CONCLUSIONS: THE CHALLENGES OF THE WASHINGTON
SUMMIT
172. NATO, as it approaches its 50th anniversary
Summit, has much to congratulate itself on. Despite the demise
of its seeming raison d'être at the close of the
Cold War, it has continued to be relevant, even increasingly so,
in the 1990s, as demonstrated by the eagerness of many central
and eastern European states to become members. It has taken on
new roles and missions, and re-emphasised its diplomatic and political
functions. These functions, as the US Deputy Secretary of State
told a recent conference, are not wholly new—
Our Alliance has always had broader political functions.
During the 1950s, it provided the security umbrella under which
reconciliation between France and Germany could take place, thus
laying the foundation for the European Union. In the early '80s,
NATO promoted the consolidation of civilian-led democracy in Spain
and, thus, the full return of Spain to the European family. On
several occasions, NATO has helped keep the peace between Greece
and Turkey. More generally, throughout its existence, NATO's
unified command and its collective approach to defence have largely
eliminated military competition among West European powers.[300]
But NATO cannot rest on its laurels. The Secretary
of State for Defence, addressing the same conference, said that—
Organisations have two fundamental choices: they
can adapt, or they can die. A state of irrelevance for a security
organisation is no different than honest disbandment ... So, while
of course we must allow ourselves a time for celebration, we dare
not sit back for a second while the world continues to change
around us.[301]
173. The Washington Summit provides a forum in which
NATO must decide on the adaptations it needs to make to remain
a viable and useful alliance in the next century. In its new Strategic
Concept and its Washington Declaration, NATO will be expected
to set out its response to the challenges ahead. In this Report
we have asked a number of questions about NATO's future. This
concluding section will recapitulate our conclusions.
174. We asked what priorities NATO should accord
its new roles and missions as it formalises them in the new Strategic
Concept. Despite the increasing possibilities of NATO's involvement
in other types of operation, Article 5 must remain at the very
core of the Alliance. Despite forty years of antagonism between
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, Article 5 has never been
invoked. In these days of east-west rapprochement, we fervently
hope that it never will be. Nevertheless, it remains the case
that NATO's preparation for an Article 5-type threat remains the
best way of ensuring that such a threat never arises. The Alliance's
Article 5 mission of self-defence must remain its core, and its
first priority.
175. The new strategic environment does require that
NATO now do more than simply defend its own territory. We fully
expect NATO to rise to the new challenges. But the new Strategic
Concept must outline clearly NATO's image of itself and its capabilities.
It must also state what challenges NATO will not take on, and
how it expects to cooperate with other international organisations
to address questions to which it cannot provide the whole answer.
The new Strategic Concept must provide the reader with an explicit
picture of NATO's competence and priorities.
176. We asked how NATO's non-Article 5 operations
should be mandated, a subject upon which the new Strategic Concept
is expected to declare. Insistence on a UN Security Council mandate
for such operations would be unnecessary as well as covertly giving
Russia a veto over Alliance action (a concept explicitly rejected
in the NATO-Russia Founding Act). All 19 Allies act in accordance
with the principles of international law and we are secure in
our assertion that the necessity of unanimous agreement for any
action will ensure its legality.
177. We asked what the implications of an increased
European Security and Defence Identity would be. The development
of ESDI was both timely and positive, but we consider that Madeline
Albright's 'three ds'—no decoupling, no duplication and
no discrimination— are of paramount importance. The work
to create an enhanced European defence capability should not be
sidetracked by debates over the institutional relationship of
the WEU and the EU.
178. In our Report last year on NATO enlargement
we concluded that—
... the main mission of NATO in the post-Cold War
world is to seek to ensure peace in a world in which the risks
we face are more unpredictable than at any period from the early
stages of the Cold War to the fall of the Berlin Wall. We believe
the key to achieving this aim is support for the emerging democracies,
including Russia, and the projection of stability and democracy
eastwards.
We have not changed our minds in the intervening
period. While reaffirming our conclusions that NATO should approach
further enlargement with caution, we encourage greater cooperation
and communication between the Alliance and aspirant members. We
hope that the Washington Summit will set out a strategy for achieving
this that is more practical than rhetorical, and that the aspirant
states will seize all opportunities to develop their relationship
with NATO.
179. NATO, despite having experienced a diminution
in the importance of its primary purpose during the Cold War,
survived its identity crisis by putting increased emphasis on
the political dimensions of the Alliance. This process must be
judged a success, and invites optimism for its ability to meet
future challenges in this area. But the process must be balanced
against the need to retain NATO as an integrated military organisation,
capable of rapid and decisive action. NATO remains the only international
military organisation with an established and experienced command
system able to take action either on its own behalf or at the
behest of the UN or the OSCE, and this capability must not be
jeopardised. But, NATO must do more than simply cooperate with
aspirant members. Other states, including Russia and Ukraine,
may be ambivalent, or even hostile, towards some of NATO's future
directions. But it remains the case that their aspirations are
the same as those of the Alliance: peace and stability in the
Euro-Atlantic area. NATO must continue its dialogue with these
countries, encourage them in their progress and empathise with
their concerns. Much has already been done in this arena; more
must be attempted.
180. The Washington Summit will be held in the shadow
of the crisis in Kosovo. For the first time in its existence,
the North Atlantic Council has authorised military action against
an independent state. There could be no more dramatic illustration
of the way in which the world in which NATO is operating has changed,
as has NATO's role within it. The 'new missions' have shifted
irreversibly from the realm of rhetoric to that of reality. The
theological debate over NATO's 'mandate' has been overtaken by
events. The new members of the Alliance have been put to the test
within days of their accession. The capabilities of all the European
Allies will also be put to the proof. And the challenge of maintaining
cooperation with Russia has suddenly become an urgent and immediate
diplomatic necessity. Many see this operation as the greatest
test of NATO's credibility since the end of the Cold War. At the
time at which we agreed this report, the outcome remained uncertain.
But the Kosovo crisis should not be allowed to distract the Alliance
from the many important tasks which face the Washington Summit.
A new Strategic Concept needs to be agreed soon which explicitly
declares that Article 5 remains the core task of the Alliance;
which gives clear direction to Alliance force planners on the
types and priorities of new missions, including peace support
operations and non-proliferation efforts; which reasserts the
North Atlantic Council's undoubted right to direct NATO's operations
while making clear that the Alliance will continue to act in accordance
with international law; and which gives a clearer idea of the
strategic rationale which will underpin future operations for
the Alliance. The Summit must also lay the foundations for a strengthened
European defence and security capability, while reiterating the
strength of the transatlantic alliance; and it must set out a
timetable for the reform of the European Allies' armed forces.
Equally importantly, it must define strategies and set out practical
measures for continuing and reinforcing cooperation with Partners,
including Russia and Ukraine. While the Allies at the Washington
Summit should not announce any immediate further enlargement,
they must clearly set out the criteria for any new members to
join the Alliance, and set out a package of measures for candidates
for membership which will aid them, where appropriate, in attaining
those criteria. The Washington Summit is not a preparation for
war, however dangerous the international circumstances in which
it takes place. Its prime aim is not to devise means to make NATO
a more formidable fighting machine. The Allies must use the Summit
once more to reinforce the message to the world that NATO's purpose
is the export of peace and stability to all parts of the European-Atlantic
area.
300 Royal United Services Institute, 10 March 1999 Back
301 ibid Back
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