APPENDIX 3
The Berlin Declaration
Extract from the Final Communiqué
of the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council
Berlin 3 June1996
1. We met today in Berlin, the capital of a united
Germany and the city that stood for the success of Alliance policy
and transatlantic cohesion for over four decades. Its unification
is now a symbol of the new era of partnership and cooperation.
2. Here in Berlin, we have taken a major step forward
in shaping the new NATO, a NATO taking on new missions such as
IFOR. Today, we have taken decisions to carry further the ongoing
adaptation of Alliance structures so that the Alliance can more
effectively carry out the full range of its missions, based on
a strong transatlantic partnership; build a European Security
and Defence Identity within the Alliance; continue the process
of opening the Alliance to new members; and develop further strong
ties of cooperation with all Partner countries, including the
further enhancement of our strong relationship with Ukraine, and
the development of a strong, stable and enduring partnership
with Russia.
3. This new NATO has become an integral part of the
emerging, broadly based, cooperative European security structure.
We are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with many of our new
Partners and other countries, contributing through the Implementation
Force (IFOR) to bringing an end to war and conflict in that country
and assisting the building of peace in the region. This joint
endeavour, the largest military operation in the Alliance's history,
points the way to our future security cooperation throughout the
EuroAtlantic area.
4. We have today given new impetus to the process
of the Alliances adaptation and reform, which began in 1990 at
the NATO Summit meeting in London and was carried forward at the
1994 Brussels Summit. Taking into account the sweeping changes
in the security environment in Europe as new democracies have
taken root and following the adoption of our new Strategic Concept
in 1991, we have reorganised and streamlined our political and
military structures and procedures; reduced significantly our
force and readiness levels; and reconfigured our forces to make
them better able to carry out the new missions of crisis management,
while preserving the capability for collective defence. In addition,
we have been conducting an expanding array of outreach activities
with our Partners. We want to make our adapted Alliance better able to fulfil its main purpose: peace and security in the EuroAtlantic area.
5. Much has been achieved, but now is the moment
to take a decisive step forward in making the Alliance increasingly
flexible and effective to meet new challenges. Therefore we are
determined to:
adapt Alliance structures. An essential part of this
adaptation is to build a European Security and Defence Identity
within NATO, which will enable all European Allies to make a more
coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities
of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities;
to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the transatlantic
partnership;
develop further our ability to carry out new roles
and missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis management
and the Alliance's efforts against the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and their means of delivery, while maintaining
our capability for collective defence; and
enhance our contribution to security and stability
throughout the EuroAtlantic area by broadening and deepening
our dialogue and cooperation with Partners, notably through PfP
and NACC, and by further developing our important relations with
Russia and Ukraine, as we maintain our openness to new members
through our established enlargement process and strengthen our
links with other organisations which contribute to European security.
6. Today we welcome the progress achieved in the
internal adaptation of our Alliance, building on the decisions
taken at the 1994 Brussels Summit, in particular:
the completion of the CJTF concept. By permitting
a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including for
new missions, this concept will facilitate the mounting of NATO
contingency operations, the use of separable but not separate
military capabilities in operations led by the WEU, and the participation
of nations outside the Alliance in operations such as IFOR. We
now request the Military Committee to make recommendations to
the Council for the implementation of this concept to the satisfaction
of all Allies, taking into account ongoing work to adapt military
structures and procedures;
the establishment of the Policy Coordination Group
(PCG),which will meet the need, especially in NATO's new missions,
for closer coordination of political and military viewpoints;
the first results of the Military Committee's LongTerm
Study, which will result in recommendations for a military command
structure better suited to current and future EuroAtlantic
security. We task the Military Committee to continue its work
on the LongTerm Study, consistent with the decisions we
have taken today;
completion of original work plans of the Senior PoliticoMilitary
Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation
(DGP) to address the common security concern of proliferation;
the meeting later this month of the North Atlantic
Council (Defence Ministers), in which all 16 NATO countries will
take part.
7. In our adaptation efforts to improve the Alliance's
capability to fulfil its roles and missions, with the participation
of all Allies, we will be guided by three fundamental objectives.
The first objective is to ensure the Alliance's military
effectiveness so that it is able, in the changing security environment
facing Europe, to perform its traditional mission of collective
defence and through flexible and agreed procedures to undertake
new roles in changing circumstances, based on:
situation in Europe and enables all Allies to participate
fully and which is able to undertake all missions through procedures
to be defined in accordance with decisions by the Council;
HQ structures which are more deployable and forces
which are more mobile, both capable of being sustained for extended
periods;
the ability to provide for increased participation
of Partner countries and to integrate new members into the Alliance's
military structure;
the ability to mount NATO nonArticle 5 operations,
guided by the concept of one system capable of performing multiple
functions. We will further develop flexible arrangements capable
of undertaking a variety of missions and taking into account national
decisions on participation in each operation, building upon the
strength of NATO's existing arrangements. These operations may
differ from one another in contributions by Allies and, as a result
of Council decision on a casebycase basis, aspects
of military command and control. The CJTF concept is central to
our approach for assembling forces for contingency operations
and organising their command within the Alliance. Consistent with
the goal of building the European Security and Defence Identity
within NATO, these arrangements should permit all European Allies
to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures
and, as appropriate, in contingency operations undertaken by the
Alliance;
increased politicalmilitary cooperation in
particular through the PCG, and effective exercise of political
control by the North Atlantic Council through the Military Committee;
the need for costeffectiveness.
The second objective is to preserve the transatlantic
link, based on:
maintenance of the Alliance as the essential forum
for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement
on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of
Allies under the Washington Treaty;
further development of the strong partnership between
North American and European Allies, both politically and militarily,
and including a continued involvement of the North American Allies
across the command and force structure;
readiness to pursue common security objectives through
the Alliance, wherever possible;
full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis
management, including as necessary through joint consultations
on how to address contingencies.
The third objective is the development of the European
Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. Taking full
advantage of the approved CJTF concept, this identity will be
grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate
military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent
and effective forces capable of operating under the political
control and strategic direction of the WEU.
As an essential element of the development of this
identity, we will prepare, with the involvement of NATO and the
WEU, for WEUled operations (including planning and exercising
of command elements and forces). Such preparations within the
Alliance should take into account the participation, including
in European command arrangements, of all European Allies if they
were so to choose. It will be based on:
identification, within the Alliance, of the types
of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support
assets, as well as, in order to prepare for WEUled operations,
separable but not separate HQs, HQ elements and command positions,
that would be required to command and conduct WEUled operations
and which could be made available, subject to decision by the
NAC;
elaboration of appropriate multinational European
command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full
advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command
and conduct the WEUled operations. This implies doublehatting
appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to perform
these functions. Such European command arrangements should be
identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently well
articulated to permit the rapid constitution of a militarily coherent
and effective operational force.
Further, the Alliance will support the development
of the ESDI within NATO by conducting at the request of and in
coordination with the WEU, military planning and exercises for
illustrative WEU missions identified by the WEU. On the basis
of political guidance to be provided by the WEU Council and the
NAC, such planning would, at a minimum:
prepare relevant information on objectives, scope
and participation for illustrative WEU missions;
identify requirements for planning and exercising
of command elements and forces for illustrative WEUled operations;
develop appropriate plans for submission through
the MC and NAC to the WEU for review and approval.
NATO and the WEU should agree on arrangements
for implementing such plans. The NAC will approve the release
of NATO assets and capabilities for WEUled operations, keep
itself informed on their use through monitoring with the advice
of the NATO Military Authorities and through regular consultations
with the WEU Council, and keep their use under review.
8. On the basis of the guidelines agreed today,
we have tasked the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice
of NATO's Military Authorities:
to provide guidance and develop specific proposals
for further adapting the Alliance's structures and procedures;
to develop, with regard to the European Security
and Defence Identity within the Alliance, appropriate measures
and arrangements for implementing the provisions of paragraph
7.
Among the arrangements which require detailed elaboration
will be provisions for the identification and release for use
by the WEU of NATO capabilities, assets, and HQs and HQ elements
for missions to be performed by the WEU; any necessary supplement
to existing information sharing arrangements for the conduct
of WEU operations; and how consultations will be conducted with
the NAC on the use of NATO assets and capabilities, including
the NATO monitoring of the use of these assets;
and to report to our December meeting with recommendations
for decisions.
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20. We are satisfied with the growing ties between
NATO and the WEU, and are determined to broaden and deepen our
cooperation with the WEU, on the basis of the agreed principles
of complementarity and transparency. We welcome the conclusion
of a security agreement between our organisations, and the framework
it provides for the exchange of information critical to the pursuit
of our common security objectives. We hope that this will open
the way for more intensive cooperation. We are pleased that, in
response to our mandate to the Council in Permanent Session, additional
areas of focussed NATOWEU cooperation (joint meetings on
their respective Mediterranean dialogues and exchanges of information
in the field of relations with Russia and Ukraine) have been identified.
We will explore possibilities for enhanced cooperation in other
areas as well. We attach importance to our consultations, including
in joint NATOWEU Council meetings, on issues of common concern.
We welcome the resumption of meetings of the WEU Permanent Council
with SACEUR.
We continue to support the WEU in its efforts to
enhance the development of its operational capabilities and welcome
the decisions taken in this regard last month at the WEU Ministerial
Council in Birmingham.
21. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) has an essential role to play in European security
and stability. We reaffirm our commitment to support the OSCE's
comprehensive approach to security and the ongoing process of
developing a security model for the 21st Century. We value the
OSCE's effectiveness in the prevention, management and resolution
of conflicts and the work of the High Commissioner for National
Minorities. These are important contributions to regional stability
which we will continue to support and work to strengthen.
The OSCE is playing a vitally important role in Bosnia
and Herzegovina contributing to implementing civil aspects of
the Peace Agreement, particularly in supervising the preparation
and conduct of the first elections, in promoting and monitoring
human rights, and in overseeing implementation of confidence
and securitybuilding measures and negotiation of arms limitations.
These tasks are a major contribution to building a just and stable
peace in the region. IFOR is supporting the OSCE's tasks, and
in particular the preparation of the elections, by helping to
create a secure environment and promoting freedom of movement.
We are also pleased with the practical support that NATO has been
able to provide through its Verification Coordination Section
to the OSCE in helping establish measures to verify the arms control
elements of the Peace Agreement. We support the continued development
of such pragmatic cooperation between NATO and the OSCE.
We remain deeply concerned about developments in
Chechnya which have caused so much suffering and so many casualties.
We welcome the announcement of a ceasefire in Chechnya and look
forward to its full and effective implementation. We call for
continued meaningful negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement
of the dispute, using the continuing good offices of the OSCE.
We support the efforts of the Minsk Group to achieve a political
settlement of the conflict in and around NagornoKarabakh.
We welcome the established contacts between the North
Atlantic Council and the OSCE ChairmaninOffice. We
will continue our efforts to strengthen dialogue between NATO
and the OSCE on issues of common concern, including through senior
representation at Ministerial meetings and, on a more routine
basis, through the International Staff.
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