House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Third Report

Future Enlargement

THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOR ENLARGEMENT

146. After the 1994 Brussels Summit, at which NATO committed itself to accepting new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, a study on the 'how and why' (rather than the 'who and when') questions surrounding enlargement was commissioned.[268] Following the study's publication, twelve countries entered into bilateral discussions with NATO. All twelve stated their wish to join NATO at the earliest opportunity. At the Madrid Summit in 1997, NATO not only invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession negotiations, but recommitted the Alliance to an 'open door' policy regarding further enlargement.

147. Since the Madrid Summit, the nine disappointed candidates—Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia—have continued their dialogue with NATO in the hope of being invited to join in a future round of enlargement. It now seems likely that there will not be a concrete demonstration of the 'open door' policy at the Washington Summit, and that no new invitations to join the Alliance will be issued; nor will there be—

... earmarking of any individual country or any particular time-frame for the next round of accessions.[269]

This is partly to ease the problems of 'digesting' the three new Allies, and partly to prevent any perception that the Summit is 'about enlargement'—which is also one of the reasons for the early accession of the three invitees. Such a perception could damage NATO-Russia relations, and would certainly make attendance at the Summit difficult for Russia.

148. There appears to be little internal consensus within the Alliance about the scope or timing of future enlargement beyond the acknowledgement that it will not occur at Washington; Dr Jonathan Eyal informed us that—

It is difficult to see how a new consensus could be created for another enlargement in a few years, how the US Congress could be persuaded to ratify another wave, and how the Russians could be persuaded that, yet again, this should not threaten their interests.[270]

However, nine self-declared candidate countries continue to knock at NATO's door, and they will not remain satisfied indefinitely without proof that that door really is open.

149. The only criteria for candidacy for NATO are that countries must be European, and that they must declare themselves as candidates. So it is no surprise that among the nine remaining candidates, varying levels of suitability for membership can be seen. In terms of military capability and civilian control; stable democracy; progress towards a market economy; respect for human rights; resolution of border disputes and problems with minority groups—all unofficial preconditions for NATO membership—each candidate displays different degrees of attainment. It is, of course, also the case that existing members of NATO display some variation in their achievements against each of these standards, and we would do well to remind some of our Allies from time to time of the need to set the highest standards against these criteria if we are to justify NATO's moral right to pick and choose its members. Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are regularly discussed as the three top candidates—despite those countries' desires for their aspirations to be decoupled. The Baltic states are similarly linked,[271] but dogged by Russia's declaration that—

It is an open secret that if any one of these states is enticed into NATO we shall have to reconsider our relations with the Alliance.[272]

Professor Michael MccGwire informed us that—

... while Moscow sees the inclusion of Warsaw Pact members in NATO as a breach of trust, these countries are in no way comparable to the former Republics of the Soviet Union.[273]

150. While not accepting that Russia should have a veto on NATO policy, we feel that the current rapprochement between NATO and Russia, which was shaken but not destroyed by the Madrid Declaration, should not be jeopardised at this juncture. One witness pointed out the 'almost universal Russian resentment' over NATO enlargement.[274] During our visit to Moscow we found that this resentment, in relation to the three new members, had become more muted, and was relatively relaxed in relation to other Central and Eastern European former Warsaw Pact countries. The 'line in the sand' that could not be crossed for most Russians was the accession of countries which had formerly been part of the USSR.

151. The UK government's position on further enlargement is that it—

... supports further enlargement when the Allies collectively judge that further invitations would strengthen European security and the Alliance itself.[275]

When considering candidates for NATO membership we stand by our statement that it is NATO's military effectiveness that makes the Alliance—

... unique and uniquely valuable as a guarantor of security.[276]

We would not wish to see the Alliance's military effectiveness jeopardised by future enlargements. Certainly it is the case that few, if any, of the candidate countries could add to NATO's military effectiveness at present. And few would deny that, for example, Albania and FYROM are further away from NATO membership than many of their rivals.[277] But without dismissing the importance of military capability, we also note that NATO has never been a partnership of equals,[278] and that political considerations can prevail over military ones in the overall quest for security in the Euro-Atlantic area. In our Report last year, we concluded that for NATO's previous enlargement—

... the benefits of increased stability in central and eastern Europe outweigh any potential military costs.[279]

152. We are still open to the idea of any enlargement that will increase security in the Euro-Atlantic area. However, NATO is not faced with the same situation now as it was at Madrid in 1997. At that time, there were three or four candidates who stood head and shoulders above the others, and, while debate on who to admit was "considerable",[280] the outcome was by no means a surprise. Today, NATO would face several problems if it were to embark upon a further round of enlargement straight away. Not least of those is that, as discussed above, a great deal of work has yet to be done with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland before they attain NATO standards in many areas, and further enlargement might disrupt this process.

153. A further consideration is that, were there to be further invitations issued at Washington, some candidate states would be in the unhappy position of having been rejected twice, which could have serious internal repercussions—particularly, perhaps, for those countries which are also experiencing rejection from the European Union.[281] For Romania, we were told, success with its NATO application was expected to alleviate the pain of economic reform,[282] and its 'failure' at Madrid created bitter disappointment and a rising cynicism about the West. NATO is certainly now aware of the need to manage expectations and stress that enlargement is a long-term process.[283]

154. We believe that the realities of the current round of enlargement must be taken into account when weighing up the complex issues connected with the further enlargement of the Alliance. To invite additional members into NATO at a time when its resources were already overstrained would not enhance the security of the Alliance or of Europe as a whole. Moreover, rushing the pace of integration could dangerously overstrain resources in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland themselves, possibly putting at risk the economic successes they have achieved. While NATO's future might still be seen to be in a state of flux, we stand by our comment that—

It is certainly appropriate that NATO's future Strategic Concept should be thoroughly debated and agreed before any further commitments to enlargement are made.[284]

For these reasons, we believe that further enlargement in the near term should be approached with caution. Further enlargement should be based on an assessment of the benefits and costs for both existing and potential new members. The benefits of enlargement could include increased stability and security, as well as the beneficial effects on burden-sharing created by the addition of new members; costs that could fall to either existing or new members, or both, include infrastructure and force modernisation costs as well as the difficulties of decision-taking in a larger Alliance.

155. But ruling it out altogether or delaying it indefinitely would have unsettling effects throughout the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, and would be seen as a serious political setback to democratic reformers in the candidate countries, for whom NATO membership is of immense symbolic importance. NATO must, therefore, come up with a 'Madrid plus' package to satisfy the candidate states. It is already working towards such a package; the final communiqué of the December 1998 ministerial[285] stated that the ministerial group had—

... tasked the Council in Permanent Session to develop for the Washington Summit a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process, operationalise our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards.

268 The Study on NATO Enlargement, available on the Internet at www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm Back

269 Q 72 Back

270 Ev p 100 Back

271 See Third Report, Session 1997-98, op cit para 93 Back

272 Ev p 138 Back

273 Ev p 112 Back

274 Ev p 112 Back

275 Ev p 91 Back

276 Third Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para 43 Back

277 ibid, para 92 Back

278 Ev p 109 Back

279 Third Report, Session 1997-98, op cit, para 52 Back