerable about expanding cooperation
at a time when official opinion in Russia is outraged and public
opinion in Ukraine is shaken. Ironically, it is pro-NATO opinion—understandably
the most attached to the principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the most wary of those who might use 'human rights'
as a justification to abridge them and the most conscious of a
separatist challenge within Ukraine's own borders (Crimea)—who
will be the most apprehensive about NATO's action, even if anti-NATO
opinion will be the most angered by it. Nonetheless, NATO must
not subsume its relations with Ukraine to considerations of Russia's
position. Any attempt to link progress in NATO's relationship
with Ukraine to progress with Russia would insult Ukraine's independent
status, diminish Western influence and undo much of what has been
achieved. If problems arise in this relationship, they should
reflect the problems of the relationship, not the difficulties
of a third country.
129. One of our interlocutors in Kyiv described 'Natoisation'
of Ukraine as a prelude to membership of the EU. He told us that
NATO had "changed in its essence" in the last decade,
and placed its development firmly in the context of the PfP and
the EAPC, the OSCE and the WEU (of which Ukraine is an associate,
as well as being a member of the Council of Europe) as representing
a growing European Security and Defence Identity.[250]
It is in this context of the web of cooperation which underpins
security and stability in the new Europe that NATO's relationship
with Ukraine must be developed. Ukraine is at present a contributor
to security in the region, rather than a consumer. We must be
prepared to ensure that it remains so, and improved NATO-Ukraine
relations are essential for this to continue.
235 Poland and Hungary Back
236 Romania
and Slovakia Back
237 Meeting
at National Security and Defence Council, 18 March 1999 Back
238 on
8 February, 1994 Back
239 Meeting
at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 March 1999 Back
240 Meeting
with Presidential Administration, Foreign Affairs Department,
18 March 1999 Back
241 January
1997 Back
242 Meeting
with National Security and Defence Council, 18 March 1999 Back
243 Charter
on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and Ukraine, available on the Internet at www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm Back
244 Embassy
Briefings, 17 March 1999 Back
245 Meeting
at Ministry of Defence, 19 March 1999 Back
246 Meeting
with Mr Horbulin, 18 March 1999 Back
247 See
para 111 Back
248 Meetings
in Kyiv, 18 and 19 March 1999 Back
249 Meeting
with Rada Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees, 18 March 1999 Back
250 Meeting
at National Security and Defence Council, 18 March 1999 Back
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