A 'MADRID PLUS' PACKAGE
156. We visited three of the candidate countries—Bulgaria,
Romania and Slovenia—during the course of our inquiry.[286]
In each case we were impressed by the strength of desire to become
full Alliance members, the political commitment towards this aim,
and the progress that had been made in areas such as reform of
the military.
157. We learned in Bulgaria that its armed forces
were still oversized and under- equipped. However, it appears
to be politically stable and its government has embarked upon
an ambitious reform programme, covering financial and military
reform. The Bulgarians suggested to us that NATO should look less
at the political or military aspects of inviting it to join, but
should concentrate on strategic issues. Bulgaria's accession to
NATO, it was argued, would represent a commitment from NATO to
the stabilisation of south eastern Europe. While politicians seemed
confident that full membership would eventually be bestowed on
Bulgaria, they were not complacent; yet the military seemed to
us somewhat less committed to, and realistic about, NATO.
158. Romania's military have been active PfP Partners,
and have a track record of participation in multinational operations.
Their level of cooperation with the UK military is considerable
and appeared to us to have borne fruit. However, the political
background gives somewhat less cause for confidence, with the
possibility of future instability. Also, as a recent report by
the European Commission[287]
showed, the economy has gone into reverse in the last eighteen
months, which must put pressure on Romania's ability to finance
military reform.
159. Slovenia is half-way through its two year tenure
on the UN Security Council. Its performance has been seen as competent,
and as a result it has perhaps a stronger international reputation
than any of the other candidates. Its army is small and mainly
conscript, but it has undertaken many PfP exercises, including
hosting one, and the government is in the process of drawing up
a long-term defence plan, with the emphasis on interoperability
and military restructuring. Slovenian politicians were keen to
stress the strength of the Slovenian democracy and economy, and
the strategic importance of their country both as a physical 'bridge'
between NATO and Hungary and as having a unique insight into the
crises in the former Yugoslavia.
160. While the Committee did not visit Slovakia,
we took evidence from the Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs.[288]
The Chairman's separate visits to the country, which involved
discussion of accession prospects with a number of politicians
and officials, confirmed our impression of the conspicuous progress
made there since the end of the Meciar government.
161. Each country seemed to have a realistic assessment
of the likelihood of formal invitations to membership being forthcoming
at Washington; but each stressed the importance of NATO's 'open
door' policy being demonstrated to be more than simply words.
They were similarly emphatic that the Summit should do more than
simply reiterate the Madrid formula, which encouraged interested
countries to increase their participation in the EAPC and PfP,
committed NATO to continuing its intensified dialogue with candidates,
and recognised and took account of—
... the positive developments towards democracy and
the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries,
singling out Romania and Slovenia for particular
praise.[289] Ideally,
it was suggested to us by the Romanian Deputy Minister of Defence,
the 'open door' policy should be reaffirmed, but should be accompanied
by practical as well as symbolic steps. The Summit, we were told,
should set out a 'road map' for entry into NATO, define milestones
along it and offer practical assistance in attaining those milestones;
and that any criteria for membership should not be set higher
than those for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These arguments
were restated by many of our interlocutors in all three countries,
as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Slovakia when he gave evidence to us.[290]
The Bulgarian National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee suggested
that Washington should produce an invitation to start negotiations
while possibly deferring the start to a date to be fixed. The
Slovenian Foreign Minster hoped for, at the very least, a stronger
statement on Slovenia's chances than that of Madrid. When we visited
Hungary, then an invitee, the Hungarians (despite their privileged
position) were also keen on NATO articulating the possibility
of further membership at Washington; the Defence Minister told
us that he hoped for a further round within the next three years.
(One witness, Humphry Crum Ewing, suggested to us that the three
new members would be much more vociferous advocates for further
enlargement once they attained full membership.)[291]
162. The pressure from candidates leaves NATO with
a rather uncomfortable problem to confront at the Washington Summit.
As the US Defense Secretary has said, the—
... open door is at the top of a very steep flight
of stairs.[292]
NATO is neither ready nor willing to invite further
candidates this Spring. Some of the self-declared candidates are
further up the staircase than others, yet any preferential treatment
may cause friction where NATO most wishes to promote stability.
However, to deny the progress that many candidates have made,
and to rebuff their hopes of an early accession to the Alliance
may cause just as many problems.
163. A further problem faced by NATO is that its
Madrid Declaration singled out Romania and Slovenia for especial
praise. Romania has now asked for the Washington Summit to produce
a—
... differentiated listing of the eligible aspirants,
starting with Romania and Slovenia.[293]
And the Slovakian Foreign Minister hoped for "some
signal, some recognition" of Slovakia's chances, stating
that the worst outcome would be if Slovakia was not mentioned
at all.[294] Hence,
as Sir Michael Alexander put it,
...the Alliance faces an awkward choice between disappointing
Romania and Slovenia if it fails to indicate some kind of preference
for their candidatures ... and disappointing eg. Bulgaria, Slovakia
and Lithuania if it does do so.[295]
The Policy Director at the MoD told us that NATO
was attempting to,
... produce a formula which does make it clear that
there is a continuing process, a continuing expectation, but without
making any rash promises or divisive language between one country
and another.[296]
This will certainly be difficult. One thing that
we are convinced of is that there must be no champions—particular
Allies unwilling to accept any enlargement that does not include
their favoured candidates—and no 'beauty contest' among
the aspirant members. NATO must make the criteria upon which membership
will be offered clear and intelligible, without offering any guarantee
of automatic membership, and offer candidates assistance in meeting
those criteria where appropriate. Now is the time for practical
measures rather than rhetoric.
164. The Alliance is already trying to reduce the
pressure for membership among the candidates and other non-members
by offering them a variety of ways of cooperating with NATO, short
of formally admitting them to the Alliance or of extending Article
5 guarantees to them. The measures are channelled particularly
through the individual partnership agreements in the framework
of PfP (enhanced PfP), which range from cooperation and advice
on the restructuring of military industry, defence ministries
and armed forces, budget management and defence planning in the
widest sense to individually tailored joint exercises and the
integration of Partnership staff elements into NATO's military
structure. Partners are involved in many NATO exercises and are
informed of NATO planning and decisions. While this is not expressly
articulated, these measures are designed to blur the differences
between full NATO membership and Partnership, so as to give many
of the Partners the benefits of many forms of associations with
NATO short of the coverage by Article 5.
165. Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC)—which offers cooperation and
dialogue between NATO and other states in areas such as peacekeeping
training, the security aspects of economic development and regional
security issues—have been two of NATO's greatest successes.
They have extended stability outside the territory of NATO's members
and provided valuable opportunities for cooperation between NATO
and other European nations both within and outwith the defence
arena. Without the work done under the auspices of these programmes,
the three new members of NATO would not be able to contribute
nearly as much as they can to the Alliance.
166. During the course of this inquiry, we visited
the SHAPE Partnership Cooperation Cell, which coordinates Partners'
interoperability with NATO structures and the initial planning
of training and exercises, and were impressed by the obvious enthusiasm
and professionalism of those working there. We were told during
our visit that Partner nations do not necessarily take up all
the assistance and cooperation that are offered to them, for a
variety of reasons. Under PfP, each Partner nation has an Individual
Partnership Programme, but we believe that further tailoring of
PfP to individual Partners' requirements is required. Also important
is 'tough love' for the Partners, with rigorous and credible external
assessment of their achievements and shortfalls.
167. The effectiveness of the Alliance's 'Madrid
plus' package must be one criterion on which the success of the
Washington Summit is to be judged. As Dr Jonathan Eyal told us—
... how to phrase this promise in such a way that
it offers concrete advantages to potential new members while not
committing the West to any new obligations is now the biggest
immediate problem.[297]
Suggestions for such a package apparently include
increased feedback, advice and assistance, the promotion of transparency
within the aspirant countries' militaries and attempts to maximise
the impact of bilateral relations with Allied states. However,
it seems that the Alliance will avoid giving any undertaking of
automatic membership when any criteria set had been met.
168. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
suggested that the 'Madrid plus' package should take the form
of a 'Membership Action Plan', leading to an 'Upgraded Individual
Dialogue' which would focus on—
- designing a specific accession-preparation strategy
meant to cover all the dimensions of the process (political, economic,
military etc.);
- establishing a well-defined mechanism for progress
evaluation;
- singling out the areas where assistance and closer
cooperation are needed for the attainment of the Membership Action
Plan's goals;
- coordinating other tracks of the aspirant's relationship
with the Alliance, such as PfP.[298]
We applaud many of Romania's points. However, while
we would encourage NATO to come up with a 'Madrid plus' package
that will effectively aid aspirant members, NATO is not the appropriate
forum for economic and political assistance. Other organisations
exist for these purposes; NATO is however the only organisation
which can encourage interoperability, civilian control of the
military and the reform of the armed forces, all extremely important
tasks for candidate states. A 'Madrid plus' package for membership
candidates should include clear targets in those areas and strategies
for achieving them in collaboration with the Alliance.
169. We are far from persuaded that membership
will benefit the security of every state seeking to join the Alliance.
But if doors are closed, the possibilities of finding constructive
alternatives will be diminished, if not lost. On the other hand,
we fear that 'waves' of enlargement or strict timetables will
only exacerbate division, rivalry and insecurity. It is our belief
that further enlargement should be limited, gradual and conducted
on a case-by-case basis.
170. We also believe that the attitude of
Russia—and the security of Ukraine—are factors that
must be taken into account. To accept that we must either
give Russia a veto, or alternatively refuse to consider its interests
and likely responses would demonstrate a deficiency of imagination
and statesmanship. Although still opposing NATO's present enlargement,
Russia has accepted it, and it has done so on terms which have
not destroyed but, thanks to the Founding Act, have enhanced NATO-Russia
cooperation.
171. Finally, we believe that NATO should be attentive
to, and engaged in, the debate about EU enlargement.[299]
We perceive a serious prospect that the respective enlargements
of NATO and the European Union could proceed at cross purposes.
In Partnership for Peace, NATO devised a mechanism that has been
softening the distinction between members and partners. In contrast,
the aim of the EU is not to lower barriers between members and
non-members, but to deepen the integration of members. The Schengen
agreement, binding upon any state that now accedes, has multiplied
concerns in Central and Eastern Europe that an expanding EU could
establish the dreaded 'new dividing lines' whose creation NATO
has so studiously avoided. The risk is compounded by the tendency
for officials with NATO and EU responsibilities to work in separate
compartments. It is time that the perennial NATO-WEU-EU dialogue
about Collective Defence became a broader dialogue about the enlargement
of the Western security community, and the security of the whole
of Europe.
286 See Annexes A and B; the Chairman also visited Slovakia
on two separate occasions to discuss enlargement issues with politicians
and officials Back
287 Composite
Paper: Reports on progress towards accession by each of the
candidate countries, 4.11.98. Available on the Internet at
europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/enlarge/report_11_98_en/index.htm Back
288 QQ
157-187 Back
289 Madrid
Declaration on EuroAtlantic Security and Cooperation,
available on the Internet at www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97081e.htm Back
290 Q
157 Back
291 Ev
p 96 Back
292 US,
Germany iron out NATO nuclear differences,
Reuters, 8 February 1999 Back
293 Ev
p 140 Back
294 Q
162 Back
295 Ev
p 122 Back
296 Q
75 Back
297 Ev
p 102 Back
298 Ev
p 140 Back
299 See
also Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report, Session 1998-99,
European Union Enlargement, HC 86 Back
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