NATO'S three new members
137. In the intervening period, between invitation
and accession, both NATO and the three invited countries have
been focussing their efforts on bringing the countries' military
and political structures up to the required NATO standard. As
previously discussed, the three invitees will not—as originally
envisaged—formally accede to NATO during the Washington
Summit itself, but have already completed the protocols and became
full members of the Alliance on 12th March 1999. The efforts of
NATO's three latest members to enter the Alliance as producers,
rather than mere consumers, of security have been commendable
and more substantial than we might have expected in the time available.
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have not only reduced the
size of their military establishments (as mandated by the CFE
Treaty), they have changed force postures and deployments, reformed
systems of training and education and made substantial progress
in producing the legislative framework required to make democratic,
civilian control a reality. They are also contributing assets
and facilities of direct importance to NATO's new, wider security
and peace-support functions—especially in the case of Hungary
which, at some risk to itself, has offered valuable host country
transit, logistics and training support for IFOR and SFOR.
138. We visited Hungary during the course of this
inquiry and found that Hungary's achievements in its preparations
for NATO membership have so far been impressive: a mostly civilian
Defence Ministry has been created and the Army is being restructured.
However, we heard that major problems remain with command and
control and logistics. There is a serious equipment shortfall;
the Army still relies on conscripts; and there may be a problem
with IT interoperability of high-level systems. Pilots achieve
well under the NATO standard of 200 hours' annual flying time.
We were told that one of the major problems faced by the three
invitees is lack of proficiency in speaking English among military
and civilian personnel: in Hungary's case, perhaps 1000 of its
50,000-strong armed forces have reasonable English, with a further
300 fluent.
139. There is little doubt that there remain shortfalls
in the capabilities of all three states (many of which will not
have been resolved by the time of the Washington Summit in any
case). As the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee has stated—
The three invitees have the double requirement to
achieve interoperability with the rest of the Alliance and to
upgrade their forces as necessary. These challenges are significant
and will not be resolved prior to ratification ... I would anticipate
it will take us a couple of years before the issue of interoperability
is largely resolved, while equipment upgrades may take considerably
longer.[258]
One of our witnesses suggested that it may take fifteen
years or longer, rather than the ten envisaged by the 'general
western view', to modernise the invitees' armed forces.[259]
We were told at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
that one of the lessons learned from this enlargement was that
a two year preparation period was required to get a country in
synch with the Alliance's Force Planning Process. This would suggest
that the next round of enlargement should not take place before
2001 at the earliest. We outlined in our previous Report that
this round of enlargement was based on political rather than military
considerations,[260]
and it remains the case, as stated in that Report, that NATO's
military effectiveness can only, in the short term at least, be
diluted by this enlargement.
140. Yet there should be no doubt that the principal
challenges are not those that have been faced, but those that
lie ahead. Only since the Madrid summit has it become thoroughly
clear to the invited countries that NATO is not a substitute for
national defence policy, but a framework for it and that far from
removing pressure for change, membership will both intensify and
institutionalise it. To date, none of the three new members possess
armed forces and national security systems which are wholly NATO
compatible. There have tended to be inconsistent, rather than
coherent and sustained, efforts to connect the first principles
of national defence with detailed programmes of force development
and institutional reform. Military establishments have not felt
at ease with themselves, confident of their place in the new democratic
order or genuinely valued by it. Unsurprisingly, the armed forces
have had difficulty recruiting and retaining talented officers
and building up a corps of proficient NCOs.[261]
Resource constraints, certain to continue,[262]
have only exacerbated these problems, but they are secondary to
the problems themselves. Despite these deficiencies, we have
been most impressed by the will shown by the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland since the Madrid summit to address deficiencies and
by the progress achieved. But it would be unrealistic to expect
the integration of new members to be either rapid or straightforward.
141. In our Report of last year, we conducted an
analysis of the various studies that had been made on the costs
of NATO enlargement, for the Alliance as a whole and for the individual
invitees.[263]
These estimated the total cost of enlargement at anything between
$1.5 billion and $125 billion, albeit with differing risk assessments,
definitions of costs and timespans. NATO's official study of December
1997, written after the decision to take on the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland was made, estimated the cost to Allies at $1.5
billion over ten years. This figure did not include the costs
payable by new members for modernising their armed forces. According
to the MoD—
A further assessment of the resource implications
of accession was included in the report on the Alliance's medium-term
resource plan, noted by Defence Ministers at their meeting in
June 1998; this confirmed the Alliance's earlier assessment that
Alliance costs associated with accession would be manageable.[264]
We note that the debate on the costs of enlargement
has been somewhat subdued in recent months; however, we are pleased
to see that NATO is continuing to update its analysis and hope
that the implications of its studies and their correlation with
reality will be taken into account as the Alliance contemplates
further enlargement. However, we remain disappointed that NATO
has not made publicly available, as we have requested,[265]
declassified versions of its studies on the financial and military
implications of enlargement.[266]
258 An Evolving NATO in an Evolving World-Revisited,
General Klaus Naumann, in NATO's 16 Nations Special Issue 1998 Back
259 Ev
p 96 Back
260 Third
Report, 1997-98, op cit, para 44 Back
261 Ev
p 99 Back
262 ibid Back
263 Third
Report, 1997-98, paras 53-88 Back
264 Ev
p 91 Back
265 Third
Special Report, Session 1997-98, NATO Enlargement: The Draft
Visiting Forces and International Headquarters (Application of
Law) (Amendment) Order 1998, HC 903, para 4 Back
266 Ev
p 118 Back
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